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List of Contributors

ERNEST B. BREWSTER is currently Visiting Assistant Professor at Rutgers University. He received his PhD from the Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations of Harvard University in 2018. His research interests include combining philology with a doctrinal-historical and philosophical approach to key ideological developments in early medieval Chinese Buddhism. Email: ernestbrewster@gmail.com

TRA-ILL DOWIE holds dual PhDs in Philosophy and Psychiatry, and founded the Ikon Institute, the largest provider of transpersonal psychology training in Australia. He currently works as an associate professor and research fellow. Tra-ill maintains an active passion for the study of philosophy, psychotherapy and trauma. Email: tra-ill.dowie@ikon.edu.au

ARUNA K. GAMAGE holds a PhD in the Study of Religions from SOAS, University of London. He is currently conducting research on the Theravāda Vinaya as an Alexander von Humboldt Postdoctoral Fellow at the Philipps University of Marburg. Email: arunak.gamage@yahoo.com

STEFAN KARPIK is an independent researcher working on Pali literature and language. He lives in Totnes, UK. Email: stefankarpik@hotmail.com

BRYAN G. LEVMAN studies the languages of early Buddhism, the languages that the Buddha and his early disciples spoke and the oral transmission of the teachings. Levman holds a PhD from the University of Toronto and is currently a Visiting Scholar at the University of Toronto's Department for the Study of Religion. Email: bryan.levman@utoronto.ca

PETER D. MASEFIELD (1943–2020) was a former lecturer at the University of Sydney and Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University in Bangkok (Thailand), and a translator of a number of Pali commentaries for the Pali Text Society. His monograph Divine Revelation in Pali Buddhism (1986) was a pioneering book within the study of early Buddhism.

ALEIX RUIZ-FALQUÉS holds a PhD in Indian Studies from the University of Cambridge. He is currently the Head of the Department of Pali and Languages at the Shan State Buddhist University, Taunggyi (Myanmar) and Khyentse Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Buddhist Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Email: arfalques@cantab.net

JULIEN TEMPONE-WILTSHIRE is a senior lecturer based in Melbourne. He has published works at the intersection of Buddhist philosophy, cognitive science, and psychological practice. His current research concerns the intersection of western psychology with Indigenous and Eastern contemplative traditions. Email: julien.tempone-wiltshire@acap.edu.au

Guidelines for Contributors

The *Journal of the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies* (JOCBS) is now inviting submissions for Volume 24 of the journal to be issued in November 2024.

The JOCBS is a peer-review and online journal, found at: http://jocbs.org/index.php/jocbs.

The JOCBS accepts articles, notes, review articles and book reviews in any area of Buddhist studies. The editorial board especially encourages submissions pertaining to Pali and Southeast Asian Buddhism on a broad range of disciplinary interests.

To submit your article, please write to chief editor, Dr Aleix Ruiz-Falqués: arfalques@cantab.net.

We ask that articles be submitted according to the guidelines stipulated below:

- Articles should be between 3,000 (minimum) and 15,000 words (maximum).

- Please submit your articles (written in English) in MS-Word (*.doc, *.docx).

- Because this journal is an online publication, authors may include hyperlinks, images, videos, graphics, and so forth, as necessary and without limitation (with proper captions and credit lines).

- Abstracts in English should accompany all article submissions and consist of fewer than 200 words. Please also provide a list of 3 to 7 keywords for articles.

- Please follow the *New Oxford Style Manual* (*New Hart's Rule*) or similar volumes readily available online. British spelling and style preferred.

- We use a mixture of in-text citation following the author/date system (e.g., Gombrich 1978: 78–80) and footnotes, usually reserved for longer citations or additional information that would disrupt the flow of the main text.

- All references should be listed at the end of the articles. See the following examples for clarification:

Bechert, Heinz (1988). Preface. In F. Bizot, *Les traditions de la* pabbajjā *en Asie du Sud-Est. Recherches sur le bouddhisme khmer IV*. Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Rupert, pp. 9–12.

Bernon, Olivier de (2000). *Le manuel des maîtres de kammaṭṭhān. Étude et présentation des rituels de méditation dans la tradition du bouddhisme khmer*. PhD Dissertation. Institut national des langues orientales, Paris.

Bizot, François (1976). *Le figuier à cinq branches*. Paris: École française d'Extrême-Orient.

—— (1980). La grotte de la naissance. Recherches sur le bouddhisme khmer II. *Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient* 67: 232–273.

Cousins, Lance S. (1997). Aspects of Southern Esoteric Buddhism. In P. Connolly & S. Hamilton, eds., *Indian Insights: Buddhism, Brahmanism and Bhakti. Papers from the Annual Spalding Symposium on Indian Religions.* London: Luzac Oriental, pp. 185–207.

Li Rongxi, trans. (2000). *Buddhist Monastic Traditions of Southern Asia: A Record of the Inner Law Sent Home from the South Seas by Śramaṇa Yijing.* Berkeley, CA: Numata Centre for Buddhist Translation and Research.

Phra Thep Nyanawisit (พระเทพญาณวิศิษฏ์) (2558 BE/2015 CE). ตำราพระ กัมมัฏฐานโบราณ *Tamra Phra Kammatthan Boran* [*Treatise on Traditional Meditation*]. Nakhon Pathom: Mahamakut University.

Revire, Nicolas & Stephen A. Murphy, eds. (2014). *Before Siam: Essays in Art and Archaeology*. Bangkok: River Books & The Siam Society.

Ruiz-Falqués, Aleix (2017). The Role of Pāli Grammar in Burmese Buddhism. *Journal of Burma Studies* 21(1): 1–96.

Skilling, Peter. 1997a. The Advent of Theravāda Buddhism to Mainland South-East Asia. *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 20(1): 93–107.

——. 1997b. New Pali Inscriptions from Southeast Asia. *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 23: 123–157.

Wynne, Alexander (2007). *The Origin of Buddhist Meditation.* London: Routledge.

- References to Pali texts are made to Pali Text Society publications for the most part, in which case publication details are not included in the list of references. All Pali references have been assigned abbreviations by the *Critical Pali Dictionary*, which is recognised and adopted internationally. See: https://cpd.uni-koeln.de/intro/vol1_epileg_abbrev_texts.

- Diacritical marks should be used accordingly for foreign and Indic words, in italics, except in the following cases: Bodhisattva/Bodhisatta, Buddha, Dharma/Dhamma, karma/kamma, nirvana/nibbana, stupa/thupa, yoga, and other Sanskrit and Pali words that have passed into common English usage.

- If you are not a native speaker of English, please have your article proofread by a scholar who is a native speaker before submission.

All non-solicited articles will undergo a thorough review and evaluation by at least two members of the editorial board or other academic peers in the field, with readers' comments made available upon completion of the review for potential revisions.

The decision to accept or reject the articles for publication is made by the editorial board and is final.

Submissions will be accepted until June 1, 2024, to be given full consideration for the next issue.

EDITORIAL
The Buddha's Language Saga Continues

Aleix Ruiz-Falqués

After a year that has been particularly challenging, the *JOCBS* is back with a fresh batch of articles. In this issue, five of the six pieces deal with Pali language in some way or another. Specifically, two authors, **Levman** and **Karpik**, bring up new contributions to the old and fascinating saga on the language of the Buddha: "Did the Buddha speak Pali or an eastern dialect that is virtually lost in the textual record?" Both authors have written on this topic before, even in this very journal (Vols. 16 and 17). The reader is therefore kindly advised to refer to previous publications if he or she wishes to better understand the context of this scholarly debate, one that goes back to early scholarship on Pali in Europe. In the first published Pali grammar written in English—Benjamin Clough's *Compendious Pali Grammar* (Colombo, 1824)—we read:

> It has been a contested point whether the Pali of Sansgrit [sic] be the more ancient language of India; it is certain, that Pali was the popular dialect of the native country of Buddho, namely Magadha, before the powerful sect founded by him, was expelled from the continent of India, an event prior to the Christ Æra. (Clough 1824: iii)

This summarises the traditional understanding according to which the Buddha spoke *māgadhī*, the language of Magadha. Now the problem is what exactly *māgadhī* refers to, what is the language behind this label. Surely, we call any form of English "English", whether it is from the 16th century, the 19th, or 21st; whether it is from "Los Angeles" or "Dakota", "Tasmania" or "Hawai'i" (note that all these proper nouns, despite non-English origin, would also be

considered in the English lexicon). We know that English is not French despite the fact that an erudite scholar could postulate an original French redaction of classical English works, consider this fragment from Chaucer's *The Knight's Tale* (lines 859–862):

> *Whilom, as olde stories tellen us,*
> *Ther was a duc that highte Theseus;*
> *Of Atthenes he was lord and governour,*
> *And in his tyme swich a conquerour* [1]

Indeed, the words *stories, duc, Atthenes, governour* and *conquerour* are most probably Gallicisms—they are from French. But all languages have borrowed words. Similarly, Burmese, Sinhalese and Thai use very many Sanskrit and Pali words, especially in literary texts. To some extent, then, we know that a certain text in a certain language may present words that are borrowed from another language, but that does not mean this text is a translation. This is quite obvious.

The problem is that the debate around Pali is not so simple, because we enter the realm of closely related dialects rather than clearly distinct languages. In the case of Pali (or any other early Buddhist texts in Indic languages, such as Gandhari and Buddhist Sanskrit), the issues at stake are, on the one hand, the fact that the *māgadhī* described by grammarians does not correlate to our Pali, and on the other hand that our Pali is more similar to epigraphic texts from western India, rather than texts from eastern India, closer to Magadha. There is ample consensus, then, that whatever *māgadhī* means in Pali commentaries and grammatical texts, this is not the *māgadhī* that we know from other sources. It could simply be a symbolic name for the language that we, conventionally, call Pali. It could be a plain misnomer too. Expanding on a line of thought that, to my knowledge, was first propounded by R. O. Franke in his pioneering (and mostly forgotten) essay *Pali und Sanskrit* (1902), Stefan Karpik shows that the premise for the previous argument, namely that Pali corresponds to "western" dialects, is false. We possess a large corpus of inscriptions in a sort of Middle Indic *koiné* that Franke called "*gesamtes Pali*" ("common Pali"), as opposed to the literary Pali of the Buddhist canon in Sri Lanka. These inscriptions are not from the west and they are not necessarily

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[1] https://chaucer.fas.harvard.edu/pages/knights-tale-0

Buddhist. It is true that they may have a later date than the date given to the composition of the earliest Pali texts. But it is quite plausible, as Karpik posits, that these two linguistic mediums of expression, similar as they are, correspond to different stages of the same language. This language is not the *māgadhī* from the kingdom of Magadha, but perhaps a dialect originally from central and western India (from Kosala westwards up to Avanti).

Now Levman's argument works in quite a different direction, taking as a point of departure the famous work by Heinrich Lüders, *Beobachtungen über die Sprache des buddhistischen Urkanons* (Berlin, 1954), published posthumously under the editorship of E. Waldschmidt. In short, the thesis here is that the Pali texts that we have are not the "original canon" ("*Ur-Kanon*"), but a sort of recast into a western Middle Indic dialect. It is my opinion that Levman's important research, which includes groundbreaking work on non-Indo-Aryan onomastica, is partly compatible with the Franke/Karpik claim. But the gist of Levman's article is precisely in those parts of the argument that are not aligned with Karpik's. This includes a detailed description, with examples, of how certain words present problematic forms that can be explained and understood only as backformations, that is to say, a sort of translation—sometimes "wrong" translations—from an earlier dialect that was not always properly understood. This is a point that Karpik does not address, but perhaps, if the saga continues, he will in a future issue of the journal.

Other articles in this issue represent the noble efforts in exploring the rich treasures of medieval Pali literature, whether it is by editing and translating lesser known texts, as the new installment of the late **Peter Masefield**'s work on medieval Pali narratives; or by exposing the importance of literary analysis in the language of the commentarial texts, which, as **Gamage** shows us, abound in hermeneutical discussions that ultimately determine the correct understanding of a word or a line, and constitute an indispensable aid to grammar. In line with these articles, **Brewster's** contribution sheds light on classical controversies in the Madhyamaka school. Brewster's analysis offers us a key to contextualise and better understand philosophical debates on Emptiness. Finally, a more contemporary and practice-oriented contribution, the one by **Tempone-Wiltshire** and **Dowie**, explores the always complicated relationship between mindfulness and contemporary science. This is a subject that is often treated from a purely theoretical standpoint, but here we have an instance of a more practical approach based on the experience of psychological practice.

I would like to conclude this editorial by stating that I'm pleased to have been able to accept the editorial role and to assist in steering a course towards a positive future for the journal. I am very grateful to the editorial team, including the former editor Alexander Wynne, who have worked especially hard to bring this volume to publication. This year we have chosen not to publish any reviews, but look forward to doing so in future volumes. Information about submissions, with new revised guidelines, will be available from the website as of 2024.

Descent with Variation

Bryan G. Levman

ABSTRACT—The Pāli canon contains thousands of different variants in the different recensions that have come down to us, principally Burmese, Sinhalese and Thai. Descent with variation, that is, diachronic change of a language over time from a common source, is one of the basic reasons why this happens, along with synchronic (dialect) variation, transmission errors, indigenous bilingual speakers constrained by a foreign phonological system, etc., to name only a few of the causes of linguistic change. Pāli also contains a lot of Sanskritizations where the words are "restored" to their Old Indic form, which results in different interpretations of the words' meanings depending on context and the tradents' expertise. This paper discusses sixteen different examples of these restorations from the early canon and in most cases demonstrates what the earlier transmission must have been in order to account for the variation. This reconstruction process is the same historical linguistic technique which led to the discovery of the Indo-European language family by William Jones in the late eighteenth century.

Introduction

Descent with variation is a basic principle of life on earth. Life changes over time, evolves and gives rise to new forms with shared features from a common ancestor. This is not only how species originate, as Darwin observed in his 1859 monograph, *Origin of the Species*, but how all life forms evolve, including language. It was the observation of this principle—the shared features amongst language groups, Sanskrit, Greek and Latin—which led William Jones to the discovery of the Indo-European language family and the beginning of the science of comparative philology, which studies language variation over time as it evolves from a common source (Allen 2002: 62–63).

The Indo-Aryan language family—which itself evolved from the Indo-Iranian language group—is the easternmost branch of the Indo-European language family and continued the same process of development, from Old Indic (Vedic and Sanskrit) to Middle Indic (Pāli and the Prakrits) to New Indic (Hindi and the other languages of modern India). Pāli has been called "Old Middle Indic" both because it is the earliest of the Middle Indic forms—its lineage goes back to the time of the Buddha and earlier—and because most of its linguistic forms are foreshadowed in the Veda itself, which contains not only Prakritic elements but attempts to purify the Prakritic element by translating them back into Sanskrit from Prakrit. Vedic was the "language of the gods" and its phonetics was not to be muddied with the language of the *vulgus* (Bloomfield and Edgerton 1932: 20).

The earliest record we have of Middle Indic is the Asokan edicts and they show a fairly advanced evolution of the Prakritic element of the language (Levman 2016: §6). One may reasonably assume that the language in north India at the time of the Buddha, a century to a century and a half earlier, showed similar phonetic development, in terms of such common features as lenition and loss of intervocalic stops, replacement of aspirate stops by aspirates only, conflation of sibilants into one sound, interchange of labial consonants, etc. (Levman 2016, 2109); plus there is reason to believe that the Asokan inscriptions were more conservative than the colloquial languages of the day, which were more advanced phonologically (Lüders 1954: 9). We may reasonably expect, as Norman has intuited (1983: 4–5), that the language of the Buddha or his disciples used a similar phonological form as the other MI Prakrits preserved in the Asokan edicts, and that the "backwards" changes of intervocalic glides to stops or aspirates to aspirate stops, which regularly occurs in Pāli, are back-formations. This process is operant, as noted above, even within the Vedas themselves.

There are thousands of variants in the Pāli canon. Mark Allon has recently written a very informative and valuable monograph on the origin of some of them (2021). The picture is indeed very complex and includes several factors: 1) the many different dialects prevalent in India at the time of the Buddha 2) natural language change over time 3) linguistic diffusion (dialect variation) 4) Sanskritization 5) the influence of non-IA (Indo-Aryan) languages due to bilingualism and foreign word borrowing 6) oral transmission errors 7) conflicting commentarial data 8) written transmission errors 9) harmonization and standardization of the canon by the grammarians. In this article I am primarily interested in demonstrating the process of descent with variation and restoration, which has been variously called an "Übersetzung" ("translation") of an "Ur-kanon" with various "falsche Pālisierungen" ("false Pāli-izations" or "Hyperpālismen"; Lüders 1954: §122–48), "back-formation" (Norman 1983: 4–5), "Sanskritization" (Norman 1997/2012: 95–112), "backward transition" (von Hinüber 1996: 190 or διασκευαστής (diaskeuastés, "revision" von Hinüber 1982: 138), restoration or editings.[1] Reversing this process of linguistic evolution reveals what Lévi (1912) has termed a "langue précanonique du Bouddhisme", a dialect which has disappeared (which I have elsewhere called a "koiné" or common language of trade in use at the time of the Buddha and earlier), which by the time of the Buddha had attained an advanced level of phonetic erosion;[2]

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[1] Although many of these Sanskritizations are "fortitions" (strengthening of voiced consonants to unvoiced consonants or of a -ẏ- glide to a consonant), this term should not be used to describe this backwards process. Fortitions are a natural process, while restorations ar a deliberate attempt to interfere with the natural process of lenition. In Levman 2019: 89, I use the word "fortition" to describe the change of g- > k- in the word kañjiya which is clearly a natural language change as the other five exemplars all maintain the initial g- consonant; the tradent either spoke in a dialect which tended to devoice initial velars, and/or he/she was a bilingual Dravidian speaker where all initial velars were automatically voiceless. In Levman 2021: 288 I discuss the Pāli word roga ("illness"), which appears to be a back-formation from the Prakrit roẏa (attested in AMg), and which has an alternate form (Pāli paloka, "decay, illness") which has undergone fortition in the change of -g- > -k-. The occurrence of voiced and unvoiced intervocalic velars in parallel words suggests that this is also a "natural language change" (i.e. a fortition), although, because of the ambiguity, "strengthening" might be a better choice of words.

[2] Lévi gives many examples in his 1912 paper. One that he felt was "absolutely decisive" (absolument décisif) to demonstrate an earlier phonological layer underneath Pāli is the word avādesi ("he played (the lute") in Jātaka 62, while the Bharhut stūpa preserves the form avāyesi (Lévi 1912: 497; Cunningham 1879: p. 65f, plate 26). avāyesi > avādesi. The date of the Bharhut Jātakas (third century BCE, 250–200 BCE per Cunningham ibid: 14–17; "not later than 200 BCE" per Waldschmidt

Ardha-Māgdhī, the language of the Jains, continued this process of lenition while Pāli reacted in the exact opposite fashion, moving closer to the Sanskrit norm.[3] Norman asks the question as to whether the Sanskritic elements in Pāli are retentions or restorations and concludes that:

> ...[T]hese forms [*attaja*, "born from oneself"; *brūheti*, "grows"; absolutives in *-tvā*; and *br-* in *brāhmaṇa*] and probably all other Sanskritic features, are deliberate attempts at Sanskritisation, made at some time during the course of the transmission of the canon. It is therefore clear that it is not correct to speak of them as retentions. They are features which have been restored to the texts by scribes or reciters who were trying to change into Sanskrit the language which they had received in their exemplars. (1997/2012: 98)[4]

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and Mehendale in Lüders 1963: xxx) is "much more ancient than the Pāli version of Ceylon" (Cunningham, ibid: 49), the earliest written recension of which dates to the first century BCE (Norman 1983: 5). The Pāli word *avādesi* is therefore a back-formation or Sanskritization of *avāyesi*.

[3] It is worth quoting Lévi's conclusions to this important article for the reader who doesn't have access to it (1912: 511–12): "Sanscrit et pali n'apparaissent plus que comme les héritiers tardifs d'une tradition antérieure, récitée ou rédigée dans un dialecte disparu, qui avait atteint déjà un stage avancé d'usure phonétique. Ici encore, la concurrence du Jainisme et du Bouddhisme apporte à la critique un instrument de contrôle. Né à la même époque que le bouddhisme et sur le même domaine, le jainisme a dû comme le bouddhisme employer d'abord un des parlers du pays de Magadha ou les consonnes subissaient une poussée de dégradation. Quand il s'est mis plus tard à rédiger ses textes sacrés, il a, pour ainsi dire, nivelé en bas la « demi-māgadhī » (adhamāgadhī) qu'il adoptait comme langue sacrée ; il a affaibli les consonnes intervocalique au point de les réduire à un phonème à peine articulé, la *ya-śruti*. Le bouddhisme a réagi dans un sens diamétralement opposé ; sans doute sous l'influence des éléments occidentaux qui avaient acquis la prépondérance dans l'Église, il s'est rapproché de la norme sanscrite." Translation: "Sanskrit and Pāli only appear as the late heirs of an earlier tradition, recited or written in a vanished dialect, which had already reached an advanced stage of phonetic erosion. Here again, the competition of Jainism and Buddhism provides the critic with an instrument of control. Born at the same time as Buddhism and in the same area, Jainism, like Buddhism, had to first use one of the dialects of the country of Magadha where the consonants were undergoing a significant amount of weakening. When Jainism later set about writing its sacred texts, it, so to speak, wore away the "half-māgadhī" (*ardhamāgadhī*) which it adopted as a sacred language; it weakened the intervocalic consonants to the point of reducing them to a barely articulated phonème, the *ya-śruti*. Buddhism reacted in a diametrically opposite direction; no doubt under the influence of Western elements which had acquired preponderance in the Church, it approached the Sanskrit norm."

[4] Or, more likely (as A. Wynne suggested to me in an email) the Buddhist tradents were adopting "a veneer of Sanskrit" perhaps to give the teachings more acceptability among the Brahmanical elite. Obviously they could have changed the teachings completely into Sanskrit

Given the evidence it is difficult if not impossible to argue that all variations in Pāli are the result of natural dialect variation or errors in oral and manuscript transmission; certainly these are important factors, especially the former where the whole theory of India as a "Linguistic Area" is based on bilingual Dravidian speakers in effect acting as a dialectal influence on IA languages, but it is a theory difficult, if not impossible to quantify or prove, as its opponents have noted (see Levman 2023: 66–67 for discussion); dialect variation and transmission errors are just two of many factors. Such an argument is an extreme view and unscientific, in that it reduces the whole field of historical phonology, descent with variation, to random and/or unquantifiable factors. Diachronic change over time or descent of cognate words from a common ancestor is also fully consonant with the Buddha's teaching of *anicca* and dependent co-arising. Everything changes, including language, but it changes according to certain identifiable causes and conditions. If that were not the case, then the whole Buddhist philosophy of liberation would be in vain.[5] The purpose of this paper is to illustrate this process, by comparing cognate groups in parallel passages and tracing them back to a common, shared source, either attested or not, but which must exist to account for the variation that is found.

The Pāli Canon and Sanskritization

The canon began to take its present shape by the mid-third century BCE or earlier and was completely closed by the first century BCE with the exception of minor emendations and harmonizations (Norman 2002: 140; Wynne 2005: 65–66). Anālayo (2012: 246) notes that the canon was "fairly closed" by the first century BCE and argues, along with Rhys Davids (1911: 174), Geiger (1916: 7) and

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if they wished, and indeed, that was later the case. See discussion in Salomon (1998: 83–86) and Pollock (2006: 56–59).

