It is important that inter-state relations in Asia improve. A period of international collaboration is called for. Supra-national construction could be in prospect.

Recent history has not left the states of the region particularly well-adapted for this challenge. Nationalism frames popular and political discourse.

Élites seek modern identities that de-emphasise links with neighbouring cultures. Such psychological factors may limit the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy.

At the same time, cultural commonalities across the region are striking. They are overdue for revalidation. This stands to bring internal benefits for each culture as well as supporting better international relations.

Harmony is a key value. Western teleology favours conflict; a cyclical understanding of time produces less clear-cut contrasts between right and wrong.

Conflict has been rife across Asia, no doubt, and modern attitudes and behaviours are often conflictual. A bias in favour of harmony is still discernible in patterns of discussion and decision-making, in internal political arrangements and international dealings — and even in turbulent episodes of recent history.

That goes with an understanding of social and political order as deriving from personal, psychological orientations, values and practices. Buddhist Studies offer a key to this world-view, illuminating both its background in the history of ideas and its contemporary relevance.

CONTEXT

NATIONALISM & INTERNATIONALISM

There is growing contact and co-ordination between economies and societies in Asia. This needs to be recognised and deserves to be fostered; that much is clear to many among the relevant élites.

It is easier said than done, though. Inter-state relations are often poor to terrible. There is currently no stable balance of forces. Economic and political accommodation offers clear and attractive opportunities; every Asian country has an interest in their realisation; yet movement is painfully slow. Why?

Over some centuries, non-Asian forces have profoundly affected every Asian society. Each has had to renew itself. The overriding imperative has been national competitiveness. National distinctiveness is naturally to the fore. So, the internal political discourse of the various states does not favour international initiatives.

Europeans responded to a similar challenge with a programme of supra-national construction. Asia is not yet moving that way. Whence the contrast? European cultural commonalities are well established. A collective identity is entrenched in institutions like churches and universities. Asia lacks that advantage. Developments in the direction of Buddhist internationalism have potential to contribute here.

NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-ORDINATION

The need is apparent:

• In South East Asia there are manifold issues between the states of the region:
  • Collaboration is necessary to keep the Molucca (Maluku) straits safe.
  • The Aceh peace accord has a regional dimension.
  • Thailand and Malaysia must co-operate on southern Thailand.
  • There is the question of engagement or non-engagement in Burma. .
• Moving to East Asia, there are issues around:
  • China:
    • the Taiwan-China standoff
    • the Spratleys and Paracels, and Chinese-Vietnamese relations
    • maritime security in the South China Sea
    • the China/Japan relationship: a combination of major economic ties and very poor cultural and political relations is untenable
  • Korea:
  • In the North:
    • Is there to be a soft or a hard landing?
    • Who is it to be involved in managing it, how?
  • In the South:
    • How to slough off US tutelage (/troops)?
    • How to build on a mid-position between China and Japan?
  • Japan:
    • How will US- Japanese trade arrangements develop?
    • How can Japan assert a viable national identity vis-à-vis both the US and neighbouring countries?

CULTURAL-DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND

So the need is not just for international cooperation. It is for supranational construction. It is urgent: Taiwan-China and North Korea are obviously dangerous; long-term, China-Japan is the most threatening breakdown in communication.
Yet little or nothing seems to be moving. There is little discernible discourse in favour of greater mutual understanding, let alone closer ties.

ASEAN talks about Asian values. That is a gain: in East Asia, there is less talking, let alone about shared values. But ASEAN’s discourse starts with Lee Kuan-Yu and identifies Asian values in terms of patriarchy and authoritarian state structures.

PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

There are cultural commonalities between all the ASEAN countries and more widely among the countries of the Pacific Rim and indeed of Asia as a whole. This is a historical reality. There is a contemporary, practical side to it, too.

Among the political and commercial élites, many find they differ from western peers in basic ways of categorising reality and reacting to it. With Asian colleagues, such differences are less. On the business level, fellow Asians may appear more as competitors, so that mutually beneficial relations are harder to develop; still, in human terms they tend to be more understandable. So, there is a sense that it is important to identify and articulate what makes ‘our’ culture(s) distinct from a western norm. This sense is multi-faceted and not clearly defined.

A countervailing tendency is also discernible. Asians who operate internationally must adapt to western partners. That changes them. To motivate themselves, they need to approve of that change. It may then become integral to their identity. So, élite individuals may begin to reject implicit attitudes and unreflecting behaviours common in their own societies. They may come at times to associate with less favoured contemporaries much that seems distinctive of their cultures.

Thus internationally-minded Thais or Japanese, say, may be ambivalent about cultural commonalities across Asia. In theory, they may wish their culture (often specifically their Buddhism) to be better appreciated by other Asians; in practice that may have low priority. For, they may see themselves as belonging to the globalised culture of the developed world; more specifically, they may locate themselves within the comity of nations next to the western-advanced-industrial group, particularly America.

Accordingly, long-term intra-Asian trade-flows may seem of secondary importance, compared to trade with America. Likewise, to have Theravada or Zen better understood in Asia might be attractive, but to be understood by Americans may be more attractive. There may almost be an inclination to reinvent one’s identity to coincide with the (decontextualised) way it might be seen from a western perspective.

Over the long term, however, trade-flows in Asia are bound to be crucial for both countries. Moreover, a focus on presenting Theravada or Zen to Americans may not help to re-imagine it for modern circumstances, to breathe fresh life into it. Instead, it may open a gulf between élite and popular attitudes.