  [5] The doctrine of fortuitous origination (*adhiccasamuppannavāda*) is one of the sixty-two wrong views. See DN 1, 28[20] = views 17 and 18 of the *Brahmajālasutta*. See also the *Saṃyutta Nikāya Nidāna-Saṃyutta*, *Dasabala-vaggo*, *Aññatitthiyā* ("those who belong to another sect"), where suffering created by oneself and others are two extremes, the first a view of eternalism, the second a view of annihilationism; the third view is that suffering is created both by oneself and another (partial-eternalism) and the fourth that suffering arises fortuitously (Bodhi 2000: 737, n. 37; text on p. 556–57).The correct teaching is that suffering is dependently arisen, through the causes and conditions of the twelve *nidānas* or links on the chain of *paṭicca-samuppāda*. Maintaining that all variation in Pāli is the result of dialect variation or transmissional mistakes is either equivalent to view two (caused by others) or view four (fortuitous or random origination). Fortuitous = "happening by accident or by chance".

Pande (957: 16) that the absence of the mention of King Asoka in the canon points to its completion prior to his reign, that is, the mid-third century BCE (p. 243). Von Hinüber (2006: 202) makes a similar observation with regard to the lack of mention of Pāṭaliputra in the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* as the capital of the Maurya empire, suggesting that the text is likely pre-Mauryan. Epigraphical confirmation that a canon existed in Asokan and probably pre-Asokan times is provided by the Asokan Bhabra Edict, which mentions several canonical works by name and by near-coeval epigraphical evidence at the Sanchi and Bharhut *stūpas* where the terms *dhamma-kathika* ("preacher of the Dhamma"), *peṭakin* ("one who knows the *piṭaka*"), *suttantika/suttantakinī* ("a man/woman who knows a *suttanta* by heart") and *pañca-nekāyika* ("one who knows the five *nikāyas* by heart") are inscribed (Bühler 1894: 92; Rhys Davids 1911: 167–68). In the mid-third century Asoka's son Mahinda brought the commentaries (and undoubtedly an early version of the canon) to Sri Lanka where the commentaries were translated into Sinhalese.

According to Norman, Sanskritization of Pāli began as early as the third century BCE and is evident in the Asokan edict at Girnār where Norman attributes the use of conjunct consonants to insertions by a "Sanskritising scribe" (Norman 1997/2012: 97). By the first century BCE when the canon was written down, Sanskritization was likely fixed along with the canon itself (Norman 1983:5). Edgerton dates the earliest Sanskritization to the second century BCE (1953/1998: xxv, §1.35, p. 5, n. 13), citing the oldest parts of the *Mahāvastu* as an example. The earliest version of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* (Lotus) *Sūtra* was composed in a Prakrit or Sanskritized Prakrit in the first century BCE (Levman 2018: 142); all the mss that have survived since then have been heavily Sanskritized. Certainly by the turn of the common era fully Sanskritized works were being composed; Mäll, for example, considers the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* to be the earliest of this "perfection of wisdom" genre of works and dates it to the first century BCE (2005: 96); the earliest mss evidence we have for this genre is written in Gāndhāri, a Prakrit, dated to the first century CE (Falk and Karashima 2012, 2013), but probably much earlier in origin and perhaps one of the sources of the later Sanskrit works.[6] Others (Salomon 1998: 82; Cousins 2013: 124) date the start of Sanskritization to the early centuries CE, based on epigraphical evidence

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[6] See also Falk 2015 for a new Gāndhārī version of the *Dharmapada*, also from the Split Collection and also dated to the first century CE. Levman 2020 compares this text with the Khotan *Dharmapada* and the parallel Pāli and Prakrit recensions, showing numerous examples of Sanskritization from an underlying *koiné* in all the different transmissions.

(the so-called "Epigraphical Hybrid Sanskrit"); this generalization does not take into account the evolution of the oral and literary traditions, and at the same time Salomon acknowledges (1998: 84) that "hybrid Sanskrit arose in the course of a gradual Sanskritizing movement which had its origins in the late centuries B.C." and that "early tendencies toward Sanskritization, in the form of sporadic semi-Sanskritized orthography, appear in some Prakrit inscriptions of the pre-Christian era." Here he is probably referring to the Mathurā inscriptions which Waldschmidt and Mehendale (in Lüders 1963: xxiii) date to the early first century BCE and which show definite signs of Sanskritization (Norman 1983: 5).

There is apparently a lot of uncertainty about the timescale of Sanskritization. Norman himself seems contradictory on the subject. In his 1985 monograph he states, "It seems probable that the Sanskritisation of Pali was virtually fixed at the stage it had reached by the time of the commission to writing..." (in the first century BCE, p. 5), and he dates the first beginnings of Sanskritization to the time of Asoka (1985: 5; 1997/2012: 96–97), well before the canon reached Sri Lanka. Yet in the same work (p. 75) he states that "the greater part of the Sanskritisms were introduced in Sri Lanka" and that the start of Sanskritization was "not before the second century BCE." Another tentative timescale for Sanskritization is outlined in Levman (2020: 142–43). Sanskritization was a gradual process that happened over several centuries, so the timescale cannot be fixed with any exactitude. None of this, however, affects the overall validity or cogency of the argument outlined here, that is, descent with variation and restoration: descent from a common OI source to a Prakrit form and Sanskritization of the Prakrit through partial restoration of Sanskrit phonology and/or morphology (Norman 1997/2012: 97). This holds true regardless of when it happened, whether in the oral tradition before the writing down of the canon in the first century BCE, or afterwards, where Sanskritization would be included in the general rubric of "minor emendations and harmonizations" mentioned above.

Why Sanskritization? Sanskrit was the prestige language of religion, and, although it is clear that the Buddha specifically forbade his works to be composed in Sanskrit (Levman 2008/2009), his later followers were either unaware of, or ignored this injunction. As is well known, many of Buddhism's initial converts were highly learned Brahmans who naturally would have favoured the language of the gods and Vedas for a teaching which they believed encapsulated the ultimate truth. The use of Sanskrit increased its acceptance among their fellow

co-religionists. Another important factor was the large number of dialects in India at the time, not necessarily mutually intelligible, especially among those converts from the indigenous tribes who spoke MI as a second language. Regardless of what Prakrit they spoke, all who were educated would have learned the same Sanskrit from the grammar books; it is no surprise then that the oldest Sanskrit *Prajñāpāramitā* work (the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā*) was apparently composed in Andhra, a Dravidian speaking area (Marasinghe 2003: 446). Sanskrit was a universal pan-Indic language, standardized from at least the time of Pāṇini, who is believed to have lived at approximately the same time as the Buddha. Sanskrit was a common denominator among diverse Indo-Aryan and Dravidian linguistic groups and increased the prestige of the speaker and content. Prakrit vernaculars were looked down upon by the "puritanical" brahmanical upper class of Indian society (Deshpande 1979: 7–21). For a generalized discussion of the various views on the origin of Sanskritization see Salomon 1998: 83–86.

Interpretation Problems

Descent with variation, which in the evolution of OI > MI often meant simplification, produced many homonymic forms, because of the assimilation of conjunct consonants and the weakening or elimination of intervocalic stops and aspirated stops. A word like Pāli *satta* could refer back to several OI words (*sapta*, "seven"; *śākta*, "power"; *sakta*, "devoted"; *satya* "truth"; *satvan* "warrior, hero"; etc. Levman 2009: 28), and when an intervocalic or aspirated stop was removed an element of ambiguity was added; the word *virayo*, where a *-ẏ-* glide has been substituted for an intervocalic stop could mean *virato*, "ceased" or *virajo*, "stainless" (Norman 1980: §3.2); *pahāna*, where the aspirated stop has changed to an aspirate (*-h-*) only, could mean abandoning (Pāli, *pahāna*) or *padhāna* "striving, exerting" (Levman 2012: 60). Usually the context made this clear, but not always. Some MI words are so malleable that we really don't know their exact meaning, such as *bodhisatta* (Levman 2009: 28; Norman 1997/2012: 104–05). This malleability led to what Norman called "hyperforms": forms (1989: 375) which "are unlikely to have had a genuine existence in any dialect, but which arose as a result of bad or misunderstood translation techniques." Much of this theory has already been discussed in Norman and von Hinüber's work above cited, and in Levman (2014, 2016, 2019, 2020 and 2021: 275–309). What follows are some new examples illustrating this fundamental process of variation in the Pāli canon, which accounts for scores, perhaps hundreds of variants: descent with variation and back-formation.

1. Theragāthā 19, Dhammapada 80

*udakaṃ hi **nayanti nettikā**, usukārā namayanti tejanaṃ.*
dāruṃ namayanti tacchakā, attānaṃ damayanti subbatā ti.[7]

"Truly canal-makers lead water, arrow-makers bend the bow,
carpenters bend wood, men of good vows tame the self."
(Norman 1969/1995: 3)

The Sanskritized version of this verse in the *Udānavarga* 17.10 reads
udakena nijanti nejakā ("washer-persons purify with water"),[8] which is quite
different from the Pāli ("canal-makers lead water" or "conduits lead water").
These variations point to an underlying form where the intervocalic stop
was represented by a *-ẏ-* glide (a common simplification in the *koiné*; hiatus
glide or Hiattilger per von Hinüber 2001: §171; Pischel §187, *laghuprayatnatara
yakāra*, "lightly articulated *ya*"). The Pāli version kept the *-y-* form, *nayanti*, but
the Sanskrit changed it to *-j-* resulting in *nijanti* ("they wash, purify"), with the
-a- changed to *-i-* because of the stress on the second syllable, *nijánti*; Pischel
§101). The subject must also have been transmitted with a *-ẏ-* glide (*néẏakā*)
which Pāli took as *nettikā* ("conduits" or "canal-makers", doubling the *-tt-*, and
changing the *-a- > -i-* because of the stress on the first syllable) and *Udānavarga*
took as *nejakā* ("washer-persons"). See Norman 1969/95 p. 125 who speaks of
"a dialect where *-y-* and *-j-* both became *-y-*" (that is, a *koiné*).

- Underlying transmission *udakaṃ naẏánti* (or *niẏánti*) *néẏakā*.

- Note also the alternation of *namayanti* and *damayanti*.

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[7] PTS editions are used, unless otherwise noted. The word *namayanti* has a Burmese variant
damayanti (both occurrences) in the *Theragāthā* edition. Se = Thai Syāmaraṭṭha edition, Ce =
Buddha Jayanti edition, Be = Burmese Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition.

[8] The word *nijanti* is present in the mss, but *nejakā* is a reconstruction based on the Tibetan
mss (*btso blag mkhan dag chus* "washer person cleans with water"). See text comparison at
https://www2.hf.uio.no/polyglotta/index.php?page=fulltext&vid=71&view=fulltext&cid=1108
80&level=2#N1024cn11. The Chinese is different again, showing the ambiguity of the underlying
transmission: 水工調舟船: "The sailors control their boats." Here *neyakā* has apparently been
interpreted as *nāvikā* ("sailors"), but where the word for "boats" (Chinese 舟 and 船 both mean
"boat"; Pāli *nāvā*) has come from is not clear. The Chinese word 調 ("controls") presumably
translates *nayanti* ("they lead, direct"). There is no Gāndhārī version of this verse.

2. Māradhītusuttaṃ, SN 1, 127

acchejja taṇhaṃ gaṇasaṅghacārī,
*addhā **carissanti** bahū ca **sattā**.*

"He has cut off craving, faring with his group and order;
Surely many other beings will cross." (Bodhi 2000: 219)

- PTS, Se, Ce and Be have *carissanti*. PTS, Se, and Be all list *tarissanti* as a Sinhalese variant. A parallel BHS verse in the *Mahāvastu* has *raktā kariṣyanti* (Mvu 3.284).[9]

- PTS and Ce have *sattā* ("beings") in the *mūla*, while Be and Se have *saddhā* (*aññe saddhā* "others who have faith", following the commentary).

The three different verbs *carissanti/tarissanti/kariṣyanti* point to an underlying *ẏa-śruti* substituting for the intervocalic stop between the *-ā* of *addhā/raktā* and the first vowel of the verb, *addhā carissanti/raktā kariṣyanti > addhāẏarissanti/raktaẏariṣyanti* (per Pischel §186, §187), the two words acting as a compound per Pischel §184.

The change of *-t- > -c-* or a dental for a palatal does occur sporadically in Pāli and Geiger attributes this to "dialectal influence" (§41.2; e.g. Pāli *tikicchati* "he cures" ~ OI *cikitsati* idem, desiderative of *cit, cetati*, "to attend to, be attentive, observe"; see also Kaccāyana's grammar sutta 19, change to *ti > cci* and the Asokan edicts widespread alternation between *cu* and *tu*, "but"; Pischel §215). This may also have been due to bilingual Dravidian speaker's influence where the *c-* sound was pronounced as an affricate *tš-* in proto-Dravidian and therefore sometimes represented in Dravidian with a *t-, s-,* or *š-* (Emeneau 1988). The reflexes do not seem to have any directional pattern (OI *cikitsati* > Pāli *tikicchati, c- > t-*; but Pāli *tiṭṭhanti* > AMg *ciṭṭhanti*, "they stand" *Uttarajjhāyā* 25, 17b in Bollée 1980: 46, *t- > c-*), which suggests dialect influence. However, when the Mvu reflex *kariṣyanti* is considered alongside the two Pāli reflexes, the three strongly suggest the existence of an underlying *-ẏa-śruti*

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[9] Mvu 3, 285,$_{6-7:}$ *ācchetva tṛṣṇāṃ guṇasaṃpracārī, bahv atra raktā kariṣyanti cchandaṃ*; "He who fares on with his groups and orders has cut off all craving. And many beings will make a resolve." (Jones 1956: 273, reading *sattvā* for *raktā*).

to account for the three consonants, *t-*, *c-* and *k-*, all from different points of articulation (and therefore unlikely to be of dialect origin), and more likely back-formations. Of interest as well is that two other potential reflexes of *-ẏarissanti*, would also work in the context: *jare(i)ssanti* ("to destroy (craving)") and *darissanti* ("to rend, divide, destroy"), with initial *j-* and *d-*. One wonders therefore whether such a polyvocality was intended by the speaker, where one word has several overtones of meaning (Levman 2014: 386–87 re: various meanings of *sabbato pahaṃ* at DN I, 223,$_{12}$; Levman 2023: 90, n. 58 with reference to various meanings of *pāṭimokkha*).

3. *Sutta Nipāta, Āmagandhasutta*, **verse 250**

> *sotesu* *gutto* **vijitindriyo** *care*

> "Guarded in the apertures [of the sense-organs], one should wander with one's sense faculties conquered..." (Norman 1992/2006: 30)

> - Be, Se: *yo tesu gutto viditindriyo care*
> - "Whoever is guarded in those [sense-faculties], having full knowledge of the faculties, should wander..."
> - Ce: *sotesu gutto viditindriyo care*
> - "Guarded in the currents [of the sense faculties], having full knowledge of the faculties, he should wander..."

The variation between *vijitindriyo* and *viditindriyo* points to an underlying form *viẏitindriyo*; the extant forms resemble what Norman calls a "wrong back-formation from a dialect or dialects where both *-j-* and *-d-* become *-y-*" (1992/1996: 208) or more simply, it points to dialects where most intervocalic stops are dropped or replaced by a *ẏa-śruti* (Pischel §186, §187), that is a *koiné*. Norman also wonders whether it could be a "Sinhalesism" since all *-j-* sounds > *-d-* in Sinhalese; however, this change bears the marks of an early oral transmission error, before the canon reached Sri Lanka. The commentary takes the "original" meaning as *vidita*: " 'Having understood the six faculties with full knowledge, having made them known, one should continuously wander' it is said" (*ñātapariññāya chaḷindriyāni viditvā pākaṭāni katvā careyya, vihareyyāti*

vuttaṃ hoti, Pj II, 1, 292,$_{12-13}$).[10] Although not found in an ms, the compound also works with the word *vihita* ("practised, put in order, established, directed; "one should wander with his faculties put in order", where the aspirate *-h-* may have been interpreted as a substitute for an alif (') or *ẏ*-glide as occurs in Gāndhārī (Brough §39, *vihita = viẏita*; as Gāndhārī *ramahi= rama'i* = Pāli *damayaṃ*, "taming") and the Prakrits (Pischel §206, *-h-* written for *-k-*).[11] *-h-* also appears for *-c-* in Gāndhārī which would also make sense in this context (*vicita < vi + ci* "to collect, remove, cull," OI *vicinoti*; or *vi + ci* "to investigate, examine make clear" OI *viciketi*; "with collected faculties" or "with faculties examined"). In other words the ambiguity of the underlying *viẏita* with its several potential meanings may have been a deliberate polyvocality; and as Norman has noted with respect to the Sanskritization of *brāhmaṇa* (where the pun on *bahati* "to be strong", < OI *br(m)h*, and *bahati* "to remove", < OI *bṛh*, is obscured because of the restoration of the *br-* conjunct; Norman 1997/2012: 103), information is lost when *viẏita* is "translated" or back-formed into one of the forms above, whereas leaving it in its underlying form preserves its semantic overtones. The varying consonants in dialect variation must be close in place and manner of articulation; so when one finds examples where this is not the case and where variants in cognate, parallel passages are quite different phonetically, the logical conclusion is that we are dealing with an underlying *koiné* (numerous examples in Levman 2014, 2019 and 2020),[12] providing proof that the underlying form is historical. In Pāli most of these forms were Sanskritized so only survive in rare cases, e.g. *khāyita* survives alongside *khādita* "eaten"; *sāyati* alongside *svādate* (OI), "he tastes"; *svādiyati*, "he enjoys himself"; Goyāna alongside Godāna, proper name; Pāli *tādi* alongside BHS *tāyi*, "such a one"; etc. See Lüders 1954: §107–15.

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[10] Although Lüders (1954: §116) considers the intervocalic *-j-* as the earlier form, at least in the Asokan edicts.

[11] *vihita* is attested in the Asokan edicts (Bloch 1950: 126,$_{26-8}$) in Kālsī, Mānsehrā and Shābāzgaṛhī, with the meaning "practiced, established."

[12] For example, **payedi* as the form underlying *pāceti* ("he brings to maturity") in Dhp 135 Ce, PTS, with Be, Se var. *pājeti* ("he drives forth" < OI *pra + aj*, "to drive"), PDhp 200 *prājeti* (idem) and *Udānavaraga* 1.17 *prāpayate* ("he leads"). The commentary gives *neti* as a synonym, so *prāpayate* is closest in meaning. Lüders (1954: §140) considers *pāceti* a "hyperpālismen", i. e. a wrong translation of an underlying *pāyeti* in the "Ostsprache" (eastern language of the underlying canon); this form is attested in GDhp 148 *pada* d (*aya payedi praṇina*, "thus old age and death drive the life of beings").

One other alternation between *viditā* (PTS, Be, Ce) and *vijitā* (Se) occurs in *Jātaka* 351, the *Maṇikuṇḍalajātaka*, *gāthā* 3, pada c): *viditā* (*vijitā*) *mayā sattuka lokadhammā* ("Oh my enemy! Worldly things I have known/conquered").

4. Maṇikuṇḍala Jātaka (Jā 3, 154,$_{6-7}$)

> *udeti āpūrati veti cando,*
> **attaṃ tapetvāna** *paleti suriyo*

"The moon rises, becomes full and disappears.
After illuminating its home, the sun runs away."

- Be and Ce are the same, Se reads *atthaṅ gametvāna*; the verse also occurs in the *Mahāniddesa* 124,$_{12-13}$ (ad Sn 806) and 436,$_{21-22}$ (ad 950):

> *udeti āpūrati veti cando,*
> **atthaṃ gametvāna** *paleti suriyo*

- Here, Be has *andhaṃ tapetvāna* (ad Sn 806) "after illuminating the darkness" and *attaṃ gametvāna* (ad Sn 950);
- Se again reads *atthaṃ gametvāna*, "going home";
- Ce similarly has *atthaṅ gametvāna* and *atthaṃ gamitvāna*.

The *Jātaka* commentary reads: "Just as the sun destroying the darkness, after illuminating a large part of the world, runs home in the evening, goes home and is not seen, so (wealth arises and is destroyed)...".[13] It apparently glosses *gametvāna* (lit.: "having caused to go home").

The conflation of *attha* "home" (OI *asta*) and *andha* ("darkness, blind") looks dialectal, probably in part due to bilingual speakers who did not hear aspirates or voiced stops (both of which are lacking in most Dravidian languages and in Proto-Dravidian). The word *attha* would probably he heard by a Dravidian speaker as *atta* or *adda* (note the Be variant *atta*) and the replacement of a geminate by a nasal + stop was common in Proto-Dravidian (Levman 2022: §2.2); this also occurs in Pāli vis-à-vis OI: *saṃlāpa*

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[13] Se Jā-a 4, 420$^{18-20}$: *yathā ca sūriyo andhakāraṃ vidhamanto mahantaṃ lokappadesaṃ tappetvāna puna sāyaṃ atthaṃ paleti atthaṃ gacchati na dissati evam...*

"friendly talk" ~ Pāli *sallāpa*; or OI *saṃlekha* "abstinence" ~ Pāli *sallekha* (Geiger §52.6).

The change of *-t- > -g-* (*atthaṃ tapetvāna* and *atthaṃ gametvāna*) is unlikely to be dialectal as dental and velar stops are not proximal; it is more likely the result of differential interpretation of an underlying intervocalic *-ẏ-* glide where the *anusvāra* has disappeared (Pischel §183, §184), that is, *atthaẏapetvāna*. The interchange of *-p-* and *-m-* in *-(ẏ)apetvāna/-(ẏ)ametvāna* is a common dialect change, both being labial consonants (Pischel §248); it occurs several times in the Asokan edicts (Levman 2010: §G4).

5. *Sutta Nipāta, Attadaṇḍasutta*

There is a second example of a similar phenomenon to §3 above, also pointing to an underlying *-viẏita* transmission, in Sn v. 935:

> *saṃvegaṃ kittayissāmi yathā **saṃvijitaṃ** mayā*

> "I shall describe my agitation how it was experienced by me." (Norman 1992/2006: 116)

- PTS, Ce, Be, Se; PTS reports Sī var. *saṃviditaṃ*, also in Pj II, 2, 566, n. 5 in all Sinhalese mss:
- "I shall describe my agitation how it was known/perceived/felt by me."

The verb *saṃvijita* is from a different root than *vijayati*, "to conquer" above (§3); < OI *saṃ + vij* in causative *saṃvejayati/saṃvejeti* "to terrify," p.p. *saṃvijita or saṃvejita*, "filled with fear or awe; felt, realized". The term *saṃvidita* has a different derivation, < *saṃ + vid* "to know, recognize, perceive, feel". The *Niddesa* commentary takes *saṃ + vij* as the "correct" reading ("As just myself was moved, agitated, made anxious");[14] however, as in case §3 above, both are readily derivable from an underlying *saṃviẏitaṃ*. Lüders considered *saṃvijitaṃ* "an amelioration (of the Sinhalese text) by the Burmese scholars ("eine Verbesserung der birmanischen Gelehrten" Lüders 1954: §118).

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[14] Nidd I, 406,₁₉₋₂₁: *yathā mayā attāyeva saṃvejito ubbejito saṃvegamāpādito ti — yathā saṃvijitaṃ mayā.*

6. *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, DN 2, 107,$_{3-6}$

tulam atulañ ca sambhavaṃ bhavasaṃkhāram avassajī
ajjhattarato samāhito, **abhida kavacam iv' atta**-*sambhavan ti.*

"That which had come to be, both gross and fine,
Becoming's compound did the sage reject.
With inward calm, composed, he burst asunder,
Like a shell of armour, the self that had become."
(Woodward 1935: 78)[15]

- *abhindi* (Be, Ce, Se)

- *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (Waldschmidt 1951: 212, §16.15):
  <u>*tulyam atulyam ca saṃbhavaṃ*</u>
  (*bhavasaṃskāram apotsṛjan muniḥ*
  adhyātmarataḥ samāhi)*to*
  h(*y* **abhinat ko**)<u>**ṣam ivāṇḍa**</u>(*saṃbhavaḥ*)

The underlined words are from the ms; the bracketed parts reconstructed from the Tibetan. It is the last line that we are concerned with here: "He broke the shell as if arising from an egg" or "He broke the shell, like a bird (*aṇḍa-sambhava*, a *bahuvrīhi* meaning "bird"). This BHSD version seems to make much more sense than the Pāli (see discussion in Levman 2014: 315–18); the Tibetan and two of the Chinese versions also have the same simile.

The word *kośa* was apparently back-formed to *kavasa/kavaca* ("armour") by a Pāli tradent, as it is well known that *-ava-* > *-o-* in MI (von Hinüber 2001: §139), restoring it to what he/she thought was the "original" form. The underlying form for *aṇḍa/atta* is more complex. Since geminates were not noted in the earliest transmission (e.g. Asokan *ata* for *atta*, Levman 2010: §G4) and intervocalic consonants were voiced by both Dravidian speakers (always) and MI Prakrit speakers (often), the underlying transmission was probably *āda* or *āḍa* (Pischel §218, Geiger §64, dentals represented by cerebrals), interpreted as a geminate in Pāli *ādda* > *atta* (with the geminate devoiced and the long *ā-* > *a-* in MI because of the following double consonant), and by *ǎṇḍa* by another

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[15] This verse was quoted in my 2014 dissertation (p. 315–16), without proper acknowledgement of Woodward.

tradent (*ăṇḍa* and *āṇḍa* both mean "egg" in OI), as geminates were often a sign that a nasal had been omitted (e.g. Gāndhārī *ad(d)a* for *anta*) and Pāli *sallekha* for Skt. *saṃlekha*, or Pāli *sallāpa* for Skt *saṃlāpa*, Geiger §52.6). This same phenomenon of VCC < VNC (V = vowel, C = consonant, N = nasal) was also quite prevalent in Dravidian (Levman 2022: §2.2, page 21).

7. *Brahmajālasutta*, DN 26,₂₈

> *yes' āhaṃ na **sampāyeyyaṃ**, so mam' assa vighāto.*

> "I might not be able to explain (my reasons) to those persons
> and that would be stressful to me."

- PTS, Ce, Se and Be all have *sampāyeyyaṃ* which was apparently not very well understood.

- Se has four variants: *sampāheyyaṃ, sampāpeyyaṃ, sampayeyyaṃ, sampādeyyaṃ.*

The PED has two possible derivations for this verb < *sam + pad* (from Kern) or *sam + pra + ā + yā*; *sampāyeyyaṃ* could be the optative of *sampāyati = sampādayati* < *sam + pad* in causative, "to cause to attain, to attain, to bring about, produce; to strive, to try to accomplish" which is how the commentary takes it: "having tried to accomplish, he is not able to explain" (Se Sv 108¹¹: *sampādetvā kathetuṃ na sakkuṇeyyan ti attho*). An alternate derivation is possible from *sampāyāti* < attested as *sam + pra + yā*, "to go to any state or condition" where the meaning is less apt. The meaning is also off with *sampāpeyyaṃ* < *sam + pra + āp in caus.* "to cause to get or obtain" and *sampāheyyaṃ*, the optative causative of *sam + pāheti* (< OI *sam + pra + hi*) "to send forth," only attested as *pāheti*. Of all these the most cogent meaning is as per the commentary, i.e. a causative < *sam + pad*, "I might not bring about" (*sampādeyyaṃ*), which in dialect or *koiné* would be transmitted as *sampāẏeyyaṃ* with the -ẏ- glide as a hiatus bridge; this was then (mistakenly) interpreted as derived from the verb *yā* and also taken as a substitute for *-pāp* (OI *-prāp*) as above, both of which are less convincing than a derivation from *p(r)a + pad*. Occasionally, in Gāndhārī at least (Brough 1962: §39) the *-h-* is used as a Hiattilger, which is perhaps how the form *sampāheyyaṃ* came about (as an alternate glide form).

$$sampāẏeyyaṃ/sampāheyyaṃ$$

```
            sampāẏeyyaṃ/sampāheyyaṃ
                  ↙        ↘
        sampāpeyyaṃ          sampādeyyaṃ
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
8. *Sattajaṭilasutta,* SN 1, 79,$_{8\text{-}10}$ and Ud 66,$_{6\text{-}7}$

mama purisā carā ocarakā janapadam ocaritv' āgacchanti. tehi paṭhamaṃ ociṇṇaṃ ahaṃ pacchā **osāpayissāmi**[16]

"These men are my spies, undercover agents, coming back after having reconnoitred[17] the country. That which they have first reconnoitred, afterwards I will deal with."

- PTS: *osāpayissāmi* (with var. *oyāyissami, obhāyissami*)

- Be: *osāpayissāmi* (with var. *oyāyissami, ohayissami*)

- Se: *ohayissāmi* (with var. *oyāyissāmi, obhāyissāmi, osāpayissāmi*)

- Ce: *oyāyissāmi* (with var. *osāpayissāmi, ohayissāmi*)

- Ud PTS: *otarissāmi* (with var. *obhāyissāmi, otāyissāmi,* and *osāyissāmi* glossed as *paṭipajjissāmi karissāmi*)

- Ud Be: *osārissāmi* (with var. *otarissāmi, oyāyissāmi, osāpayissāmi*)

- Ud Se: *otarissāmi* (with var. *oyāyissāmi, osārissāmi*)

- Ud Ce: *osarissāmi* (with var. *osādissāmi, osādhissāmi*)

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[16] Other variants: *ocaritvā, var. ocaritā and otaritvā; ociṇṇaṃ, var. otiṇṇaṃ* (not discussed).

[17] PED sv *ocarati* "to search, reconnoitre, investigate"; BHSD: 71, sv *avacarati* "busies or occupies oneself with (intellectually), may perhaps be rendered investigates."

We therefore have about eleven variants, all five syllables except for the first which has six, and all phonologically related. Dialect variation intuitively seems wrong, as they are phonetically far apart, though related in overall sound structure. The multiplicity of variants is a sign of the tradent lineage struggling to understand the meaning of the word, and also suggests a malleability in the underlying transmission which allowed for such diverse interpretations.

Lemma	Derivation	Meaning and Notes
osāpayissāmi[18]	Causative of **ava + sā* (CPD) = *so* ("to destroy, kill, finish") *ava + so*, *avasyati*, caus. *avasāyayati* = "to cause to take up one's abode; to complete; to cause to finish, bring to an end".	Translated by Bodhi (2000: 174 and n. 223 on p. 404) as "make them disclose" (based on Norman 1969/95: 149 ad Th 119), who recognises a verb *oseti* "to deposit".[19] The *-paya-* insertion is a regular causative suffix for verbs ending in *-ā*. For other verbs ending in a consonant it is a "double causative" (Edgerton 1946).
oyāyissāmi	< *ava + yā*, "to go away" in normal future is *oyissāmi*; causative *oyāpayissāmi*, with *-āpaya-* > *-āya-* (non-standard).	"I will cause it to go away."
obhāyissāmi	< *ava + bhā* "to shine, to appear, to become eminent"; future *obhāsissāmi*; in causative *obhāpayissāmi* with *-āpaya-* > *-āya-* (non-standard).	"I will make it eminent."

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[18] Pāli forms its future from the uncontracted stem of class 10 and causative OI verbs, so *oseti/osemi* (*osayāmi* "I cause to deposit" and *osayissāmi* "I will cause to deposit), and *osāpayissāmi* "I will cause (someone to cause) to deposit." Geiger §154.3. Pischel (§528) notes that the *-y-* is usually elided (*-ayi-* > *aï*) and here we see many forms of *-ayi-* > *-i-* where the *-ay-* is elided. Often the future (of denominatives) are formed without a causative suffix, to which the future ending is attached (e.g. OI *mārayiṣyasi* > Māgadhī *māliśśasi* "you will cause to die" < *māra*, "death").

[19] However there is no "them" as an object of the verb in the Pāli; the only object is *ociṇṇaṃ*, "what has been investigated".

Lemma	Derivation	Meaning and Notes
ohayissāmi	< *ava* + *hṛ oharati* "to remove, to take away; to do away with; to bring down"; future *oharissāmi*; caus. *ohārayissāmi*, with non-standard *-āra- > -a-*.	"I will take it down, I will remove it."
otarissāmi	< *ava* + *tṛ*, *otarati*, "to enter, penetrate, understand, comprehend"; future *otarissāmi*; or causative form *otārayissāmi*, "to remove, bring downwards, introduce, make current, begin, expound" with non-standard *-ayi- > -i-*, and *-ā- > -ă-*.	"I will penetrate/understand/ apprehend it."
otāyissāmi	? < *ava* + *tāyati* "to protect" but not attested with this prefix. *otāyayissāmi*, with non-standard *-ayi- > -i-*. Or caus. of previous *otarissāmi otārayissāmi* with *-ayi- > i-*.	"I will protect/preserve it" or "I will cause to apprehend."
osāyissāmi	Same as *osāpayissāmi* (< *ava* + *so*), with non-standard *-āpa- > -ā-*.	
osārissāmi	*ava* +*sṛ* ("deposit, put away; expound, propound; cause to visit, enter, go away") in caus. *osārayati*, *osārayissāmi*, with non-standard change of *-ayi- > i- > osārissāmi*	Sadd (1224, 426): *avasarati = avāsari = upagacchi, upavisi* "he approached, he entered." Comm. to Ud-a 333,$_{25}$ glosses *osārissāmi* as *paṭipajjissāmi, karissāmi* "I will enter upon, I will act."
osarissāmi	Same as *osārissāmi* with *-ă-*. Also, BHSD *avaśirati, ośirati, ośireti*, also spelled *oṣarati, osarati* "to clear away; send off, send forth; throw down, let loose, release; abandon, renounce; approach enter (sv *avasarati, osarati*); future *osarissāmi*; caus. *osarayissāmi* with non-standard change of *-ayi- > i-*.	"I will release it."

Lemma	Derivation	Meaning and Notes
osādissāmi	< *ava* + *sīdati*; future *osīdissāmi*; in caus. *osādayissami*, with non-standard change of *-ayi-* > *i-*.	"I will sink it."
osādhissāmi	"herb, plant, medicine; star" denominative *osādhi* (v. l. for *osadhi*) + future *-issāmi* > *osadhissāmi* (footnote 18).	"I will heal it"; "I will make it a star" (but probably only a spelling mistake for *osādissāmi* above).

Only a few of these forms are grammatically correct. The first *osāpayissāmi* ("I will [cause to] deposit") is a correct future causative form but the meaning makes no sense. *otarissāmi* ("I will penetrate, understand comprehend") is a correct future form, as is *osarissāmi* ("I will clear away"). The other forms all require a shortening of *-ayi-* > *-i-* or *-āpa-* > *-ā-* or *-āra-* > *-a-*. None of these are attested to my knowledge, although the change of *-ayi-* > *-e-* or > *-aï-* does occur (Pischel §528; von Hinüber 2001: §146 and §147).

Of all these eleven forms, there are only two that make sense in the context, *otarissāmi* and *osarissāmi*, which I have translated as: "(That which they have first reconnoitred, afterwards) I will deal with." Both Bodhi's and Sujato's translation take "they" (the spies) as the object of the verb, which it is clearly not;[20] the object is *ociṇṇaṃ* ("that which has been reconnoitred" or var. *otiṇṇaṃ* ("that which has been apprehended"). Either of these variants work in the context, the latter providing some support for the *otarissāmi* reading as from the same verb root *o-tarati*. The phrase "I will deal with" is a compromise translation which tries to capture the meaning of *otarissāmi* ("I will comprehend, penetrate") and *osarissāmi* (BSHD "I will clear away"). King Pasenadi will deal with the intelligence received from his spies by comprehending its significance and removing any threats to the nation's security, as required. *otarissāmi* occurs in the *mūla* of the PTS and Se versions of the parallel story in the *Udāna*. *osarissāmi* occurs in the *mūla* of Ce, and *osārissāmi* occurs in the *mūla* of the Be recension, but with a long *-ā-*, so it is

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[20] Bodhi (2000: 174) has "First information is gathered by them and afterwards I will make them disclose it." There is no personal pronoun in the accusative plural in the Pāli, but it does occur as the second word of the next sentence (in the nominative). Sujato (2023: 112) has "First they go undercover, then I have them report to me." Levman (2014: 352) made the same mistake, taking the *jaṭila* spies as object of the verb: "I will release them/let them go (back to the household life)."

the causative form, and as noted above, should read *osārayissāmi*, so it has been shortened (*osārissāmi*, with *-ayi-* > *-i-*).[21]

How to account for all these variant forms? The one form that underlies all of them is *oyayissāmi* which occurs in the *mūla* in Ce and as a variant in PTS, Be, and Se. It also occurs as a variant in Ud Be and Se. Presumably here the *-y-* consonant represents not a derivation from the verb *yā*, "to go" but it is a *ẏa-śruti*, (*oẏaẏissāmi*) indicating a consonant dropped off. The *ẏa-śruti* is not usually a substitute for a sibilant or an *-r-* sound. There are instances where an intervocalic *-y-* is apparently replaced by an *-s-* (e.g. *avāhayi ~ avāhasi* in *Jātaka* 271 verse 61d), but this can also be interpreted otherwise;[22] *-y-* as substitute for *-r-* is not very common but does occur (Pischel §255). Nor can these different forms (in SN) be considered dialect changes as the variants are for the most part not phonetically close.

A more likely scenario is that the earliest transmission was *otarissāmi* with the intervocalic *-t-* > *-ẏ-glide* or Ø (as AMg *oāra* = *avatāra*, "descent", or AMg. *oiṇṇa* = *avatīrṇa*, "descended, reincarnated"; see Pischel §154), and the *-ẏ-glide* was interpreted as an *-s-*, at least in the Sinhalese tradition, probably because in MI a stop was often weakened to a fricative dialectically (e.g. Gāndhāri, Brough 1962: §43a) or because Sinhalese *-s-* regularly represented MI *-c-* (Geiger 1938: §44); because a *-t-* sometimes changed to a *-c-*, both medially, *Kaccāyana* §19 *iti + etaṃ > iccetam*, (Thitzana 2016, vol. 2: 136); as well as initially in Pāli, (e.g. *carissanti*, var. *tarissanti*, example 2 above and here), and in the Prakrits (e.g. Asokan edicts *tu* and *cu*; Levman 2010: 69–70); and because bilingual speakers of Dravidian and IA pronounced an initial *c-* as both *t-* and *s-* (and sometimes *š-*), because proto-Dravidian **c-* was phonetically an affricate *ts-* or *tš-* initially and possibly also intervocalically (Emeneau 1988; Levman 2022: §2.4). The

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[21] This form is attested in *Jātaka* 540, v. 327 (Jā 6, 83,₇) as *sārayissati* ("remind" from the homonym *sarati*, "he remembers").

[22] The "original" word may have been *avāhadi* ("defecated") which weakened to *avāhayi* in the Prakrits (or, as Lüders 1954: §109 suggests, "ist aus der Sprache des Urkanons stehen geblieben"). PTS has *avāhayi*, Be and Ce *avāhasi* ("mocked, scorned") and Se *apāhasi* (idem with change of *-v-* > *-p-*) which also works in the context. It is quite possible that the change of *-y-* > *-s-* was through *-d-*; i.e. intervocalic *-d-* weakened to fricative δ (written *-dh-*, *-s-* or *-z-*), a phenomenon which occurs occasionally in Gāndhārī (Brough 1962: §43a, §43b). See for example Sn 955 *visosehi* ("dry up" < causative of *visussati* "it dries up") and a repeat of this verse in the commentary at Sv 3, 747, as *visodhehi* ("purify" < *vi + śudh* "he purifies") where the following evolution appears to have taken place: *-dh-* > *-s-* (*dh* > *-δ-* > *-z-* > *-s-*) *-δ-* = voiced dental fricative (as in English "the").

other exemplars can be understood as attempts to make sense of these two verbs *otarissāmi* and *osarissāmi*, which were obviously not very well understood in these meanings, resulting in several wrong back-formations:

Summary and reconstruction (not in chronological order)

*oẏarissāmi >   *otarissāmi* (*otārissāmi*, incorrect caus.)[23], *osarissāmi* (*osārissami*, incorrect caus.) *osărissāmi > osāpayissāmi* (caus., incorrect back-formation from verb *sā* or *so*) > *osāyissāmi* with *-āpa- > -ā-*

*oẏarissāmi >   *oyāyissāmi* (incorrect back-formation from verb *yā*) > *osādissāmi/osādhissāmi* (incorrect back-formation from verb *sīdati*) and addition of aspirate *-dh-* (spelling mistake).

oyāyissāmi >   *ohayissāmi* (incorrect back-formation from verb *harati* or simply *-h-* as a substitute *ẏ*-glide as in Gāndhārī (Brough 1962: §39)

ohayissāmi >   *obhāyissāmi* (incorrect back-formation from root *bhā*, taking the *-h-* as an aspirate substitute, Pischel §188)

A possible time-line and derivation chart might look like this. The numbers after each word represent the number of times each exemplar occurs in the various recensions (as noted above); they may be of help to establish diachronic priority. Where two lines of descent go to one form, both are possible routes.

*oẏarissāmi

otărissāmi 4/osărissāmi 3 (7)   *oyāyissāmi 6*

osāpayissāmi 5   *osādissāmi/osādhissāmi 2*   *ohayissāmi 3*

osāyissāmi 1   *obhāyissāmi 3*

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
[23] But see footnote 18. If the future causative in Prakrit may be formed without the causative suffix (which is the case in denominatives per Pischel §528) and also sometimes appears to be the case in the Asokan edicts (see Shāhbāzgaṛhī *vaḍhiśati* on page 31 below, for Girnār and Dhauli *vaḍḍhayissati*, "will cause to grow, will promote"), then these forms may be considered "correct."

There are two Chinese versions of this sutta, neither of which have translated this word.[24]

9. *Saṅgītisutta*, DN 3, 210,₁₀

> *cara vāda-ppamokkhāya*
>
> "Go on, save your doctrine." (Sujato)[25]
>
> - Be, Ce and PTS have *cara vādappamokkhāya* ("Go on, save your doctrine"; Walshe 1995: 427)
>
> - Se has only *paravādapamokkhāya*

which appears to go with the next phrase *nibbeṭhehi vā sace pahosī ti*, "Unravel yourself if you can, from the bondage to others' wrong views"; here taking *apamokkhāya* in the sense of *appamokkhāya* (as in the comm.), a negative (the *-pp-* should be a geminate because of the *pr-* in *pramokṣa* from which it is derived). Yet the Se commentary retains the word "*cara*" (in Be, Ce and PTS): *cara vādappamokkhāyā ti bhattapuṭaṃ ādāya taṃ taṃ pūgaṃ upasaṅkamitvā vādappamokkhatthāya uttariṃ pariyesamāno vicari. nibbedhehi* (so Se; *nibbeṭhehi* in PTS, Se and Ce) *vāti athavā mayā āropitadosato attānaṃ mocehi* (Se Sv 3 94,₁₃₋₁₅); "*cara vādappamokkhāya* (means): Taking a parcel of food, and approaching this group or that one, go about looking beyond the bondage of your views. 'Or, unravel yourself' means or free yourself from the faults, refuted by me." The *cara/para* alternation points to an earlier transmission with the intervocalic stop disappearing (or a *-ẏ-* glide, taking its place, Pischel §184, §186, §187), so *niggahito tvam asi-(ẏ)aravādapamokkhāya > tvam asi-para-* (Se) and *tvam asi-cara-* (Be and Ce) are reconstructions based on what the tradent deduced the *-ẏ-* glide to represent. One of the hallmarks of the MI *koiné* prevalent before and at the time of the Buddha was this disappearance or simplification of intervocalic stops (see Levman 2016: §6.1). The BHS version has *apahara vādaṃ vāda vipramokṣāya* ("remove views for the release from views"; Waldschmidt 1955),[26] which expresses the same sentiment as the Pāli but the morphology is

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[24] Sutta central: SN 3.11: *Sattajaṭilasutta*—Bhikkhu Sujato (suttacentral.net)

[25] https://suttacentral.net/dn33/en/sujato?layout=plain&reference=none&notes=asterisk&highlight=false&script=latin

[26] Only the last word is in black type, the first three are red, which presumably means a

quite different, although the words appear to be all phonetically related (*cara-para-(apa)-hara*).

10. *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, DN 2 138,₂₇

> *atha Bhagavā āyasmantaṃ Upavāṇaṃ* **apasādesi** *kho*

> "Then the Bhagavā dismissed Ven. Upavaṇa."

> • PTS has *apasādesi*, an aorist, whereas Se and Ce have the present tense *apasādeti*: "he rejected" or "he rebuked", a causative form meaning "reject, repulse; censure, rebuke"; the BHS equivalent is *ava + sad*, with change of *apa- > ava-*.

Be has *apasāresi.* The Be form is the aorist of *apasāreti* "to cause to send away" (< *apa + sṛ* in caus., "to make go away"), which is more consistent with the context: the Buddha tells Upavāṇa, who is fanning him, to move aside so that the gods who have come to see him have a clear view. The BHS version (Waldschmidt, 1950–51: vol. 3: 356) does not have this word, only *ma me purastāt tiṣṭha* ("don't stand in front of me"), which is the same as the Tibetan. Ānanda is taken aback by the Buddha's statement because Upavāṇa had been the Bhagava's attendant for a long time. Both words make sense in the context but the commentary and Ānanda's reaction suggest *apasāresi* as the right choice,²⁷ as *apasādeti* does have the meaning of "disparage, belittle, put down, rebuke," which would be out of character for the Buddha.

The change of -*d-* >-*r-* (a weakening) is unusual, but not that uncommon (in the Prakrits: Pischel §245; in the Vedas: Bloomfield and Edgerton 1932/1979: §272a; in Pāli: Geiger §43.1): e.g. Dhp 151 *pravedayanti* ~ GDhp v. 160, *praverayadi*, "they make known" Brough §43b; UV has *nivedayanti* ("proclaim"), with the same meaning but a different prefix; or Pāli *dasa/ rasa*, "ten" in compounds; Dhp 305 *damayaṃ* ("taming") Patna Dhp 313 *ramayaṃ*, Gāndhārī Dhp 259 *ramahi*). The directionality is also not clear as *ruciraṃ* ("attractive") in Dhp 51 = *ruyida* in GDhp 290 with strengthening of -*r-* > -*d-* Pāli/OI > Gāndhārī or OI *śarvarī* (also *śatvarī*, idem, but not attested) > GDhp 256 *śadvari* ("night"); OI

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reconstruction (from the Tibetan).

²⁷ The commentary glosses *apasāreti* with *apanesi* ("he removed him, he excluded him"), which could go with either verb as Se Sv 2, 185,₁ has *apasādeti = apanesi* and Be Sv 2, 170 has *apasāresi = apanesi*. The *ṭīkā* specifically says *na pana nibbhacchi* ("but he did not rebuke").

puraṃdara "destroyer of fortresses; epithet of Sakka" ~ Pāli *purindada* (idem); or *-r-* > *-t-*, Pāli *paribāhirā* ("sensual perceptions kept at bay" Bodhi 2000: 219) ~ BHS *paribhāvito* ("kept outside of him" Jones 1956: 271).

These are either dialect changes, elocution peculiarities ("a reflection of the tendency *d* > *r* in rapid speech" per Brough 1962: 255), mistakes, and/or back-formations from an intervocalic *-ẏ-*glide replacing an elided consonant, or a combination of all. The possibility of back-formations is increased by the presence of such variants as *hitvā rāgañ* ("passion abandoned") alongside var. *hitvā yāgañ* ("sacrifice abandoned") in *Therīgāthā* 18, with an alternation of *-y-* and *-r-*; OI *pariruddha* "obstructed" alongside Pāli *palibuddha* (idem) and *aparigodhāya* ("with a view to the absence of greed"; Woolner 1924/2015: 63) in Girnār and Shābāzgaṛhī (Bloch 1950: 104), with *-r-*, *-b-* and *-g-* alongside each other, which seem to point to an underlying malleable consonant differentially interpreted (i.e. *apasāẏesi*, in the present instance).

10. *Mahāsamayasutta*, DN 2, 261,[11]

> *candaṃ va* **asitātigaṃ**

> "like the moon which has overcome darkness"

> - Be and Ce are the same as PTS (above)
> - Se has *asitātitaṃ* quoting a Cambodian and Be/Mon var. *asitātigaṃ* and a European variant *asitātikaṃ* which is not in PTS.

The variation between *atiga* ("overcome") and *atita* ("gone past") does not amount to much; both mean basically the same thing. The alternation of *-t-*, *-g-* and *-k-* in the last syllable suggest that the early transmission was a *koiné*, where the stop was omitted, viz., *asitātiẏaṃ* where *-ẏ-* represents a weakly articulated glide (Pischel §187) which replace consonants. While the change of *-k-* >< *-g-* might well be a dialect phenomenon (in dialects which tend to voice or unvoice intervocalic stops), the appearance of the dental stop alongside a velar stop confirms an underlying glide interpretation, as they are not related dialectically. Other changes of *-t-* >< *-k-* (or *-g-* with *-t-* > Ø as in AMg *Uttarajjhayaṇasutta* 10, 5 *aigao* < *atigato*), like *niyato* > *niyako* (*Padarūpasiddhi* 42), or OI *saṃśayita* > Gāndhārī *saśayike* ("doubtful," also in Shābāzgaṛhī and Mansehra at Bloch 1950: 116,[19–20]) also point to the same conclusion.

11. *Poṭṭhapādasutta,* DN 1, 186,₁₋₂

> *oḷārikam kho ahaṃ bhante attānaṃ paccemi rūpiṃ*
> *cātummahābhūtikaṃ* **kabaḷiṅkārāhāra-bhakkhan** ti

"Bhante, I take the self as material, composed of form, made up of the four great elements and feeding on mouthfuls of food."

- Se: *kavalī-kāra-bhakkhan-ti.*

- Be, Ce and Ee: have an extra word: *kabaḷī-kār-āhāra-bhakkhan-ti.*

The corresponding OI word is *kavala* with variant MI spellings *kavaḍa* (BHS), *kapaḍa* (BHS var), *kabaḷī* (Be, Ce), *kavalī* (Se), *kabala* (Geiger 46.1), *kabaḷa/kavaḷa.* The word also occurs in the *Pāṭimokkha* as a technical term from *Sekhiya* 39 (*Nātimahantaṃ kabaḷaṃ* [*kavaḷaṃ* var.] *karissāmī ti, sikkhā karaṇīyā* "I shall not take an overlarge morsel [of food], thus the training is to be done," (Ñāṇatusita 2014: 178). Mayrhofer (M1 vol. 1: 187) suggests the term is a proto-Munda word *kabaḍa,* cp. Santali *khabo̱l,* "mouthful, handful" (Kuiper 1948: 34f). Burrow (1945: 91) provides Dravidian cognates *kavaḷam, kava̱ram* "morsel, mouthful" < *kavvu* "to bite". See DTS p. 167, n. 12 where no less than 14 different variants of the first part of the compound are given as *kav-, kab-, kap-* and *kac-.* If M1 (vol. 1: 187) is correct in asserting that the "ground form" (Grundform) is *kabaḍa,* this would account for the weakening of *-b-* > *-v-* (Pischel 201; von Hinüber 2001: 183) and *-ḍ-* > *-l-* (Pischel §240) which has occurred, but not the strengthening of *-b-* > *-p-* or the change of *-b-* > *-c-* in one Burmese ms (DTS above). These latter suggest an early *koiné* transmission as *kaẏ-* where the *-ẏ-* glide was back-formed to *-p-* or *-c-,* or an earlier transmission of *kav-* where the *-v-* itself was treated as a glide (Pischel §254; von Hinüber 2001: §171 re: exchange of *b* and *v* in OI and Pāli); in this case the Grundform would be *kaẏaḍa* or *kavaḍa* which would account for all exemplars. If we omit the one change to *-c-* (which in any case is not straightforward as an extra syllable has been added, viz., *kacapaḷi-*), then it is possible to interpret the alternation of *-b-, -p-* and *-v-* as of a dialectal nature as they are all close phonetically.

12. *Ambaṭṭhasutta*, DN 1 89,₉

> *loke* **vivatta-cchaddo**

> "roll back the veil of illusion in the world"

> **vighuṣṭa-śabdo** loke (*Mahāvadānasūtra*)

> "whose name has been loudly proclaimed" **(**Waldschmidt 1953: 95)

- PTS and Ce *vivatta-cchado*, with dental stop
- Se *vivaṭa-cchado*
- Be *vivaṭṭa-cchado*

Both forms (with dental and retroflex stop) are derived < *vi + vṛt*, "turn back, roll back". Other minor variants in DTS 80, n. 1. The parallel BHS version of this compound is *vighuṣṭa-śabda* ("whose name has been loudly proclaimed"); this and the variant forms point to an underlying *koiné* form **viaṭṭa-cchada*. The Pkt. form *vivaṭṭa* or *viẏaṭṭa/viaṭṭa* (with the -ẏ- glide or Ø replacing the -v-; Pischel §254; AMg *viaṭṭa* = OI *vivṛtta*, while *viaṭṭha* = OI *vikṛṣṭa*; Mylius 2003: 552) which, as well as being a derivative of Skt. *vivṛtta* ("uncovered"), is also (in the form *viaṭṭha*, with the aspirated form *-ṭṭha-* replacing *-ṭṭa-*, attested in the Pāli variants, at PTS DN 2, 16, n. 10, *vivaṭṭhachado*; Levman 2014: 416, n. 1050) equivalent to Skt. *vikṛṣṭa* ("extensive, vast, sprawling, long, far, sounded"; *vikṛṣṭa > vikaṭṭha > viẏaṭṭha > viaṭṭha*) and it is this word that was "mistaken" for *viaṭṭ(h)a* = OI *vikṛṣṭa* ("extended, sounded"), interpreted as *vighuṣṭa* ("proclaimed loudly"); *vikṛṣṭa > vikʰuṣṭa > vighuṣṭa*; vocalic *-ṛ- > -a-*, *-u-* or *-i-* in the Prakrits, Pischel §47–55). The change of *-chada > -śabda* is a hyper-Sanskritism in a Prakrit dialect where OI *ś > ch-* (von Hinüber 1983: 33). This compound *vivatta (vivaṭṭa)-cchaddo* is an exact phonological equivalent of *vighuṣṭa-śabda* ("sound proclaimed loudly" an epithet of the Buddha which occurs in three BHS texts (*Lalitavistara*, *Mahāvastu* and *Mahāvadānasutta*). See Levman (2014: 414–17) for full discussion.[28]

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[28] Norman (1985: 112; *Collected Papers* 3: 99) postulates that the original transmission was **vivṛtta-chadman* ("the veil uncovered"), but the evolution of **vivṛtta > vighuṣṭa* requires a fairly tortuous phonological pathway (see the article). We cannot be sure of what the earliest OI form was (or indeed, if there was an OI form, as the earliest form might have been a Prakrit); but

A possible derivation chart based on the above evidence:

$$*viyaṭṭha/viaṭṭ(h)a$$

vivaṭṭa/vivatta	viaṭṭa/viaṭṭha	vikṛṣṭa > vighuṣṭa
Pāli	AMg	BHS

13. *Mahāvastu* 3.435,₂₁₋₂₂

> *yo ca varṣaśataṃ jīve agniparicaraṃ caret /*
> **patrāhāro** *chavāvāsī karonto vividhaṃ tapaṃ //*

"A man may live a hundred years in careful attendance of the sacred fire, eating from his bowl, dwelling among corpses and performing many a penance." (Jones 1956, vol. 3: 437–38)

Roth (2000: 25) notes that Senart's reading *patrāhāro* (var. *paḍāhāro*) may reflect *pātra-ahāra* or Pāli *patta-ādhāra* ("whose support of livelihood is the bowl") or *pattra-āhāra* ("whose food consists of leaves"). The form *patta-ādhāra* is particularly interesting as Pāli does have the form *patta-ādhāraka* (in the Vinaya)[29] which is generally translated as "stand for a bowl". This suggests that the earlier form was indeed *patta-āhāra*, where the *-h-* was interpreted as a weakened form of an aspirated stop, very common in the Prakrits and the *koiné* (Pischel §180).

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both *vivatta* (Pāli) and *vighuṣṭa* can be readily derived from *viaṭṭ(h)a*, which, as noted above, is an attested from. The alternation of geminates like *-ṭṭ-* and aspirated geminates (*-ṭṭh-*) is very common in the Pāli canon (for discussion, see Levman 2021: 298; Geiger §40).

29 For a discussion of which see Sp 6, 1203. The Buddha allowed monks a bowl-stand, as the bowls were being broken, when left in the open air and tossed around by the wind (Vin 2, 113).

14. Theragāthā 451

amoghaṃ divasaṃ kayirā, appena bahukena vā.
*yaṃ yaṃ **vijahate** rattiṃ, tadūnaṃ tassa jīvitaṃ.*

"Daily one should do what is fruitful, little or much; whatever night he wastes that is one less (night) of his life."

There are several different variants for the word *vijahate* in pada c:
• PTS, Be and Ce *vijahate* with Ce var. *virahato* and *viharate.*

• Se *vivahate* with Sī var. *virahate*

• Other variants in PTS include *vijahata, viharate, viṭahate* (glossed as *atināmeti khepeti* at Pd 2, 190,$_5$) and *vivasate* (? question mark in PTS text).

The Be comm. (Pd 2, 119) glosses *vijahate* with *vijahati* ("abandons") *nāseti* ("eradicate, kill, ruin, destroy"), *khepeti* ("spend, waste"); the Ce comm. is the same. The PTS comm. (Pd 2, 190,$_5$) reads *viharate*, glossed as *atināmeti* ("spend, waste"), *khepeti* (idem), with variations on *viharate* as *vijahate, vivahate* ("perhaps *viṭarate*"), *viṭahate.* The Se comm. reads *vijahati nāseti* (var. *sayati*, "he sleeps") *khepeti.*

• *vijahate* < *vi + hā*, "abandon, forsake, leave, give up".

• *virahate* < *vi + rah*, "to separate" the verb not attested in Pali, just the p.p. *virahita*, "empty, exempt from, rid of, without" but late (*Milindapañha*).

• *vivahate* < *vi + vah* "to remove, carry off", only *vivāha* attested in Pāli in the sense of a marriage.

Other variants per PTS: *vijahata* (< *vi + hā* as above), *viharate* (< *vi + hṛ* "cut off, sever, separate, remove"), *viṭahate* (< ?), *vivasate* (< *vi + vas*, "to spend time").
As Norman says (1969/95), *vijahati* is a "strange verb to use of time" and he thinks the original reading was *vivasate* ("he spends time") but the clear sense of the passage is "wastes" as the commentary has it in *atināmeti* and *khepeti.* This points to the verb *vyay* in OI, "to expend, spend, waste" which is perfect in the context, *vyayati* or in caus. *vyayayati.* One does not usually find the verbal form in Pāli but *vyaya* or *vaya* is quite common in the sense of "loss, want,

expense" (*samudayavayadhammā*, "the nature of rising and falling away") and *vyayati* is a denominative from this noun. This points to an earlier form in the Th verse (of the exemplars handed down): *vⁱyayati* with epenthetic *-i-* inserted between the *v-* and *-y-* to avoid the conjunct *vy-*; the *-y-* was misinterpreted as a *-ẏ-* glide and replaced with various consonants (*-j-*, *-v-*, *-r-*, *-ṭ-*) to make sense of it, none of which were quite right. The second *-y-* appears also to have been understood as a *-ẏ-* glide; the change > *-h-* is also very unusual, although sometimes *-y-* can be a substitute for *-r-* (Pischel §255).

The verb *vyayati* is actually attested in Pāli in the form *viyeti* (*Jātaka* 476, Jā 4, 216,₈), with several variants listed in Be (Be/Ce *viyeti*, PTS *viheti*, Se *vineti*, Cambodian *aṭṭhakathā vigeti*): "But having seen (the loved one) desire for that one is gone" (*disvā pan' ekassa viyeti chando*), with the commentary glossing *chando vigacchati pemaṃ antarādhāyati*, "desire goes away, affection disappears". The other variants on *viyeti* here are obviously back-formation attempts to make sense of it, but it was not understood, in the same way that *vijahati* and the other exemplars above were apparently an attempt to make sense of *viyayati*. The Jā verse is an unusual case in that a *-ẏ-* glide is not usually replaced by a nasal or an aspirate: *viheti < vi + hā, vihāyati*, "is abandoned"; *vineti < vi + nī* "he removes", a transitive verb in an intransitive context, so one would have to take *chando* in the accusative to make sense of it, "he removes desire for him"; *vigeti < vi + gai vigāyati*, "he decries, reproaches," also a trans. verb. The term *chando* is in OI a neuter noun, but Cone shows it as both neuter and masc. The comm. (above) treats it in the nominative case.

One might argue that these (Th and Jā) are dialect changes, but the wide variation in place and manner of articulation points to an underlying malleable form which replaced consonants with a glide (or nothing), that is a *koiné*. In the case of Th the underlying form was in fact an actual verb form (*viyayati*), but it was (mis-)interpreted as a *koiné* form and six incorrect back-formations were attempted.

15. *Therīgāthā* 24

> *rāgañ ca ahaṃ dosañ ca,* **cicciṭi cicciṭī ti vihanāmi.**
> *sā rukkhamūlamupagamma, aho sukhan ti sukhato jhāyāmi* (Be)

"I remove passion and anger with the sound '*cicciṭi*' (imitating the sound of dry bamboo sticks splitting). Having gone to the root of a tree, I meditate out of happiness, 'Oh! happiness!'"

- Be, Ce: *cicciṭi cicciṭī ti vihānami* (Ce var. *vihanāmi*)

- Se and PTS: *vicchindantī viharāmi*, "Cutting off passion and anger, I abide" or "Continuing to cut off passion and anger" (interpreting it as an explicator compound structure per Levman 2022: §3.3).

Other variants listed in PTS include *vichindati* (=*vicchindatī*, "cutting off"), *vicchindi* ("he cut off"), *vichindanti* (var. spelling of *vicchindantī* "cutting off"), and *vihanāmi* ("I remove, eliminate"), *visānāmi* and *visānami* (for *viharāmi*) < *visa + ā + nam* in caus. aor. *visa-ānāmayi* (Geiger §168.4), "He subdued the poison", contracted to > *visānāmi* (-*ayi* > -*i*; as in Asokan rock edict four Bloch 1950: 99,$_{29}$ *vaḍḍhayissati* > *vaḍhisati*, "it will grow"; normal is -*ayi-* > -*e-*, von Hinüber 2001: §147).

Norman (1995: 63) opined that the original word was *viharāmi* in the sense of "remove, get rid of" which meaning was not understood by a scribe, so he/she changed it to *vihanāmi.* This, however, does not explain the alternation of *vicchindantī* with *cicciṭi cicciṭī ti.* It is an old Ārya metre (16 *matta*s) per Norman (1995: §54), which, per Warder (1967: 47) has been "corrupted into *vicchindantī*", ten *mattā*s > eight *mattā*s. There is clearly a sonic relationship between the two groups, so it is not difficult to understand how the sound *cicciṭi* which is non-IA and derived from Dravidian,[30] might morph into something more intelligible to a tradent who didn't speak the indigenous language, i.e. *ciṭiciṭi* > *vicchindantī*. That the earlier form was *ciṭiciṭi* etc., is confirmed by the presence

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[30] DED #2509–11: Tamil *ciṭuciṭuppu onom.* expr. of hissing noise, as of a burning wick when it contains particles of water. *ciṭiciṭi* the sound of sparks or flames bursting forth and crackling; *ciṭil* the crackling of flames. Tulu *ciṭiciṭi* a crackling noise. Telugu *ciṭaciṭa* the crackling noise of burning; cracklingly. Cp OI *ciṭiciṭāya*, "to make a hissing sound" Pāli *ciṭiciṭāyati*, "to hiss, fizz, sizzle".

of the words in the commentary, and the explanation by the comm. as the detested sound of the splitting of dry bamboo and sticks that the nun used to make boxes, baskets and umbrellas.[31] This particular example shows that a back-formation (or perhaps better, "re-formation") can take place when the exemplar (an unknown indigenous word) was not understood by the receiver and he or she recast it in a phonetically similar form (itself imitative of the sound of splitting bamboo), which semantically fit the context. Even then the tradent was struggling with the new word as the three variants show.

16. *Therīgāthā* 106

> *pañca kkhandhā pariññātā tiṭṭhanti chinnamūlakā*
> **dhi tavatthu jare jamme** n'atthi dāni punabbhavo (Be, Se)

"The five aggregates have been understood, they remain, but are cut off at the root.
Oh wretched old age, fie on you! Now there is no renewed existence."

Sometimes the only explanation is sonic confusion. For *pāda* c there are several different variants that have come down to us for the eight syllables:

- Be, Se: *dhi tavatthu jare jamme*

- Ce: *dhī tavatthu jare chamme*

- PTS: *ṭhitavatthuj' aneja mhi*

- Burmese var.: *thitivatthuṃ jane jammi*

- Burmese comm. var.: *tita (ṭhita)vatthujareja mhi*

- Burmese var.: *dhīta (thiti)vatthu jane jammi*

- Sinhalese var.: *thitivattuṃ janejamehi*

- PTS var. per Ce: *ṭhitivata thujanejamahi*

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[31] Pd VI, 28,$_{21-3}$: "I remove passion and anger with the sound '*cicciṭi*'. With this sound '*cicciṭi cicciṭi*' I remove, destroy, abandon, passion and anger which are the greatest of the afflictions."
rāgañ ca ahaṃ dosañ ca cicciṭi cicciṭī ti vihanāmi (Ce var. *vicchandantī viharāmi*, noted in PTS) *ti ahaṃ kilesajeṭṭhakaṃ rāgañca dosañca cicciṭi cicciṭī ti iminā saddena sadhiṃ vihanāmi* (PTS var. *viharāmi*) *vināsemi, pajahāmi* (Se var. *vijahāmi*) *ti attho.*

Norman (1995: 16) translates the PTS version as "Born from an enduring foundation, I am immovable." The Be version may be translated as "Oh wretched old age! fie on you!" The commentary supports this reading (Pd 97[14–16]): *aṅgānaṃ sithilabhāvakaraṇādinā* **jare jamme** *lāmake hīne* **tava** *tuyhaṃ* **dhi atthu**, *dhikāro hotu* "Oh wretched (low, inferior) old age! Fie on you for making my limbs weak..." Oldenberg & Pischel (1883/2006: 184) note that the commentator's reading is "quite out of place here", but then so is their reconstruction, about which they say, "I am not sure whether I have hit the correct reading."

Here all the readings are phonetically similar and the variants occur for the most part by the arbitrary division of the sounds into different words and a confusion of voiced and unvoiced stops and aspirated stops (*dhi/thi/ti*; *j/ch*) and retroflexes (*thiti/ṭhiti*); some of this may be dialect issues, or due to Dravidian speakers of IA who do not make a phonemic distinction between voiced and unvoiced stops. But most of the variation seems to result from an attempt to make sense of a continuous sonic stream through word division. It is impossible here to ascertain the earliest transmission and the different variants are a sobering reflection on the sometimes unpredictable and erratic nature of an oral transmission.

Conclusion

The simplification of various consonants in the evolution of OI > MI resulted in various ambiguous homonymic forms with different potential meanings. It was up to the tradent to pick the right meaning for the right context and in the case of Pāli many of these forms were partially restored towards their OI orthography (like a glide restored to a stop). However this process did not take place in the other Prakrits, where the forms were not artificially restored but continued to evolve. In more complex situations, where the meaning was not obvious, several different back-formations were attempted and preserved, as no one was sure what the "correct meaning" was, or indeed whether a certain polysemy was intended by the creator, since several potential meanings fit the context. The examples given above show that in most cases the variants came from a single underlying source which was malleable and subject to interpretation—what has been called a "*koiné gangétique*" (Smith 1952: 178), and/or malleable *vohāra* (< OI *vy-ava-hṛ* "to carry on commerce, trade, deal with")—a simplified dialect used for trade and government where dialect peculiarities were removed and "common denominator" phonemes were used,

like glides for stops, aspirates for aspirated stops, geminates for conjuncts, where three sibilants become one, and liquids were interchanged, to name a few of the prominent features. Often this underlying transmission can be restored (at least hypothetically) by tracing back the variants to a common denominator source. Sometimes, as in example 16 above, this is impossible; although all the variants obviously belong to a common sonic stream, there is not enough data to determine diachronic priority. The influence of bilingual Dravidian/Munda speakers (who had to adapt the IA phonology to their own very different series of phonemes) has only been touched on here, and will be dealt with in a separate monograph.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

ABBREVIATIONS

AMg	Ardha-Māgadhī
Be	Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana Burmese recension
Ce	Buddha Jayanti Sinhalese recension
BHSD	Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary (Edgerton 1953/98)
DED	*Dravidian Etymological Dictionary* (Burrow and Emeneau 1984)
DTS	Dhammachai Tipiṭaka Series
DN	Dīgha Nikāya
Geiger	Geiger 1916/2005
GDhp	*Gāndhārī Dharmapada* (Brough 1962)
IA	Indo-Aryan
Jā	*Jātaka*
M1	Mayrhofer 1956–76
MI	Middle Indic
Nidd	*Niddesa*

non-IA	non Indo-Aryan
OI	Old Indic
Pd	*Paramatthadīpanī* VI (*Therīgāthā-aṭṭhakathā*)
Pischel	Pischel 1900/1981
Pj II	*Paramatthajotikā* (*Sutta Nipāta aṭṭhakathā*)
PTS	Pali Text Society
Se	Thai Syāmaraṭṭha recension
Sī	Sinhalese variant
Sn	*Sutta Nipāta* (4th-5th centuries BCE)
SN	*Saṃyutta Nikāya*
Sp	*Samantapāsadikā* (*Vinaya-aṭṭhakathā*)
Sv	Sumaṅgalavilāsinī
Th	*Theragāthā*
Ud	*Udāna*
Uv	*Udānavarga*

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Light on Epigraphic Pali:
More on the Buddha Teaching in Pali

Stefan Karpik

ABSTRACT—The view that the Buddha spoke Māgadhī, as reflected in the Eastern Aśokan inscriptions, is a myth of 20[th] century scholarship. Computer searches of the sources are now possible, and disprove that myth; in general, the term 'Māgadhī' was scrupulously avoided in the Pali commentaries. If attention is given instead to Salomon's 'central-western epigraphic Prakrit', it can be seen as a later reflex of Pali by a method of presentation unique to this paper. Accordingly, it should be merged with the existing category of Epigraphic Pali and serious attention given to the Theravada tradition that the Buddha spoke Pali. An outline of the development of Buddhist canons in India is provided on the hypothesis that Pali was the original Buddhist language for them all. This does not necessarily mean that Theravada texts are the most authentic Buddhist texts.

KEYWORDS: The Buddha, canon literature, Pali, Prakrit, epigraphy, Māgadhī, Monumental

The problem:

> One day, someone saw Mulla Nasrudin searching on the ground and asked:
>
> 'What have you lost?'
>
> 'My key.'
>
> 'Where did you drop it?'
>
> 'In my house.'
>
> 'Then, Mulla, why are you looking here?'
>
> 'There is more light here.'[1]

The relevance of this story is that the current consensus on the origins of Pali has focused on the Aśokan inscriptions and ignored Epigraphic Prakrit. Why wouldn't they? The Aśokan inscriptions are glittering: they are among the first inscriptions in India; they show an emperor in all his pomp and also in his humanity, e.g. his difficulty in eating less meat and his repentance for his conquest of the Kaliṅgas; they show the different accents spoken in India by bureaucrats, messengers and stone-masons in the mid-third century BCE, and they are readily found in single volumes by different editors. In contrast, Epigraphic Prakrit is dull; it consists mainly of the names and identities of donors; it is a standard language with little dialectical variety; it is scattered throughout many journals and volumes that cover a mere fraction of the whole. I sympathise with the Pali scholars of the 20[th] century, but they made a major error in trying to relate Pali to the eastern Aśokan inscriptions. This paper aims to correct this situation: the Aśokan inscriptions were an anomaly in the sweep of Indian epigraphy as their linguistic varieties are no longer recorded after the Mauryan period; on the other hand, Epigraphic Prakrit was the standard inscriptional language of India for several centuries before Sanskrit began to supersede it in the 2[nd] century CE. Most importantly, Epigraphic Prakrit is a later form of Pali, as I aim to demonstrate in this paper.

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[1] Story adapted from Shah (1966: 9).

The Māgadhī myth

It might be claimed that the analogy with the Mulla Nasrudin story is unfair because scholars had good reason for overlooking Epigraphic Prakrit in favour of the Aśokan inscriptions, namely the evidence that the Pali commentarial tradition had claimed the Buddha spoke Māgadhī. Norman (1983: 3) described the language of the eastern Aśokan inscriptions as 'Māgadhī', albeit distinct from the grammarians' Māgadhī, and (1983: 145 n.85) cited Mahāvaṃsa XXXVII 244 (*māgadhāya niruttiyā*)[2] as proof that Pali was 'Māgadhī'[3]. In fact, an oblique case of *māgadhī* should be *māgadhiyā* instead of *māgadhāya*, as Norman must have known, but must have judged as irrelevant. Actually, the Mahāvaṃsa refers to the 'Magadha language', not to Māgadhī and that is a significant difference, as will be shown. Furthermore, the Mahāvaṃsa did not say the *māgadhā nirutti* was translated at the First, Second or Third Council, or when the scriptures were written down in the 1st century BCE, or at any point. Norman was selectively relying on the Mahāvaṃsa as evidence that *māgadhā nirutti* was not Pali, an interpretation its writers would never have recognised. However, von Hinüber (2005: 181) among others followed this false trail by wrongly agreeing that the Mahāvaṃsa calls Pali 'Māgadhī' and by similarly regarding the Eastern Aśokan dialect as the referent of Māgadhī.[4]

Arguments against equating Pāli and Māgadhī have been made already (Karpik 2019a: 20–38), but I wish to make one additional point: the Māgadhī myth was developed before computer searches of Pali texts were possible. Such searches can now challenge three facets of that myth:

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[2] Norman gives a reference without quoting the text, but I presume this is what he referred to.

[3] The Māgadhī myth had existed at least since Lévi (1912) argued the original Buddhist canon was in the Eastern Aśokan dialect. Norman to his credit was attempting to provide evidence for this claim.

[4] Von Hinüber (1985a: 66) recognised that he was making an assumption when he called 'Māgadhī, traditionally used in ancient Ceylon, a notorious misnomer', while equating the Eastern Aśokan dialect with Māgadhī. What he did not realise is that there is no evidence that in ancient Ceylon the term 'Māgadhī' was ever used.

1. Pind (2021: 101–102) has argued that *bhikkhave* is not a Māgadhism, but a non-emphatic form of *bhikkhavo*.[5] He concludes (2021: 105): '... it is necessary to study the language of the Tipiṭaka as a language *sui generis* and not as a random patchwork of borrowings from other linguistic environments, inter alia "eastern" ones.'[6]

2. The Buddha, who was a Kosalan, is recorded as being in Kosala vastly more often than in Magadha in a large sample of the early Buddhist texts, i.e. the first four Nikāyas;[7]

3. The term 'Māgadhī' is nowhere to be found in the Tipiṭaka or its commentaries or sub-commentaries according to the online Digital Pali Reader (DPR). Instead there are at least fourteen circumlocutions, such as (I give one reference per work, in stem form if there are several endings in that work) the following:[8]

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[5] I assume Pind (2021: 84) was using a computer search when he stated: 'There are well over 26,000 instances of *bhikkhave* in the Pāli canon.' Karpik (2019a: 36–38) also comes to a similar conclusion, that *bhikkhave* had a different pragmatic function from *bhikkhavo*, the former to introduce a new topic, the latter to invite a response.

[6] For example, Pind (2021: 84) criticises Lüders (1954 §1) for claiming *seyyathā* is a Māgadhism: 'This in itself raises the obvious question why they would consistently utilise a particle that allegedly would stem from an "eastern" MI dialect in a "western" MI linguistic context. The only conclusion to draw from the evidence is that the early compilers of the Pāli canon preferred to use *seyyathā* because they did not consider this particle as dialectically incompatible with the canonical language.' Even if Māgadhisms could be proved, they do not prove that the Buddha's language was Māgadhī; they could be transmission errors by a Māgadhī speaker or borrowings: Trask (2010: 26) observes that the Anglo-Saxon *hi* was replaced by Old Norse *they*, *them* and *their*, and (2010: 96–98) there are hundreds of words of Danish origin in English; this does not mean that English was originally Old Norse or Danish.

[7] The details are at Karpik (2019a: 20–26). To be fair, Salomon (2018: 16–17) had already come to a similar conclusion based on a much smaller sample created without the help of computers by Gokhale (1982). However, Salomon did not comment on his conclusion's potential challenge to the Māgadhī myth, and perhaps a larger sample will enable more scholars to challenge that myth.

[8] Where PTS page or verse numbers are not available on the DPR, DPR section numbers within the text (prefixed §) or paragraph numbers from the search box (prefixed 'para.') are provided. The abbreviations are in the style of von Hinüber (2008), especially pp. 250–253.

Fourteen ways of not saying 'Māgadhī'

magadhabhāsā[9] (Sp i 255, Sp-ṭ §47, Sadd i 56, Vin-vn-pṭ §903)

māgadhanirutti (Pāc-y §285)

māgadhabhāsā (Sp i 255, Sp-ṭ para.82, Vmv para.42, Pālim-nṭ para.62, Mūla-s-ṭ para.1, Sv-pṭ i 20, Sv ii 560, Ps ii 35, Ps-pṭ para.61, Spk-pṭ para.59, Mp-ṭ para.73, Vv-a 174, As-mṭ para.25, Vibh-a 387, Vism-mhṭ para.18, Sadd i 56, Abhidh-av-nṭ §1189, Moh 186)

māgadhamūlāya bhāsāya (Mūla-s-ṭ para.8)

māgadhavacanato (Vin-vn-pṭ §1209)

māgadhavohāra (Sp-ṭ para.111, Kkh-ṭ para.48, Pāc-y §285, Sadd i 144)

māgadhā bhāsā (Abhidh-av-nṭ §1189)

māgadhāya niruttiyā (Mhv XXXVII 244) *pace* Norman and von Hinüber

māgadhikabhāsā (Abhidh-av-nṭ §1186, Moh 186)

māgadhikāya niruttiyā (Pālim §46)

māgadhikāya sabhāvaniruttiyā (Vmv para.70, Padarūpasiddhi §60)

māgadhikavohāre (Vin-vn-pṭ § 94)

māgadhikāya sabbasattānaṃ mūlabhāsāya (Ud-a 138, It-a i 126, Vism 441-2, Sadd i 208)

māgadhiko vohāro (Sp vi 1214)

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[9] The reading *magadhabhāsā* is that of the PTS, but it is *māgadhabhāsa* in DPR at Sp i 255 and Sadd i 56.

There are also six non-Magadha designations of Pali:

Six ways of not saying 'Magadha Language'
ariyaka (Vin iii 27, Sp i 250, Kkh-ṭ para.48)
ariyavohāro (Sp i 255)[10]
tantibhāsaṃ (Dhp-a i 1)
mūlabhāsā (Vin-vn-pṭ para.39, Pāc-y §218, Mūla-s para.2, Mūla-s-ṭ para.1)
pāḷibhāsaṃ (Vin-vn-pṭ para.82)[11]
sabhāvanirutti bhāsāya (Mūla-s-ṭ para.8)

Out of the above twenty names, the early designations of what we now call 'Pali', according to the Tipiṭaka and its commentaries, are:

Names for 'Pali' in the Canon and Commentaries
ariyaka (Vin iii 27), the term used by the Buddha himself for his language.
ariyavohāro (Sp i 255)
tantibhāsaṃ (Dhp-a i 1)
magadhabhāsā (Sp i 255), where the commentator equates *magadhabhāsā* with *ariyaka*.
māgadhikāya sabbasattānaṃ mūlabhāsāya (Ud-a 138, It-a i 126)
māgadhiko vohāro (Sp vi 1214)

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[10] Crosby (2004: 110 n.2) states that *ariyavohāro* does not refer to the language generally. I have not referred to contexts, e.g. not lying, where it is not a language name as the word means 'noble speech' in those. Similarly, *mūlabhāsā* is sometimes a language name contrasted with another language and sometimes a language description. I have taken *jinavacana* as equivalent to *buddhavacana* and neither as a language name.

[11] Vin-vn-pṭ is the Vinayatthasārasandīpanī, a commentary on the Vinayavinicchaya handbook, which Crosby (2004) regards as having the earliest extant use of *pāḷibhāsā* as a language. Von Hinüber (2008: 156) dates Vin-vn-pṭ to the 12th century CE. Crosby provides subsequent examples which are not currently on the DPR.

Remarkably, as the twenty names show, there was no standard designation for the language of the canon, certainly not *māgadhī*,[12] which currently occurs in the DPR only in a single poem, probably late, inserted in three obscure works unpublished by the PTS and which surely means *māgadhabhāsā*.[13] This contrasts with twenty non-Māgadhī designations, six of them from early texts. Currently, many scholars assume that the Magadha circumlocutions were merely alternative ways of saying 'Māgadhī', whereas I argue they were fourteen alternative ways of deliberately shunning that particular term. It is inconceivable that the authors of the above texts did not know the term 'Māgadhī', so I must conclude that they were studiously avoiding that term for the simple reason that they did not mean 'Māgadhī'.

What they meant was what the Buddha himself described as the *samañña*, the standard language,[14] of *Ariyaka*, the Aryan language,[15] which,

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[12] Here I argue against almost every authority, most recently against Oberlies (2019: 43), 'For the Theravāda tradition has always claimed that the language spoken by the Buddha was Māgadhī — i.e. an eastern language', and Bodhi (2020: 1), 'The Theravāda tradition identifies Pāli with Māgadhī, the language of the state of Magadha, where the Buddha often stayed.' These are simply unsubstantiated myths which are repeated so often that they appear true.

[13] There is a single poem of uncertain date, probably 2nd millennium, occurring in at least three works of secondary literature: *sā māgadhī mūlabhāsā | narā yāyādikappikā || brahmāno cāssutālāpā | sambuddhā cāpi bhāsare ||*; 'This Māgadhī is the original language. Men of whatever age, Brahma Gods who have not heard a word and fully enlightened ones speak it.' It is found in a Kaccāyana grammar, the Padarūpasiddhi §60, where Māgadhī is equated to *māgadhikāya sabhāvaniruttiyā*, 'the original Magadha speech'; Norman (1983: 164) dates this work to the 13th century. Both the Vinayālaṅkāraṭīkā (§46) and the Mūlasikkhāṭīkā Ganthārambhakathāvaṇṇanā (para.8) discuss *mūlabhāsā* and quote the poem. Neither makes an attribution to the poem, which is inserted into a prose commentary on other verses. Von Hinüber (2008:158, §337) attributes the former work to 17th century Burma, but (2008: 157, §333) regards the Khuddasikkhā and Mūlasikkhā as separate works and does not attribute a place or time to the Mūlasikkhā or even mention its *ṭīkā*; Müller (1883: 86) states that the Mūlasikkhā was known in 12th century Sri Lanka, but does not include the *ṭīkā* with his text. In all three cases, the poem is not integral to the texts, so it may be a later insertion and its dating cannot be secure. As the poem is unattributed and absent from primary texts, I assume it is not an early text. This is the only example currently in the DPR of the word *māgadhī*, which I take as poetic license *metri causa* for *māgadhabhāsā* and similar circumlocutions because *māgadhī* is not found in prose.

[14] MN 139 *Araṇavibhaṅgasutta*, M iii 230. This passage has been mistranslated by Lamotte and others into an injunction to avoid standard language, rather than, as is correct, its diametrical opposite, to adhere to standard language (Karpik (2019a: 46–48).

[15] The term *ariyaka* is given in DOP i 236b as 'the Ariya language'. The Buddha describes the language of the Buddhist order as *Ariyaka* at Vin iii 27. Levman (2021: 302 n. 438) reads *ariyaka*

aping the concept of Bronkhorst (2007), was the language of Greatest Magadha, a western variety which we now call 'Pali'. I believe they are harking back to the time of the Mauryan Magadhan empire at the time of Aśoka, who ruled c. 268–232 BCE, when Magadha was practically the whole of the Indian subcontinent, encompassing the entire *Ariyaka* speaking population, and when Buddhism came to Sri Lanka.[16] The Vinaya commentary actually equated *Ariyaka* and *māgadhabhāsa* (Sp i 255). Dating from the time of the missionary efforts of Aśoka's son, Mahinda, in Sri Lanka and King Devānaṃpiyatissa's gifts to Aśoka, 'Magadha' was likely to be an ancient Sri Lankan designation for north or mainland India, much as foreigners often call the UK 'England' and the Netherlands 'Holland', although they are merely parts of a whole. These historical overtones were especially relevant to scholars finalising the commentaries during the Gupta Magadhan empire, which under Chandragupta II, who ruled c. 375–415 CE, also encompassed much of the sub-continent.[17] We can conclude

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as 'an Aryan language', but I would counter as follows: the commentary (Sp i 255) explains that the text includes miscommunication between speakers of the same language: *tattha **ariyakaṃ** nāma ariyavohāro, māgadhabhāsā. **milakkhakaṃ** nāma yo koci anariyako andhadamiḷādi. **so ca na paṭivijānātī** ti bhāsantare vā anabhiññātāya buddhasamaye vā akovidatāya imaṃ nāma atthaṃ esa bhaṇatī ti na paṭijānāti*, '"Aryan" is the name of the Aryan tongue, the Magadha language. "Foreign" is the name of anything non-Aryan: Andha, Tamil, etc. "He does not understand" means through lacking knowledge in a different language or through lacking experience in Buddhist custom he does not understand that this person is speaking with that meaning'; the commentary sees *Ariyaka* as a unitary language and contrasts it with non-Ariyaka languages like Andha and Damiḷa; it mentions only one Aryan language, māgadhabhāsa, not varieties like Māgadhī or Kosalī; this is confirmed by the sub-commentary Sp-ṭ para.111: *anariyako ti māgadhavohārato añño*, '"non-Aryan" means different from the Magadha tongue'; an argument that all varieties of *Ariyaka* in the Buddha's day were mutually comprehensible is presented in Karpik (2019a:15–17, 58–69).

[16] An animation of the expansion of Magadha from the Buddha's day to Aśoka's is to be found at https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Kingdom_of_Magadha#Media/File:Magadha_Expansion_1.gif

[17] Here I follow Raychaudhuri (2006: 445) who described the Gupta empire as the second Magadhan Empire and (2006: 469) Pāṭaliputra as the original Gupta metropolis. Devahuti (1970: 34) also wrote: '... Magadha was historically the seat of paramount kings and the symbol of supremacy.' However, Thapar (2003: 282–288) believes the imperial Guptas originated in the western Ganges plain and the Magadha Guptas were a minor family restricted to the principality of Magadha; in my view, that would make the imperial Guptas all the more likely to claim Magadha as their own. Verardi (2014:180 n. 37) rejects the notion of Ayodhyā as a settled Gupta capital and thinks the Gupta capital was often itinerant. Still, I believe the following are settled facts: (a) Magadha was part of the Gupta empire; (b) its capital, Pāṭaliputra, was a thriving

that the *māgadhabhāsā* is far more likely to be an early form of Epigraphic Prakrit/Pali, which was used for many centuries throughout India both in Buddhist and non-Buddhist contexts, than the obscure Eastern Aśokan dialect which vanished from the inscriptional record within decades and which was probably unknown in Sri Lanka.[18] Twentieth-century scholars would not have followed the false trail of Pali being a westernised, Sanskritised Eastern Aśokan dialect if they had the possibility of computer searches or had paid sufficient attention to Epigraphic Pali. They never had solid evidence for 'Māgadhī' in Pali texts or for connecting Pali to the language of the eastern Mauryan bureaucracy. They also failed to use an emic approach to enter the thought world of ancient Sri Lankans for whom 'Magadha' was the vast empire of the time when Buddhism arrived in Sri Lanka. Instead of being cautious about their strange proposition that the Mahāvaṃsa or any Pali source provides evidence that the Buddha did not speak Pali, such scholars found the lure of the Aśokan inscriptions too tempting; hence the Māgadhī myth.

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city when Faxian visited c. 405 CE; (c) Samudragupta had a *praśasti* to himself inscribed on the Aśokan pillar moved to Allahabad/Prayag, thus linking his empire to the memory of Aśoka's; (d) according to Devahuti (1970: 217), even after the Guptas, 'Magadha' was so prestigious that in 641 CE King Harsha assumed the title of 'King of Magadha' although his capital in Kannauj was nearer to Delhi than Pāṭaliputra, modern Patna. Whatever the historical intricacies, the optics for Gupta era Pali commentators would be an empire demonstrating the reality of their traditions on the Aśokan empire and justifying the continued use of *māgadhabhāsā* for the language of a vast area of India.

[18] Wynne (2019: 9–10) suggests that the standard Buddhist language was a western, Kosalan variety, which I connect to Pali and Epigraphic Pali. To my knowledge, there is no mention of the Aśokan inscriptions in the Pali commentaries, still less of their language. In c. 400 CE, when the commentaries were being finalised, visitors from Sri Lanka to the pilgrimage sites of northern India would have seen inscriptions on Aśokan pillars, but may not have been able to read them since the Aśokan and Gupta scripts are significantly different from each other; they may not also have been able to date them, since *Devānampiya* and *Piyadasi* were titles used by several rulers (Hultzsch 1925: xxxi). Even if they could overcome these hurdles, they are more likely to name as *māgadhabhāsā* the widespread Epigraphic Pali inscriptions, so similar to their canon's language, from Buddhist sites like Bhārhut, Sāñcī, etc., than inscriptions in an obscure, extinct, local dialect.

Fig. 1. *Map of some locations in this paper (Source: Wiki Commons CC BY-SA 3.0 Uwe Dedering India relief location map, adapted)*

Epigraphic Prakrit/Pali

If my interpretation of *māgadhabhāsā* is correct, there should have been a standard widespread language very closely related to canonical Pali in existence from Aśoka's mission to Sri Lanka evident in inscriptions. Such a language did indeed exist, but there is no standard term for it: Bühler (1883: 78–79) called it 'Pali', Senart (1892: 258) 'Monumental Prakrit', Pischel (1957: §7) 'Leṇa Prakrit', and Salomon (1998: 265ff) 'central-western epigraphic Prakrit'. It is usually described in journals simply as 'Prakrit' and there are hundreds of inscriptions in this language, with Salomon (1998: 77) giving as examples the inscriptions of Buddhist sites such as Bhārhut, Sāñcī, Nāgārjunakoṇḍa and Amarāvatī and secular inscriptions from Hāthīgumphā and Nāsik; there are many more sites. Senart (1892: 258) states:

> In the period which extends from the 2nd century before our era to the 3rd century A.D., all the inscriptions which are not in Sanskṛit or Mixed Sanskṛit are couched in a dialect which may be designated by the name of Monumental Prākṛit.

I believe 'Epigraphic Pali' is the most accurate description of this language. Relating this variety to Pali is the, doubtless controversial, main innovation of this paper. In fact, my definition of Epigraphic Pali is: an inscription with the same vocabulary and grammar as canonical Pali, and displaying the same phonetic changes when compared to Vedic or Sanskrit.[19]

Here is the first of nine examples of Epigraphic Pali:

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[19] Franke (1902: 126-7) concluded, as I do, that Pali was a natural language and (1902: 150-154) a direct descendant of Vedic. However, he claimed to demonstrate the former by showing the similarities of Pali, which he called *literarische Pāli*, 'literary Pali', to *Gesamt-Pāli*, 'general Pali', his term for Prakrit or MIA (1902: vi). I believe that, with this broad definition, he weakened his first conclusion: for example, he included the eastern Aśokan inscriptions in *Gesamt-Pāli* although they have grammatical terminations (e.g. *a-* declension singular nominative *-e*, and ablative *-ate*) and sound differences (e.g. *kubhā* instead of Pali *guhā* and extensive *r > l*) which are rarely, or not at all, found in Pali or Epigraphic Pali. I claim my definition of Epigraphic Pali is more precise than *Gesamt-Pāli*, thus strengthening Franke's first conclusion by leaving very few changes untypical of Pali; moreover, it supports my further claim of Pali being the standard language of the Buddha's time, evidenced by the dominance of Epigraphic Pali in Indian inscriptions for centuries.

1. *Bhārhut, Madhya Pradesh. Stupa pillar inscription A1 (in full), 2nd century BCE* (Lüders et al. 1963: 11)

Text	1 Suganaṁ raje raño Gāgīputasa Visadevasa 2 pauteṇa Gotiputasa Āgarajusa puteṇa 3 Vāchhiputena Dhanabhūtina kāritaṁ toranāṁ 4 silākaṁmaṁto cha upaṁno
English translation (Lüders et al.)	During the reign of the Sugas (Śungas) the gateway was caused to be made and the stonework (i.e. carving) presented[20] by Dhanabhūti, the son of a Vācchī (Vātsī), son of Āgaraju (Āngārdyut), the son of a Gotī (Gauptī) and grandson of king Visadeva (Viśvadeva), the son of Gāgī (Gārgī).[21]
Edited text (corrections by Lüders et al.)	1. Suṅgānaṁ[22] [23] raje raño Gāgīputasa Visadevasa 2. poteṇa[24] Gotiputasa Āgarajusa puteṇa[25] 3. Vāchhiputena Dhanabhūtina kāritaṁ toraṇaṁ[26] 4. silākaṁmaṁto cha upaṁno

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[20] 'Presented' is an unusual translation of *uppanno*; I would expect 'promoted' or 'organised' in this context. However, I don't understand the correct nuance and perhaps Lüders and his team did.

[21] Falk (2006: 149) gives an interesting translation (slightly edited): 'This gate was made by Dhanabhūti, son of a mother from the (Bhṛgu) Vātsa gotra and of Āgaraju (Āngārdyut), himself son of a mother from the Gaupta gotra and of king Viśvadeva, himself son of a mother from the (Bhāradvāja) Gārga gotra.' He emphasises that it is the mother's lineage which defines status and conjectures (2006:148): 'it seems as if a ruler without a mother from a traditional brahmin family was lacking something.'

[22] *ṅ* was inserted according to Lüders et al. (1963: xxiii §24(a)) since the *anusvāra* is often omitted in *ṅg* and *ṅgh* clusters.

[23] The change from *a* to *ā* was suggested by Lüders et al. (1963: xvi §6,14 n.1) to conform with other Bhārhut inscriptions.

[24] Change suggested by Lüders et al. (1963: 11 n.2) as the diphthong *au* does not occur elsewhere at Bhārhut and was thought to be a stonemason's accident.

[25] 'The cerebral nasal *ṇ* is, however, in all cases changed to *n*, except in the inscriptions A1 and A2' (Lüders et al. 1963: xix §12(c)). This might suggest that the pillar inscription is a late part of the site. This is strengthened by the observation of Sircar (1965: 89): 'The absence of the Śuṅga king's name in the inscription may suggest that the Śuṅga power was then on the decline.'

[26] Change suggested by Lüders et al. (1963: xv §5 (II), 11 n.3) as the *nā* (I) is the result of an engraver's omission of the top left bar of *ṇa* (I) in Brāhmī script.

Modern spelling[27]	1. Suṅgānaṃ rajje rañño Gāgīputtassa Vissadevassa[28] 2. poteṇa Gotiputtassa Āgarajussa putteṇa 3. Vāchiputtena[29] Dhanabhūtinā[30] kāritaṃ toraṇaṃ 4. silākammanto ca uppanno
My Pali translation (Differences from modern spelling in bold)	1. Suṅgānaṃ[31] rajje rañño Gāgīputassa Vissadevassa 2. pote**n**a[32] Gotiputassa Āgarajussa putte**n**a 3. Vāchiputtena Dhanabhūtinā kāritaṃ toraṇaṃ 4. silākammanto ca uppanno
Sound change(s) from Pali	*potena > poteṇa and puttena > putteṇa. na > ṇa* (see Geiger §42.5, Pischel §224 for examples).

The direction of the sound change shows that the inscription is in a later form of Pali; it is shown early in Pali words by Geiger and later in the literary Prakrits by Pischel. The inscription shows an extension of a change already started in canonical Pali, which completes to all instances of *n*, perhaps five centuries later, as evidenced in the Bagh inscription given below. This slow process is not unique to Pali; Aitchison (2001: 92-93) gives the example of French words ending in vowel plus *n* changing pronunciation into a nasalised vowel without *n* over a 500-year period.

[27] Early Brāhmī script does not indicate double consonants (Lüders et al. 1963: xxi §17) and uses the *anusvāra* for a nasal in a consonant cluster (Lüders et al. 1963: xxiii §*24(d)*). Lüders transliterated *c* as *ch* and *ch* as *chh*.

[28] Lüders et al. (1963: xxiii §21(c)) suggest *Vissadeva* (*ss* medially).

[29] Lüders et al. (1963: xxi n1) state: 'In a few cases where we have a long vowel before the assimilated cluster, the single consonant does not stand for the double one.' It is also worth noting that the simplification of the Sanskrit name also follows the rules of Pali phonetics: *Vātsī > Vāchī*, 1. *āts > acch* (Geiger §57, p. 50, §5a), 2. *acch > āch* (Geiger §5.b)

[30] Lüders et al. (1963: xv §6): '[the vowel ā] is represented as a short vowel in some cases mostly due to the negligence of the scribe and should in fact be taken to stand for a long vowel in such cases.'

[31] None of the proper names are attested in Pali dictionaries, except *vissa* and *deva* in Vissadeva.

[32] *Pota*, 'the young of an animal', does not have the meaning 'grandson' attested in Pāli dictionaries, but it could also be a formation from Sanskrit *pautra*, 'grandson' (1. *au > o*, Geiger §15; 2. *tr > tt* regressive assimilation, Geiger §53.2; 3. *tt > t* to preserve the Law of Morae, Geiger §5.b); *pauta* was in fact the original reading, but was emended by the editors as a mason's mistake.

I follow a unique procedure in showing the connection between canonical and epigraphic Pali:

1. I provide both edited text and modernised spelling. These steps make the identification of Pali easier.

2. A translation into Pali is offered. This too is uncommon, as the standard comparison is with Sanskrit, as in Sircar (1965).

3. Sound changes from Pali to the inscription are documented and compared to known phonological changes from Vedic or Sanskrit to Pali and the literary Prakrits.

4. To provide a fairly random sample, I choose the beginning of the inscription in each case, except to answer certain critics.

One such critic would have been Lévi (1912: 496–497). Out of over 200 Bhārhut inscriptions, Lévi selected *Anādhapeḍiko* for *Anāthapiṇḍako*, *Maghādeva* for *Makhādeva*[33] and *avayesi* for *avādesi*[34] as examples of an older pre-canonical language which was later Sanskritised to produce Pali. However, he did not consider the possibility that Pali might be the older variety, basing his argument on the false premise that Pali is late.[35] These sound changes do not

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[33] *Makhādeva* is found in the DPPN; the Burmese edition has *Maghadeva*.

[34] In Lüders et al. (1963) they are at: B32, p. 105 (*Anādhapeḍiko*); B57, p. 149 (*Maghādeva*); B51, p. 131 (*avayesi*).

[35] Lévi may have been influenced by his countryman, Senart (1892: 271–272) who, on the mistaken assumption that a standard language must be a literary language, argued that Pali, as well as the Jain canon, was a literary language of the 3rd century CE or later modelled on the literary Prakrits. However, see Karpik (2019a: 58–69) for a description of how a standard language could have developed naturally in Indo-Aryan.

Lévi (1912: 512) also believed that the title *Lāghulovāde musāvādaṃ adhigicya* of the sutta recommended to the sangha by Aśoka in the Bhabra/Bairāṭ-Calcutta inscription (probably MN 61, *Ambalaṭṭhikārārāhulovāda Sutta*, in Pali) was a sample of the original language of the canon. I see this argument as naïve, as if calling the sutta 'Advice to Rāhula on lying' would suggest that the original was in English. Yet he did have a more substantial point: there are sound changes that should not allow a derivation from Pali or Sanskrit of the Aśokan title, which he called a Magadhan dialect. He correctly pointed out that the *gh* of *Lāghula* (Pali *Rāhula*) is a form earlier than Pali (Geiger §37); I can also point to the Aśokan inscriptions at the Barabar Caves where a cave is *kubhā* (Pali, Sanskrit *guhā*), which must be related through Proto-Indo-European to Latin *cavus* and English *cave*; the *k* is the earlier form, *g* the later (Geiger §38.1). (On the other hand, he also noted the more advanced *adhigicya*, compared to Sanskrit *adhikṛtya* and Pali *adhikicca*. In addition, he stated that *r > l* is a Māgadhism, but Pali has both *r > l* and *l > r* according to Geiger, §44,

have the correct time sequence if Pali were a first millennium phenomenon; therefore, he assumed they must have been Sanskritised and, as they are allegedly Sanskritised, the first of these pairs must be the original pre-canonical language. However, one gets a simpler and more elegant argument if one takes Pali as a 5th century BCE standard language and applies sound changes found in Pali and other language varieties: I cite Geiger §38.4 and Pischel §203 *tha > dha* (the sound change that Lévi questioned[36]) for *Anāthapiṇḍako > Anādhapeḍiko*; Geiger §38.1a and Pischel §202 *kha > gha* for *Makhādeva > Maghādeva* and Geiger §36 *d > y* for *avādesi > avayesi*.[37] My view is that Pali is a snapshot of the language at a particular stage of development, when the Buddha was teaching and in the 4th century when the canonical texts were being composed, and the Bhārhut inscriptions are a snapshot at a later stage of development of sound changes that were already unfolding in Pali, but not in every possible instance all at once. According to the principle of Occam's Razor, this is the better, simpler hypothesis and avoids speculation regarding Sanskritisation.

A western-central dialect at Bhārhut in central India is no great surprise, nor is a similarity to Pali in inscriptions at a Buddhist site. However, in eastern India, we have the same dialect in a secular context from a king with Jain sympathies:

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§45; he claimed the same for the nominative masculine singular *-e* termination, but this is found sporadically in the Northwest and in Pali and this inscription actually comes from the West, from Rajasthan.) He therefore took these archaic features as proof of later Sanskritisation in both the Pali and Sanskrit canons of the Eastern Aśokan dialect, but I take them as proof that the original Buddhist language was not in in that dialect.

[36] As for *-peḍiko* versus *-piṇḍiko*, Lévi did not discuss it. Geiger §6.3 has Sanskrit to Pali *siṃha > sīha* and *viṃśatī > vīsati*, so one would expect *-pīḍiko*; there could also be another change *-pīḍiko > -peḍiko* on the analogy of Geiger §10 *Uruvilvā > *Uruvillā > *Uruvella > Uruvelā.* Furthermore, Lüders et al. (1963: xvii §7 (III)) note *i > e* in another simplified cluster, *Viśvabhu > Vesabhu*, so I assume this is a genuine sound change, not a spelling mistake.

[37] Lévi (1912: 497) regarded this last example as '*absolument décisif*', 'absolutely decisive'. He quotes Pischel §186–87 *d > ẏ* for *avaẏesi* where there is indeed the analogous Sanskrit *hṛdaya > hiẏaẏa* in Jain dialects (*hadaya* in Pali), which he argues 'proves' Pali's eastern origins. There are problems with this: (1) *d > y* exists within Pali (Geiger §36 *khādita > khāyita*); (2) it is not certain that *y* and *ẏ* are equivalent in central India in the last two centuries BCE (*ẏ* is a weakly articulated *y*); (3) the inscription is not in a Jain context to justify this specific sound; (4) it fails to exclude the possibility that Pali is earlier than the inscription.

2. *Hāthīgumphā Cave, Odisha. Khāravela inscription (in part), 1ˢᵗ century BCE* (Barua 1929: 7).[38]

Text edited by Barua	Namo ar(i)haṃtānaṃ[.] Namo sava-sidhānaṃ[.] Airena mahārājena mahāmeghavāhanena Ceta-rāja-vaṃsa-vadhanena pasatha-subha-lakhanena caturaṃta-(rakhaṇa[39])-guṇa-upatena Kaliṃgā-dhipatinā siri-Khāravelena paṃdarasa-vasāni siri-kaḍāra-sarīravatā kīḍitā kumāra-kīḍikā[.]
My literal translation	Honour to Arahats. Honour to all Siddhas. By his lordly and great majesty, the Mahāmeghavāhanan, descendant[40] of the royal line of Ceta, with a praised auspicious sign, with the virtue of protecting the four quarters, by the Lord of Kaliṅga, Sir Khāravela, for fifteen years with his light-brown body princely sport was played.
Modern spelling	Namo arihantānaṃ. Namo savva-siddhānaṃ. Airena mahārājena mahāmeghavāhanena Ceta-rāja-vaṃsa-vaddhanena pasattha-subha-lakkhanena caturanta-rakkhaṇa-guṇa-upatena Kaliṅgā-dhipatinā siri-Khāravelena pandarasa-vassāni siri-kaḍāra-sarīravatā kīḍitā kumāra-kīḍikā.
My Pali translation	Namo ar**a**hantānaṃ. namo sa**bb**a-siddhānaṃ. Ayirena mahārājena mahāmeghavāhanena ceta-rāja-vaṃsa-vaddhanena pasattha-subha-lakkhanena caturanta-rakkhaṇa-guṇop**e**tena Kaliṅgā-dhipatinā siri-Khāravelena pa**nn**arasa-vassāni siri-kaḍāra[41]-sarīravatā kī**ḷ**itā kumāra-kī**ḷ**ikā.

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[38] Salomon (1998: 257) regards Barua's work as an example of an important or model monograph, although he omitted it from his index of inscriptions (1998: 336).

[39] This part of the inscription is hard to read. Sircar (1965: 214) has *luṭha(ṇa)*, while Jayaswal & Banerji (1933: 79) have *luṭhita*, both presumably meaning 'roam' or 'reach'.

[40] Literally 'increaser' or 'prolonger'. PED *vaddhana* is a variant of *vaḍḍhana* 'increasing, augmenting, fostering; increase, enlargement, prolongation'.

[41] The meaning of *kaḍāra*, 'tawny' is given by the PED under the heading *kaḷāra*. Neither DOP nor CPD gives kaḍāra.

Sound changes	*arahantānaṃ > arihantānaṃ. a > i. i* is the most common *svarabakti* vowel (Geiger §30, Pischel §133), in this particular case, Sanskrit arhat > arihat.
	sabba > savva. bb > vv. bb is unique to Pali (Geiger §51.3); *b > v* (Pischel §201).
	ayirena > airena. 1. Metathesis of *r* and *y ariya > ayira* (Geiger §47.2). 2. Dropping of intervocalic y (Pischel §186).
	guṇopetena > guṇa-upatena. 1. *o > a-u.* Sandhi absent from compound. 2. *e > a* is an anomalous change, but the reading is uncertain; Sircar (1965:214) has *upitena,* Jayaswal & Banerji (1933:79) have *opahitena.*
	pannarasa > pandarasa. n > d Anomalous change. Possibly a portmanteau word combining Pali *pannarasa* and *pañcadasa,* alternatives for 'fifteen', because *pannarasa* does not have the *d* that suggests *dasa* 'ten'.
	kīḷitā > kīḍitā and *kīḷikā > kīḍikā. ḷ > ḍ* (See discussion below.)

Barua (1929: 158) noted Pali is close to Vedic in retaining *ḷ* instead of adopting Sanskrit *ḍ.* However, the Hāthīgumphā inscription (H) conforms to Sanskrit (Skt) and Ardha-Māgadhī (AMg) in this regard. Vedic *krīḷa* and Pali *kīḷikā*, 'sport', become *krīḍā* (Skt), *kīḍiyā* (AMg) and *kīḍikā* (H). Vedic *krīḷitā* and Pali *kīḷitā*, 'played', become *krīḍitā* (Skt), *kiḍḍā* (AMg) and *kīḍitā* (H). This sound change is especially interesting because it places Pali as earlier than Classical Sanskrit, Ardha-Māgadhī and the Hāthīgumphā inscription.[42] Oberlies (2019: 18-42) documents many other Vedic features in Pali not found in Classical Sanskrit and these too suggest the antiquity of Pali.

For this inscription, I cannot find a rule for every sound change, as is typical of natural languages: for example, in English, some people say *ashume*, /əˈʃuːm/, for *assume,* /əˈsjuːm/ or /əˈsuːm/, and *amacher*, /ˈamətʃə/, for *amateur*, /ˈamətə/ or /ˈamətjʊə/, and it is unclear which variants will prove to be regular, which sporadic and which extinct; similarly, Geiger (§60–64) gives details of sporadic aberrations in Pali. Nevertheless, Barua (1929: 157) wrote: 'Leaving the spelling and pronunciation of a few words out of consideration, we can

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[42] Oberlies (2019: 19) has *kīḷati* in his discussion of Vedic features in Pali. However, Pischel §240 reverses the historical situation stating that as a rule *ḍ* becomes *ḷ*, but there is no agreement among grammarians; Geiger §35 also reverses the historical order. Part of the problem must be that although Classical Sanskrit is for good reasons considered to be Old Indo-Aryan and the Prakrits and Pali as later Middle Indo-Aryan, this feature of Classical Sanskrit changed before it did so in Pali and some Prakrit. For further discussion on *ḍ* and *ḷ*, see Karpik (2019a: 54).

say that their language is Pāli, and nothing but Pāli.' Jayaswal & Banerji (1933: 73) state: 'The language of the record is a very near approach to the canonical Pali.' Sircar (1965: 213) describes the language as 'Prakrit resembling Pāli.' Norman (1993a: 87) concurs: 'There is, in fact, very little difference between Pāli, shorn of its Māgadhisms and Sanskritisms, and the language of the Hāthīgumphā inscription.' While I seriously doubt that there are a significant number of Māgadhisms or Sanskritisms in Pali, Norman's acknowledgement of the closeness of Pali and this inscription is welcome.

However, Norman (1983: 4–5) does not identify it as a form of Pali: 'The language of the Hāthīgumphā inscription, although it agrees with Pāli in the retention of most intervocalic consonants and in the nominative singular in -*o*, nevertheless differs in that the absolutive ending is -*(t)tā*, and [...] there are no consonant groups containing -*r*-.' I believe these are changes one would expect from a natural language. Pali has the sound change, *tv* > *tt*, from Sanskrit *sattva, catvāriṃśat, -tva* (abstract noun suffix) > Pali *satta, cattārīsa, -tta*;[43] it is not surprising that this same change later spread to the absolutive -*tvā* > -*ttā* (Pischel §298). We see this change in line 3 of the inscription where we have Pali *acintayit**v**ā* > (H) *acittayit**t**ā* (in modern spelling, *acitayitā* in the inscription). As for dropping *r* in clusters, these are rare in Pali and the obvious candidate for this inscription is the Pali loanword from Sanskrit *brāhmaṇa*,[44] which in line 8 appears as *bamhaṇa* with simplification of the initial consonant cluster, the long vowel shortened according to the Law of Morae and metathesis of *h* and *m* on the analogy of Geiger §49.1 (Skt.) *sāyāhna* > Pali *sāyaṇha*, 'evening'. Norman appears to be saying in this context that there is no continuity between Pali and the language of this inscription, but his argument does not stand up if we compare English from different periods:

Shakespeare (1623) First Folio. (Folger copy no. 68 p. 156 Hamlet)	Modern English (by author)
This aboue all; to thine owne ſelfe be true: And it muſt follow, as the Night the Day, Thou canſt not be falſe to any man.	This above all: to your own self be true, And it must follow, as the night the day, You cannot be false to any man.

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[43] This change has been overlooked by Geiger (1994) and Oberlies (2019), though not by Pischel. Von Hinüber (1982: 133–135) confirms the change.

[44] *Brāhmaṇa* as a loanword is discussed in Karpik (2019a: 57).

If I understand Norman correctly, he appears to be saying the equivalent of: 'Although modern English agrees with Shakespearean English in some respects, it nevertheless differs because it does not use *thine*, *thou* and *canst* and therefore they cannot be called the same language.' I think few native English speakers would agree with this proposition as the showing of films of Shakespeare plays in cinemas in English-speaking countries without modern English sub-titles should demonstrate. Norman goes on to claim that, because of the differences, Pali was an artificial, ecclesiastical language, but I claim the opposite, that it was a natural evolving secular language as evidenced by Epigraphic Pali.

Von Hinüber (1982) also claimed the *-tvā* absolutive demonstrated that Pali was an artificial language, but I regard his arguments as outdated:

a. he claimed (1982: 133–135) that the *-tvā* absolutive was a later Sanskritisation because it did not follow the sound change of Old Indo-Aryan *-tv* to Pali *-tt* evidenced in *sattva > satta* and *catvāra > cattāra*; however, Aitchison (2001: 84–85) criticises the view that a sound change happens at the same time in all instances, and dates that view to the Neo-Grammarians of the 1870s; as we have seen, she (2001: 92–93) gives the example of French words ending in vowel + *n* changing pronunciation into a nasalised vowel without *n* over a 500-year period. However, the situation can be more complex than this: Trask (2010: 11–12) discusses *r* dropping in British English, where 'farther' and 'father' sound identical; it was recorded in London in the early 1800s in the work of the poet, John Keats, and it spread throughout England and Wales and to the eastern United States; however, Millar (2012: 17–26) records that *r* dropping reversed in New York city in the mid 20th century because it became perceived as less prestigious; it is not clear to me if this sound change will ever completely spread throughout the English speaking world, but it will surely take more centuries to do so, if at all.[45] I believe that canonical Pali *-tvā* did later change

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[45] Millar (2012: 29–41) provides two more examples of sounds changes in English spread across centuries.

naturally to *-ttā* in Epigraphic Pali, thus completing the *tv >tt* change; this is the simplest and most elegant hypothesis according to Occam's Razor and historical sociolinguistics provides parallels for a piecemeal lengthy process;[46]

b. von Hinüber (1982: 135–137) suggested that 5 nominative agent nouns in *-(t)tā* with *abhijānāti* and *sarati* could be mistaken readings for an absolutive in *-ttā*; Pind (2005) used computer searches to examine 45 such instances and found no evidence for such a *-ttā* absolutive in Pali sources; for example, he (2005: 511 §12) pointed out that the alleged *-ttā* absolutive occurs only in the anomalous sentence final position and found it difficult to understand (2005: 508 §6) that it appears only in conjunction with *abhijānati* and *sarati* and, furthermore, that only in this circumstance did it escape the alleged Sanskritisation of thousands of other instances into *-tvā*.[47] A case against the existence of the *-ttā* absolutive in canonical Pali can also be found in Karpik (2019b:107–108);

c. von Hinüber (1982: 137–138) regarded *katvā* and *disvā* as proof of artificiality as they cannot be derived from Sanskrit according to phonetic laws. I suggest either he is incorrect[48] or they are 'backformations', where a native speaker creates pseudo-derivational rules; Gaeta (2010: 153) gives examples of backformations in natural languages, for example, deriving 'burgle' from the French loanword 'burglar' or German *notlanden* 'to make an emergency landing' from

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[46] The discipline of historical sociolinguistics is widely thought to have its beginnings in 1982 with the work of Suzanne Romaine, so von Hinüber was not at fault for being unaware of its findings.

[47] Wynne (2013: 151–155) did not answer these arguments when, on the grounds that many *-ttā* forms are not derived from the verbal root, he rejected Pind's understanding of the alleged absolutives as all agent nouns. However, variant formations are common in Pali and native Pali speakers ignorant of grammatical fictions like verbal roots may well have created backformations of this rare form. In my view, coupled with the existence of the parallel construction in Sanskrit using the agent noun in sentence final position, Pind's arguments are stronger.

[48] Karpik (2022: 133) suggests possible derivations and points out that Geiger §209 calls *katvā* and *disvā* 'historical forms'. However, whether they are truly historical forms or backformations, they are not proof of an artificial language.

Notlandung 'an emergency landing'. Backformations are so common in natural languages that they are discussed in several elementary textbooks on linguistics, e.g. Hudson (2000: 263–264) gives 'televise', 'burger', '-athon', '-gate' and '-holic' as backformations and suggests they arise from metanalysis, a process whereby learners (including adults) analyse the data of their language somewhat differently from the previous generation;

d. while I agree with von Hinüber (1982: 138) that there was some Sanskritisation of Pali, I don't regard it as proof of artificiality. The Sanskritisation is probably accidental, minimal and, in my view, inevitable as a consequence of the many *tatsama*s in Pali and Sanskrit and of a manuscript tradition approaching two millennia maintained mainly by non-native speakers who often knew Sanskrit;

e. while I suspect that von Hinüber (1982: 139) is correct in finding faint evidence for awareness of a *-ttā* absolutive in Hybrid Sanskrit, my interpretation is different: this absolutive is found in Epigraphic Pali inscriptions and demonstrates the natural evolution of Pali from canonical *-tvā* to later *-ttā* found in epigraphy, the literary Prakrits and, presumably, in later speech.

To emphasise the secular nature of Pali, here is an example of a 3rd century BCE Epigraphical Pali inscription; it is engraved on a cave wall by an open-air theatre and is a poem on the subject of hearing poetry in spring, perhaps in that theatre; it has what may be the earliest extant use of the *daṇḍa* as a punctuation mark:

3. *Sītābeṅgā Cave, Chhattisgarh. Wall inscription (in full), 3ʳᵈ Century BCE*
(Bloch 1906: 124)

Text	1. adipayaṁti hadayaṁ | sabhāva-garu kavayo e rātayaṁ … 2. dule vasaṁtiyā | hāsāvānūbhūte | kudasphataṁ evaṁ alaṅg. [t.]
My translation	1. Truly respected poets set the heart alight. They at night … 2. At the spring festival when laughter and desire[49] arise, they thus hang (garlands) rich in jasmine.[50]
Corrections by Bloch	1. adipayaṁti hadayaṁ | sabhāva-garu kavayo [y]e rātayaṁ … 2. dule vasaṁtiyā | hāsāvānūbhūte | kudasphataṁ evaṁ alaṅg[enti]
Modern spelling	1. adipayanti hadayaṃ | sabhāva-garu kavayo ye rātayaṃ … 2. dule vasantiyā | hāsāvānūbhūte | kudasphataṃ evaṃ alaṅgenti.
My Pali translation	1. **ādī**payanti hadayaṃ sabhāva-garu-kavayo, ye **rattā**yaṃ … 2. dolāya vasantassa hāsāvānu**bbh**ūtāya ku**nd**apa**ph**ītaṃ evaṃ ālaṅgenti. (2. dule vasantiyā hā**s**avan**ubbh**ūte …[51])

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[49] Bloch (1906) and Falk (1991) translate *vāna* as 'music', but I cannot find this meaning in Pali or Sanskrit dictionaries. I am following *vāna*² in the PED, while they appear to follow Sanskrit *vāṇa* and assume *vāna* is an equivalent.

[50] Bloch's translation is: 'Poets venerable by nature kindle the heart, who … [*rātayaṁ* untranslated]. At the swing (festival) of the vernal (full-moon), when frolics and music abound, people thus (?) tie (*around their necks garlands*) thick with jasmine flowers.'

[51] This is the translation if Pali was known to have variants of *dula* for Sanskrit *dola*, 'swing festival' and *vasanti* for *vasanta*. Although the corpus of Pali literature is vast, it cannot be presumed to document every variant form and it already shows many variants with different pronunciations and genders.

Sound changes	*ādīpayanti* > *adipayanti*, etc. This and other changes in vowel length may be *metri causa* or spelling mistakes.[52] (Falk edited this instance as *ādīpayanti*.)[53] *rattā* > *rāta*. Compensatory lengthening (Geiger §5.b).[54] *ubbhūte* > *ūbhūte*. Compensatory lengthening (Geiger §5.b). *kundaphītaṃ* > *kudasphataṃ*. 1. *n > ø*. Anomalous loss of nasal or incorrect reading. 2. *ph < sph*. Retention of sibilant or incorrect reading.[55]

Bloch (1906: 131) says of this poem: 'Its language is closely related to the so-called Lena-dialect or the Prākrit of the other cave inscriptions. This dialect stands nearer to the Śaurasenī of the dramas in certain points, such as the retention of *r*, the final *o*, and the dental sibilant *s* instead of the palatal *ś*.' Pali, too, has these same features. Falk (1991: 273) calls the language 'western' in contrast to the adjoining Jogīmārā cave inscription in Māgadhī, also of the Aśokan period. While the reading of the second line is disputed, the first line is obviously in Pali, even canonical Pali. This means that the traditional division of Aśokan-era dialects into Eastern, Western and North-western is incomplete, as Pali and Māgadhī are also attested at this site, while Sanskrit and Ardha-Māgadhī must have also have existed then. It also implies that Pali existed before the 3rd century BCE, the time of the earliest inscriptions in India.

Here is an inscription on sacrifice to Vedic gods; it looks more like Pali than Sanskrit:

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[52] Salomon (1998: 64–65) refers to 'extremes of carelessness in the planning and execution' of early Indian inscriptions in general.

[53] Falk (1991: 271–272), unlike Bühler, worked from copies; he edited the text on palaeographic and metrical grounds as:

1. *ādīpayaṃti hadayaṃ sabhävagarukavayo e ?? ta yaṃ(?)*

2. *dūle vāsaṃtīyä hāsāvānūbhūte kuṃdeṣu taṃ eva ālagitaṃ,* meaning: '*Sie entflammen das Herz, die Dichter, die aus ihrer Natur heraus ehrwürdig sind....; wenn die Schaukel des Frühlingsfestes erstanden ist unter Lachen und Musik, wird es [das Herz des Zuschauers] in die Jasmin-Sträucher gehängt.*', 'They set the heart alight, the poets, who by their very nature are venerable....; when the Spring Festival swing is up amid laughter and music, it [the heart of the audience] will be hung in the jasmine bushes' (My translation via Google Translate). He claims that the motif of the heart hanging in a tree is well known from the 4th book of the Pañcatantra and he identifies the metre as an unusual Āryā. As no-one can complete the poem, I don't see his or other interpretations presented here as conclusive, but I offer them as an example of the difficulty of reading some epigraphs.

[54] 'Compensatory lengthening' is the term of Oberlies (2019: 28, §3(22)).

[55] Falk has *kundeṣu taṃ* for *kundasphātaṃ*, but, in my view, *ṣ* for *s* would be a spelling mistake if that is the correct reading.

4. *Nānāghāṭ Cave, Maharashtra. Wall inscription (in part), 1ˢᵗ century BCE*

(Bühler 1883: 60)

Text	1. [oṁ namo prajāpati]no Dhaṁmasa namo Idasa namo Saṁkaṁsana-Vāsudevānaṁ Chaṁda-sūtānaṁ [mahi]mā[v] atānaṁ chatuṁnaṁ chaṁ lokapālānaṁ Yama-Varuna-Kubera-Vāsavānaṁ namo kumāra-varasa Vedisirisa ra[ñ]o 2. ... [v]īrasa sūrasa apratihatachakasa Dakhi[nāpa]ṭha[patino]....
My translation	1. [*Om honour*] to Dharma [*Lord of created beings*]; adoration to Indra, honour to Saṅkarṣaṇa and Vāsudeva, the children of the Moon, who turned towards earth,[56] and to the four guardians of the world, Yama, Varuṇa, Kubera and Vāsava; honour to king Vediśri, the best of royal princes! 2. ... of the brave hero, whose succession is unbroken, [*of the lord of*] the Deccan ...
Modern spelling	1. oṃ namo prajāpatino Dhammassa namo Idassa namo Saṅkaṃsana-Vāsudevānaṃ Canda-sūtānaṃ mahim āvattānaṃ catunnaṃ caṃ lokapālānaṃ Yama-Varuna-Kubera-Vāsavānaṃ namo kumāra-varassa Vedisirissa rañño 2. ......vīrassa sūrassa apratihatacakkassa Dakkhiṇāpaṭhapatino....
My Pali translation	1. oṃ namo **p**ajāpatino Dhammassa namo Idassa namo Saṅkaṃsana-Vāsudevānaṃ Canda-s**u**tānaṃ mahim āvattānaṃ catunnaṃ **ca** lokapālānaṃ Yama-Varuna-Kubera-Vāsavānaṃ namo kumāra-varassa Vedisirissa rañño 2. ......vīrassa sūrassa a**p**atihatacakkassa Dakkhiṇāpaṭhapatino....

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[56] Bühler translates *mahimāvatānaṃ* as 'endowed with majesty', and Sircar (1965: 195) has *mahimavadbhyāṃ* as his Sanskrit equivalent. However, I read it as *mahim āvattānaṃ* 'who turned towards Earth', referring to the legend that Saṃkarshaṇa and Vāsudeva were two of the five heroes of the Vṛṣṇi clan of the Mathura area (Quintanilla 2009: 212). Shaw (2007: 53–55) states that, when the Bhagavata cult evolved from *vīravāda* (hero doctrine) to *vyūhavāda* (manifestation doctrine), the members of the Vṛṣṇi clan were no longer seen as earthly beings. The inscription appears to state the two heroes were gods of lunar descent who manifested themselves on earth, while perhaps remaining in heaven, and it thus belongs to the *vyūhavāda* tradition. This would explain why only the two heroes have an epithet in this list of gods, the reason being to explain their new status as deities to any who might think they were mere heroes.

Sound changes	***p**ajāpatino* > ***pr**ajāpatino* and *apatihatacakkassa* > *apratihatacakkassa*. *p* > *pr* (See discussion below on retention of *r*) *s**u**tānaṃ* > *s**ū**tānaṃ*. *u* > *ū* (Bühler (1883: 61 n.3) thought the long *ū* was a fissure in the rock, a scribal mistake or the influence of local dialect) *ca* > *caṃ* (Bühler (1883: 60 n.1) simply says to read ca for *caṃ*)

The only non-Pali feature of this inscription is the retention of *r* in line 2 *apratihatachakasa*, in *prajāpatino* in line 1 (conjectured) and in line 4 *putradasa* and line 5 *vrata* (not given above). This feature is also found in the Devnīmorī and Bagh inscriptions (given further below) and in the Girnar Aśokan inscriptions. All come from the Gujarat-Maharashtra-Madhya Pradesh area and I take it as a local dialectical variation and not as a Sanskritisation. I follow Ollett (2017: 44), who writes: 'The "Sanskritization" of Middle Indic finds a better explanation in the fact that Sanskrit forms—which need not necessarily have been recognized as belonging to the Sanskrit language at all—were often the common denominator among the locally dominant languages ...'. The fact that the gods Ida and Saṅkaṃsana are not given their Sanskrit names, Indra and Saṅkarṣaṇa, adds weight to Ollett's view.

Inscriptions of quotations from Pali texts

So far, we have seen Epigraphic Pali used in Buddhist, Jain, Vedic/Brahmanic and secular contexts. This suggests that its predecessor, Pali, was also a non-ecclesiastical language. The sound changes indicate that Pali is earlier and this also goes for the next five inscriptions. They are all quotations from a canon, but some have even more sound changes, suggesting that even canonical Pali continued to evolve in some circles. The first two from Sarnath are very close to canonical Pali, the last three from Devnīmorī, Ratnagiri and Bagh are less so. Salomon (1998: 80–81) calls the first four 'Pali', despite the changes; he regards them as having 'cultic' status.

5. *Sarnath, Uttar Pradesh. Stone umbrella inscription (in full), 2ⁿᵈ–3ʳᵈ century CE*
(Konow 1981: 292)

Text	1. Chatt[ā]r=imāni bhikkhavē ar[i]yasachchāni 2. katamāni chhattāri dukkha[ṁ] dikkhavē arāyasachcha[ṁ] 3. dukkhasamudaya ariyayachchaṁ dukkhanirōdhō ariyasachchaṁ 4. dukkhanirōdha-gāminī cha paṭipadā ari[ya]sachchaṁ
Translation by Konow	Four, ye monks, are the noble axioms. And which are those four? The axiom (about) suffering ye monks, the axiom (about) the cause of suffering, the axiom (about) the suppression of suffering, and the axiom (about) the path leading to suppression of suffering.
Modern spelling	1. cattārimāni bhikkhave ariyasaccāni 2. katamāni chattāri dukkhaṃ dikkhave arāyasaccaṃ 3. dukkhasamudaya ariyayaccaṃ dukkhanirodha[57] ariyasaccaṃ 4. dukkhanirodhagāminī ca paṭipadā ari[ya]saccaṃ
Pali from SN v 425 (SN 56.1, Be) Quotation not found by Konow	cattārimāni, bhikkhave, ariyasaccāni. katamāni **c**attāri? dukkhaṃ ar**iya**saccaṃ, dukkhasamudayaṃ ariya**sa**ccaṃ, dukkhanirodhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā ariyasaccaṃ.
Sound changes	None. Konow regarded *dikkhave*, *arāyasaccaṃ*, *ariyayaccaṃ* as spelling mistakes and thought the scribe did not understand the original. *chhattāri* (line 2) and the omission of anusvāra are obvious mistakes also. I wonder if perhaps this was the inaccurate dictation of a non-MIA native speaker visiting the famous pilgrimage site. Tournier (2023: 416 n.44, 46) read the text as identical with the Pali above, except that the inscription has an extra *bhikkhave* in line 2 and an extra *ca* in line 4, which he thought might be evidence for a Sammitīya transmission. I regard the inscription as poorly executed canonical Pali.

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[57] Konow gave *nirodha* as an alternative. This matches the preceding *samudaya*, both without anusvāra, and also the Pali quotation that he was unable to find without the possibility of computer searches.

6. Sarnath, Uttar Pradesh. Slab inscription (in full), 3ʳᵈ–4ᵗʰ century CE

(Konow 1981: 293)

Text	1. Yē dhammā hētu-prabhavā 2. tēsaṁ hētuṁ tathāga- 3. tō avōcha tēsaṁ cha 4. yō nirōdhō ē- 5. vaṁ vādi mahā- 6. śramaṇō.
My translation	Whatever springs from a cause, the Tathāgata told their cause. Whatever is their end, the great ascetic has told it.
Modern spelling	Ye dhammā hetuprabhavā tesaṃ hetuṃ tathāgato avoca tesaṃ ca yo nirodho evaṃ vādi mahāśramaṇo
Pali from Vin i 40 (Be)	ye dhammā hetup**p**abhavā, tesaṃ hetuṃ tathāgato **āha** tesañ ca yo nirodho, evaṃvādī mahā**s**amaṇo
Sound changes	Konow called this 'mixed Pali', pointing out that *prabhavā* and *śramaṇo* are not Pali. Von Hinüber (2015: 6) calls the inscription 'hybrid Pali'. He and Tournier (2023: 416 n.45) both read *avaca* for avoca, but both forms are found in the Theravada Pali canon, with *avaca* most frequently prefaced by *mā*. However, *avoca/avaca* for *āha* indicates a non-Theravada transmission and, indeed, Tournier (2023: 415–417) argues for a Sammitīya transmission. The final word, *śramaṇo* suggests Sanskritisation and so *prabhavā* should be considered Sanskritic.

Here is a late example of Epigraphic Pali with many sound changes:

7. *Devnīmorī, Gujarat. Relic casket inscription (in part), 4ᵗʰ–5ᵗʰ century CE*[58]
(Tournier 2023: 424–430)

Text as read by Tournier	1. evam me sūta eka samaya bhagavā sāvatthiya viharati jetavaṇe a[ṇ]ādhapiṇḍikassa ārām[e] tattha hu bhagavā bh[i]kkhū āmantrettā bhikkhave ti bhant[e] ti 2. te bhikkhū bhagavato praccaṁs ṁs[ū]ṁ bhagavā etad avoca padīccasamūpādaṁ vo bhikkhave desesaṁ ta sādhu su[ṁ] sūṇādha maṇasīkarodha bhāsissām.
My translation	1. This is what I heard. At one time the Blessed One was staying at Sāvatthi at Jeta's Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika's Park. Right there, after the Blessed One addressed the monks, saying: 'Monks', 'Sir' 2. the monks replied to the Blessed One. The Blessed One said this: 'Monks, I shall teach you dependent origination. Listen well to it and pay attention, I will speak.'
Text restored by Tournier, with one edit[59]	1. evam me suta(ṁ). eka(ṁ) samaya(ṁ) bhagavā sāvatthiya(ṁ) viharati jetavaṇe aṇādhapiṇḍikassa ārāme. tattha hu bhagavā bhikkhū āmantrettā bhikkhave ti bhante ti 2. te bhikkhū bhagavato praccasūṁsū. bhagavā etad avoca. paḍīccasamūpādaṁ vo bhikkhave desesaṁ. ta(ṁ) sādhu suṁsūṇādha maṇasīkarodha bhāsissām(i).
Pali from S ii 1 (PTS from GRETIL) The inscription deviates from the Pali sutta later on	1. Evam me sutaṃ || ekaṃ samayaṃ Bhagavā Sāvatthiyaṃ viharati Jetavane A**nāth**apiṇḍikassa ārāme || || **Tatra kho** Bhagavā bhikkhū āman**tesi** Bhikkhav**o** ti || Bha**da**nte ti 2. te bhikkhū Bhagavato **pa**ccas**sosuṃ** || || Bhagavā etad avoca ||Paṭiccasamu**pp**ādam vo bhikkhave des**issāmi** || ta**ṃ** s**uṇāth**a sādhu**kam** ma**n**asikaro**th**a bhāsiss**ām**ī**ti** ||

Sound changes	*n > ṇ* in *Anāthapiṇḍikassa > Aṇādhapiṇḍikassa* (Geiger §42.5, Pischel §224)
	th > dh in *Anāthapiṇḍikassa, suṇātha, karotha > Aṇādhapiṇḍikassa, suṃsūṇādha, karodha* (Geiger §38.4, Pischel §203)
	tatra > tattha. Both are Pali words. However, as this pericope always begins with *tatra* in the Pali canon, *tattha* suggests a non-Theravada transmission.
	kho > ho > hu. 1. Unvoiced aspirate replaced by *h* (Geiger §37 and Pischel §188); 2. *o > u* (Geiger §15.3).
	āmantesi > āmantrettā. 1. ungrammatical change from finite verb to absolutive, *āmantetvā* in Pali; 2. retention of *r* in local dialect;[60] 3. *-tvā > -ttā* (Pischel §298).
	bhikkhavo > bhikkhave and *bhadante > bhante.* A computer search easily confirms Pind (2021), that in Pali suttas this pericope starts with the emphatic *bhikkhavo* and *bhad(d)ante* and continues with unemphatic *bhikkhave* and *bhante.* The inscription has only the unemphatic forms, which again suggests a non-Theravada transmission.
	paccassosuṃ > praccasūṃsū. Dialectical retention of r in Vedic *prati > Pali paṭi > Pali pacca* before a vowel.
	paccassosuṃ > praccasūṃsū. Tournier corrected *sūta* to *sutaṃ* in the first sentence and here too we might read *praccasuṃsu;* von Hinüber (1985b: 192) read *praccasuṃsū.* Metathesis in the ending; the change is analogous to Pali *agamuṃ/agamiṃsu.*
	paṭiccasamuppādam > paḍicca-samūpāda. 1. *ṭ > ḍ* (Pischel §198); 2. *ī* is probably a spelling mistake as later in the inscription we have *paḍi-* twice; 3. *upp > ūp* is a variant with compensatory lengthening (Geiger §5.b).
	desissāmi[61] *> desesaṃ.* 1. *iss > īs* is a variant with compensatory lengthening of vowel quantity (Geiger §5.b); 2. *īs > es* (Geiger §11); 3. *-aṃ* is an alternative Pali ending to *-āmi* (Geiger §150).
	suṇātha > suṃsūṇādha. 1. Possible unattested intensive verb on the model of *caṅkamati,* intensive of *kamati;* 2. for *th > dh,* see above.
	sādhukam > sādhu. Perhaps for *sādhuṃ,* an abbreviated form of *sādhukam.*
	manasikarotha > maṇasīkarodha 1. *n > ṇ* (Geiger §42.5, Pischel §224); 2. *i > ī* is perhaps a spelling mistake, as above, though DPR gives *manasī* in Th and Ja; 3. for *th > dh,* see above.

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[60] PED gives *āmanteti* as a denominative verb from *ā + mantra,* which explains *r* retention.

[61] According to DOP, Be only has *desessāmi* instead of *desissāmi,* which might render my derivation incorrect if *desessāmi* is the original form; *desessāmi* could be the original under Geiger §151.3, which later became *desissāmi,* perhaps under Geiger §155; it is not clear if Oberlies (2019: 486–487) regards *desessāmi* as original or if his layout is merely for ease of presentation. Either way, *desessaṃ* in the inscription conforms to changes already present in canonical Pali.

Von Hinüber (1985b: 190) thought the *th > dh* change indicated a language 'slightly younger' than standard Pali. I differ and see here a language perhaps seven hundred years later than canonical Pali with many changes, almost all of which are typical of Pali. For example, Geiger §38.4 shows from Sanskrit *vyathate*, *grathita > Pali *pavedhati*, *gadhita* (and *gathita*) that the change *th > dh* was happening in the earliest Pali, and we see it spreading from canonical *Anā**th**apiṇḍikassa* to *Anā**dh**apeḍiko* at Bhārhut and persisting as *Aṇā**dh**apiṇḍikassa* here (with the *-peḍiko* at Bhārhut apparently reversed). Von Hinüber (1985b: 190) also noted that *hu* is found in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, so I infer a link between Pali and that language.

Here is the same inscription from the opposite side of India:

8. Ratnagiri, Odisha. Slab inscription (in part), 5ᵗʰ century CE
(von Hinüber 1985b: 193)

Text [supplemented by von Hinüber]	1. [e]vaṃ me su[taṃ ekaṃ samayaṃ bhagavā sāvatthiyaṃ] 2. viharati ja[tavane ānāthapiṇḍikassa⁶² ārame] 3. tatra ko bha(ga)[vā bikkhū āmantesi bhikkhavo ti bhante ti] 4. te bhikkhū bha(ga)[vato paccassosuṃ bhagavā etad avo] 5. ca paḍi(ḥ)casa(mu/ū)[ppādaṃ vo bhikkhave desisā] 6. mi taṃ s[u](ṇ)[ātha sādhukaṃ manasi] (k)[a](r)[otha bhāsissā] (m) [īt]y [e?]
Translation	As for Devnīmorī
Pali	As for Devnīmorī
Sound changes	*Jeta > Jata*. Anomalous change, but von Hinüber writes that the inscription is not clear. *kho > ko* Rare loss of aspirate (Geiger §40.2) or von Hinüber (1985b: 194) states of *ko*: '… which may be a mistake hard to explain.' *paṭiccasam**upp**ādam > paḍi**ḥ**ca-sam**ūp**āda*. 1. *ṭ > ḍ* (Pischel §198); 2. Von Hinüber states the use of the visarga to indicate a double consonant seems known only in this inscription, see below; 3. *upp > ūp* is a variant with compensatory lengthening of vowel quantity (Geiger §5.b). *it**i** > it**y***. The y is probably followed by *e* of *evaṃ* (Geiger §70.2a).

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⁶² I presume *ānāthapiṇḍikassa* is a printing error for *anāthapiṇḍikassa*, otherwise von Hinüber (1985b) would have commented on it.

Von Hinüber (1985b: 195) comments: '... in *du(ḥkha)* [later in the inscription] the *visarga* marks a double consonant. This makes the latter word look like Sanskrit. Therefore, by this purely graphical rule, non-genuine Sanskritisms could intrude into Middle Indic and help to pave the way for a more far reaching Sanskritisation.'

I regard as Pali this inscription from Bagh, first published in 2003 and re-edited by Tournier (2023):

9. *Bagh, Madhya Pradesh. Slab inscription (in full), 5th–6th century CE*

Tournier (2023: 441)

Text [supplemented by Tournier]	1. ye dhammā hetuprabhavā tesaṁ hetuṁ tathā 2. ga[t]o avaca tesaṁ ca yo [ṇ]ir[o]dh[o] evaṁvādī 3. mahassaman[o ti]. cattāri im(ā)[ṇi] bh(i)kkhave 4. ayirasaccāni yāṇi mayā saïṁ abhiña ca sacchika 5. ttā abhisaṁbuddhāṇi. katam[ā]ṇi [ca]ttāri. dukkhaṁ ayirasacca[ṁ] 6. dukkhasamu[da]y[o] dukkhaṇirodho dukkha[ṇ]irodhag[ā]miṇi paḍipadā 7. ayirasa[c](c)[aṁ]. imāṇi h[o] bhikkhave cattāri aïrasaccā[ṇi]
My translation	Whatever springs from a cause, the Tathāgata told their cause. Whatever is their end, the great ascetic has told it. There are, monks, four noble truths which I fully understood after recognising and realising them myself. What four? The noble truth of suffering, the arising of suffering, the cessation of suffering and the noble truth of the path leading to the cessation of suffering. These, monks, are the four noble truths.
Pali from Vin i 40 (Be) plus adapted text from SN 56.13, S v 425 (Be) [*putting in italics my Pali translation of the part of the Bagh text without an equivalent in the Theravada transmission*]	1. ye dhammā hetup**pa**bhavā, tesaṃ hetuṃ tathā- 2. gato **āha** tesañca yo **n**irodho, evaṃvādī 3. mah**ā**samaṇo (Vin I 40). cattārim**ā**ni, bhikkhave, 4. a**riy**asacc**ā**ni [*yāni mayā sayaṃ abhiññā sacchika-* 5. *tvā abhisambuddhāni*]. katam**ā**ni cattāri? dukkhaṃ a**riy**asaccaṃ, 6. dukkhasamudayo dukkha**n**irodho[63] dukkha**n**irodhagāminī paṭipadā 7. a**riy**asaccaṃ ... imā**ni k**ho, bhikkhave, cattāri a**riy**asaccā**ni** (SN 56.13 adapted).

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[63] Be (SN 56.13) Saṃyutta Nikāya, mahāvaggo, 12. saccasaṃyuttaṃ, 2. dhammacakkappavattanavaggo 3. khandhasuttaṃ has *dukkhasamudayo ariyasaccaṃ dukkhanirodho ariyasaccaṃ as a v.l. to dukkhasamudayaṃ ariyasaccaṃ, dukkha*nirodhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ.

Sound changes	*hetuppabhavā > hetuprabhavā. pa > pra.* Retention of pr in local dialect. *āha > avaca.* Evidence of a non-Theravada transmission. Tournier (2023: 441–443) plausibly argues for a Sammitīya transmission. *n > ṇ* in *nirodho, imāni, saccāni, yāni, abhisambuddhāni, katamāni, gāminī > ṇirodho, imāṇi, saccāṇi, yāṇi, abhisambuddhāṇi, katamāṇi, gāmiṇī* (Geiger §42.5, Pischel §224). *mahāsamaṇo > mahassamaṇo* 1. Regressive assimilation of *-śramaṇo > -ssamaṇo* (Geiger §53.2); normally the word is *samaṇo* in Pali, but *-ssamaṇo* in a compound (Geiger §51.2). 2. Compensatory shortening of *mahā > maha* conforming to the Law of Morae (Geiger §6.2). *ariyasaccāni > ayirasaccāṇi.* Metathesis of *r* and *y* (Geiger §47.2), although *ayira* is found in canonical Pali.[64] *sayaṃ > saïṃ.* Saṃprasāraṇa *ya > i* in an unaccented syllable (Pischel §151). *abhiññā > abhiña.* 1. *iññ > īñ* (Geiger §5b); 2. *ī > i* a spelling mistake or shortening of second long syllable (Geiger §23) 3. *ā > a* a spelling mistake, the other absolutive *sacchikattā* has *ā*. *sacchikatvā > sacchikattā. -tvā > -ttā* (Pischel §298). *paṭipadā > paḍipadā. ṭ > ḍ* (Pischel §198). *kho > ho.* Unvoiced aspirate replaced by h, (Geiger §37, Pischel §188). *ariya > aïra.* 1. Metathesis of *r* and *y ariya > ayira* (Geiger §47.2). 2. Dropping of intervocalic *y* (Pischel §186).

We now have in the last five inscriptions (5–9) what I believe is a complete set from India of quotations from Pali canons published so far.[65] I say 'canons' because I accept Tournier's claim that Devnīmorī and Bagh are Sammitīya transmissions, but I believe *pace* Tournier that the first Sarnath inscription is probably a Theravada transmission taken to a pilgrimage site. The affiliation of the Ratnagiri and the *ye dhammā* Sarnath inscriptions is unclear to me.

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[64] Though *ayira* is a rare variant in the Pali canon, with *sacca* it is always *ariyasaccaṃ*.

[65] The *ye dhammā* formula has only been found in India at Sarnath and Bagh, so far as I am aware. On the other hand, there are many examples of the *ye dharmā* formula on clay seals, bricks and miniature stupas in India and elsewhere; Boucher (1991) provides many references.

Epigraphic Pali as a category

Konow called the Sarnath inscriptions 'Pali' and 'Mixed Pali'. Von Hinüber called the second Sarnath inscription 'Hybrid Pali' and the Devnīmorī and Ratnagiri quotations 'Continental Pali'. Salomon (1998: 80–81) not only calls only the inscriptions at Sarnath, Devnīmorī and Ratnagiri 'Pali', he even describes them as 'canonical Pali', despite many sound changes. Why then does he call the Bhārhut inscription with only a single sound change 'central-western epigraphic Prakrit' (Salomon 1998: 267), but Devnīmorī with far more sound changes 'Pali'? He is firm on this distinction, wishing to restrict 'Pali' to canonical Pali; Salomon (1998: 80 n.29) states: 'It should be noted that in some early (and even some more recent) epigraphic publications the term "Pali" has been inaccurately used to refer to various other MIA dialects.'[66] However, he makes no effort to justify this sharp division and my claim is that he cannot justify it on linguistic grounds, since every inscription presented in this paper is obviously in Pali. His distinction only serves to maintain the fiction the Pali was an artificial ecclesiastical language, but the reality was that its later developments in inscriptions show it as a widespread, non-sectarian, natural and evolving language.

This is a debate between (hair-)splitters and lumpers, analogous to that between Darwin (1857) and his correspondents. Splitters wish to make demarcations and tend to complexity, lumpers wish to draw out similarities and tend towards simplification.[67] In this instance, I believe the splitters have gone too far and are missing the underlying unity of Pali and central-western epigraphic/Monumental/Leṇa Prakrit. This has the consequence of not allowing them to see the possibility and indeed the probability that 'Pali' is at least as old as inscriptions in India, and thus that the Buddha spoke Pali. I believe splitters have been misled by the Māgadhī myth and Pali canon misreadings based on that myth.[68]

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[66] Skilling (2021: 43) also has this tendency of seeing the similarity to Pali in inscriptions and then rejecting it, for he says of label inscriptions in South Asia, including Bhārhut: 'The labels are all in Prakrit – none are in Pali properly speaking.'

[67] Although Darwin used simple language, this is not a trivial problem, as the existence of a journal such as *Cladistics* demonstrates. McMahon & McMahon (2005), a geneticist and a linguist, were in the early stages of development of techniques for a computational cladistics approach to languages and dialects, which they (2005: 238) regarded as additions, not replacements, to linguistic knowledge, experience and insight.

[68] The Māgadhī myth was the implicit background for serious misreadings of *sakāya niruttiyā* (Karpik 2019a: 39–45) and *samaññaṃ nātidhāveyya* (Karpik 2019a: 46–48). My interpretation of

I am now in a position to answer Skilling (2021: 38):

> No-one has been able to identify an ancient 'Pāli-land' once populated by 'Pāli speakers'. For this there may be good reason, since the evidence suggests that rather than a displaced 'natural' language, Pāli is an artificial and hybrid literary language. [...] The premise of this essay is that Pāli inscriptions have been found only in Southeast Asia ...

I answer Skilling as follows: The Buddha was a Kosalan and spent more time there than anywhere else, according to the first four Nikāyas. He spoke in a standard western dialect which spread across India, excepting perhaps the North West, as is shown by epigraphic evidence. The bureaucracy of the Mauryan Empire used the Eastern Aśokan variety in the first inscriptions of the Ganges basin, but this variety could not have been widely spoken beyond the Mauryan bureaucracy as it vanished from the inscriptional record with that Empire in less than a century; since the Buddha died before the Mauryan empire, he is unlikely to have spoken it and therefore Pali could not be an artificial formation from it. Pali is not in evidence in the Aśokan inscriptions because it was a standard, trans-regional language and probably less suitable for devolved bureaucracies headquartered in Taxila, Ujjain and Patna with their separate, perhaps pre-Mauryan, traditions. However, the western Aśokan inscriptions at Girnar are very similar to Pali,[69] and combined with the

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the *sakāya niruttiyā* passage at Vin ii 139 is that there are hundreds of prose Pali suttas which include verse, and two Brahmin monks, educated in Vedic verse, noticed this and proposed to the Buddha '*buddhavacanaṃ chandaso āropema*', 'let us elevate the Buddha's words with verse', intending to versify entire suttas and thus reduce the likelihood of corruptions; it had nothing to do with 'translation', which is not a meaning given for *āropeti* in the PED or DOP (though it is in the CPD); von Hinüber (2021: 113) translates *āropento* in the proem to the Vinaya commentary as 'having raised [from Sinhala to Pali]' instead of 'having translated'. Later, however, in Chinese sources the *sakāya niruttiyā* passage was taken as permission to translate. Because of the Māgadhī myth, many scholars have misread the *sakāya niruttiyā* passage as translation from Māgadhī to other language varieties and then reversed the meaning of *samaññaṃ nātidhāveyya* at MN 139 (*Araṇavibhaṅgasutta*, M iii 230) from the correct 'you should not go against standard language' to the opposite. Certainly, Salomon (2018: 59) adopts the common misunderstanding of Vin ii 139 as meaning that the Buddha's words 'should be learned "in one's own dialect" (*sakāya niruttiyā*), that is in the local vernacular'.

[69] Talim (2010: xii) converts the Girnar inscriptions into Pali as she considers: '[Girnar] Aśokan edicts are more in Pāli; maybe 75% in Pāli, 20% in Prākrit dialects and 5% in Sanskrit.' Although

Sītābeṅgā inscription, they strongly suggest that Pali existed when inscriptions were first made in India. That there are so few inscriptions in canonical Pali is due to the fact that it was an oral tradition, like the Vedas and Jain Āgamas, developed before writing was common in India; it merely appears to be an ecclesiastical language because only some Buddhists have preserved this standard vernacular in its fifth-century BCE form. Pali inscriptions in India could be numbered in the hundreds, as one would expect of the homeland of Buddhism, if one uses the definition of Epigraphic Pali proposed here.

Skilling is, of course, not alone: Norman (1993b: 158) argued that the Devnīmorī inscription should not be called Pali because its deviations from canonical Pali would not fall within the limits of scribal variation. However, this assumes that Pali was never a natural language and defines Pali as if it were only the exact language of the Theravada canon, thus severing its connections to the wider linguistic landscape. In my view, labels for non-Theravada varieties, like 'Sammitīya MIA'[70] and 'central-western Epigraphic Prakrit'[71] are needlessly vague, rather like calling an epitaph quotation from the King James Bible 'Church of England Germanic' or 'Southern England epigraphic dialect'. More precise would be 'Sammitīya Pali' and 'Epigraphic Pali'. Epigraphic Pali can be accurately defined through its relationship to canonical Pali as another MIA dialect alongside the Aśokan dialects, Ardha-Māgadhī and the literary Prakrits. It is only because of excessive splitting in some academic circles that Skilling can make the implausible claims that Pali inscriptions have been found only in Southeast Asia and that Pali is an artificial language. These are odd results, which suggest that their particular definition of Pali is defective.

I am sympathetic to her case, I would not include the Girnar inscriptions in Epigraphic Pali because it is hard to fit them in a line of descent from Pali to the central-western epigraphic Prakrit; for example, it is not clear how the Pali gerundive *-bba* could change to Girnar *-vya* or how the Girnar absolutive *-tpa* could change to Hāthīgumphā, Devnīmorī and Bagh *-tta.*

[70] A term used by Tournier (2023: 417 n.46). To his credit, he compares the Sarnath, Devnīmorī and Bagh inscriptions with Pali, not Sanskrit, so my describing their language as a variety of Pali does not seem extreme.

[71] 'Central-western epigraphic Prakrit' is potentially misleading, for, as we have seen, this language is not confined to the centre and west of India. Salomon acknowledges this, for after pointing to dialectical and stylistic variations, he states (1998: 77): 'But all in all, the standard epigraphic or "Monumental" Prakrit can be treated as essentially a single language whose use spread far beyond its place of origin, and which should not be taken to represent the local vernacular of every region and period where it appears.'

The question then arises as to why the traditional Theravada belief in the Buddha speaking Pali has been censured. One reason is that the first inscriptions in the Ganges basin were in the Eastern Aśokan dialect and this was assumed to be the Buddha's language;[72] another is acceptance of the Māgadhī myth and its corollary of Pali being an artificial, ecclesiastical language; another is that many familiar with the editorial principle of *lectio difficilior potior*, 'the more difficult reading prevails', may find complex narratives like westernised, Sanskritised Māgadhī more convincing and are naturally drawn to splitting; splitters may have also feared, as I fear, accusations of pro-Theravada sectarian bias for reviving the practice of calling early inscriptions 'Pali'.[73]

Implications of Epigraphic Pali

The implications of Epigraphic Pali are that Pali was not originally an ecclesiastical language, but a naturally evolving non-sectarian standard language used across India for many centuries and in many contexts. The narrative of Sanskritised Māgadhī was promoted by Lévi (1912: 511) to eliminate sterile debates on the authenticity of the Pali or the Sanskrit canon; therefore, rejecting it appears at first glance to reopen this uncomfortable doctrinal issue. Lévi's solution was that neither canon was authentic, meaning not in the original language; my solution is that, if all canons were originally in Pali, the language of the Buddha, that should not confer priority to any canon. To that end, I propose the following outline of the transmission of Buddhist texts.

Gombrich (2018: 69ff) has argued that the Buddha spoke Pali.[74] Similarly,

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[72] This was the view of von Hinüber (1985a: 61) and Oberlies (2019: 43) for example. However, I follow Cousins (2013: 120–121): 'The significant point is that the Eastern or Eastern-influenced dialect of all other Mauryan inscriptions in India cannot have been the local or ordinary spoken dialect of most people in the majority of the places where it is used. That this is so is indicated rather clearly by the fact that no post-Mauryan inscriptions in this dialect are extant.' I wonder if this dialect was that of the first Mauryan rulers, but dropped out of fashion with the expansion of the empire. Aśoka was viceroy in Ujjain and his children, if brought up there, may not have spoken that Eastern dialect.

[73] For example, Bühler (1883: 78–79) calls the language of some Kanheri inscriptions 'Pali'.

[74] Richard Gombrich informed me by email of a further argument that Pali reciters aspired to the Buddha's speech rather as the King's English was the reference standard for English. I have found that Vale (2016: 34–35) identifies August 1417 as the time when letters in Chancery

Karpik (2019a) has argued that there is no evidence to reject the Theravada tradition that the Buddha taught in Pali. This implies that the oral texts of all Buddhist schools were originally in Pali, though perhaps with slightly different transmissions which were eventually adopted by different schools and with local dialectical features.[75] I suggest these transmissions were treated differently by native MIA speakers and non-native MIA speakers in the centuries after the Buddha's death.

In native MIA native speaker communities, oral Pali texts may well have been written down in other varieties of MIA, e.g. Gāndhārī, Buddhist Hybrid Gāndhārī and Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit.[76] Thus, at first there were two tracks simultaneously: an oral Pali tradition used for text recitation and a modernised language track for note taking. Salomon (2011: 183) writes of some Gāndhārī texts:

> These manuscripts thus seem to serve more as prompts to stimulate the reader's memory of the text than as the primary records of them. This sort of extremely abridged text ... is presumably a manifestation of the lingering orality which pervades Buddhist scribal traditions, whereby written texts tended to function as supplements to, rather than as replacements for, recitation and memorization.

English appeared from Henry V's signet office, some of which were in the king's own hand. The phrase, 'the King's English', in Shakespeare (2006: 957), *The Merry Wives of Windsor*: 'Here will be an old abusing of God's patience and the King's English,' reflected a distant reality. There is therefore some justification in historical sociolinguistics for Pali to have taken a similar course.

[75] Tournier (1923: 442) plausibly argues from their language that the Devnīmorī and Bagh inscriptions were a Sammitīya transmission, including (2023: 436) their retention of *r*, shown also in the Aśokan Girnar inscriptions, all in the west, which was a stronghold for that sect. I add that Nānāghāṭ, also in the west, has *r* retentions.

[76] Salomon (2001: 242) describes the language of some British Library scrolls as: 'a sort of "Gāndhārī translationese" with clearly discernible traces of the phonology and morphology of a substratum language of the midland MIA type, from which the texts were evidently more or less mechanically translated into Gāndhārī'. I take the midland MIA language to be canonical or Epigraphic Pali. Similarly, Edgerton (1953: 13 §1.105(2)) thought the underlying dialect of Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit had similarities with Pali, but also important differences. I take the differences to be a modernisation of Pali. Ollett (2017: 38–45) argues from epigraphic data that Hybrid Sanskrit was not an incompetent attempt at Sanskrit, but an attempt at a common Prakrit denominator across dialects; he states (2017: 44): 'On this account, Sanskritization did not begin as Sanskritization at all, but as a regression to the linguistic mean.' Bronkhorst (1993: 408) argues that some Buddhists: 'looked upon the language of their [Hybrid Sanskrit] sacred texts as fundamentally identical with classical Sanskrit.'

My hypothesis is that these prompts expanded to full written texts and, eventually, canons in contemporary language varieties[77] for the purpose of private devotion, study and instruction in much the same way as many may prefer reading a modern English Bible to the archaic King James version. As it is improbable that the language of such a revered figure as the Buddha was immediately completely discarded, which would be contrary to Indian custom or the Buddha's instructions[78] or practicality,[79] these modernised written texts, exemplified in Devnīmorī, Ratnagiri and Bagh, were at first in parallel to the increasingly archaic Pali recitations and services, but eventually may have replaced them in parts of *Ariyaka* speaking India when Pali was becoming unintelligible to the uneducated, perhaps in the 4th century CE[80]. When the dialects did become too divergent for easy understanding, Pali had become a separate ecclesiastical language, difficult to understand except to the educated, and, as the language of education became predominantly Sanskrit during the 1st millennium, this divergence opened the way for increasing Sanskritisation of texts to facilitate public debate with Brahmins[81] and to conform with wider society;[82] the *ye dhammā* Sarnath inscription marks the early stages of this trend and the Patna Dharmapada is an important milestone in the Sanskritisation of Pali.[83]

However, in Dravidian speaking southern India and its neighbour, Sri Lanka, the situation was very different: Pali was from the first a separate, foreign ecclesiastical language in this zone. This is obvious for Dravidian speaking

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[77] Dīp V 50 may refer to this process where it states that some time after the Second Council other sects altered the collection of suttas: *nāmaṃ liṅgaṃ parikkhāraṃ ākappakaraṇāni ca pakatibhāvaṃ vijahetvā tañ ca aññaṃ akaṃsu te*, 'they abandoned its original nature regarding nouns, genders, basics and proper usage and made it something different.'

[78] Karpik (2019a: 14–15)

[79] Karpik (2019a: 13)

[80] Salomon (1998: 85) says of the early Christian era: '... it is questionable whether the MIA dialects of the time were really so different; from the available literary and inscriptional data, it would appear that they were not yet so widely divergent as to present major difficulties of communication.'

[81] Verardi (2011: 205–214) describes public debates that had serious, painful consequences; unfortunately, the language used is not discussed, but Sanskrit is the most likely candidate from the Gupta era onwards.

[82] The reasons for Sanskritisation are wider than intelligibility and were not a solely Buddhist phenomenon according to Salomon (1988: 84–86).

[83] Tournier (2023: 435–440) dates this trend from the 4th century CE onwards and compares the Devnīmorī inscription, which he considered 'close to canonical Pāli' to later Sammitīya sources, such as the Patna Dharmapada and the Maṇicūḍajātaka of Sarvarakṣita.

areas, but it also seems that Sinhala had already diverged considerably from Pali before the Common Era;[84] furthermore, according to Pali sources, Aśoka's son, Mahinda, brought the commentaries to Sri Lanka and translated them into Sinhala, presumably to meet local needs.[85] The contact between the Sinhala and Dravidian language communities in this zone[86] would have

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[84] By the time of Aśoka, Sinhalese had developed separately from the mainland for centuries. It is therefore a cousin of Epigraphic Pali, if Pali is considered the parent. Gair (1988: 5–7) states: 'Otherwise, the [phonological] system very closely resembles the Middle-Indo-Aryan one except for the lack of a voiced and voiceless aspirated stop series contrasting with the unaspirated ones. This is a peculiarly Sinhala feature with respect to Indo-Aryan, since in the languages of that family within India itself none has lost that feature completely. This dramatic change occurred before the earliest inscriptions, and it is probably the strongest candidate for substratum phonological influence from the Dravidian family, which, it will be noted, also lacks aspirates.' Sircar (1965: 241–242) offers a 2nd to 1st century BCE cave inscription near Anurādhapura. The corrected reading is:
    Devanapiya maharaja Gamiṇi-Tisaha puta Devanapiya Tisa-Abayaha leṇe agata anagata catu disa sagasa dine.
    My Pali translation is:
    Devānampiya-mahārāja-Gāmini-Tissassa putta-Devānampiya-Tissa-Abhayassa leṇaṃ āgatānāgata-cātuddisa-saṅghassa dinnaṃ.
    Wickremasinghe (1912: 144) translates: 'The cave of Devanapiya Tisa Abaya, son of the great king Devanapiya Gamiṇi Tisa, is given to the Buddhist priesthood from the four quarters, present and not present.' (Normally, if it were in Pali, *āgatānāgata* would mean 'past and future'.) Geiger (1938) states: (§8) that long vowels and *anusvāra* are generally not marked; (§35) aspirated consonants are de-aspirated and conjunct consonants are made single; (§95.1) the direct singular a-stem ending is *-e*; (§95.3) the oblique singular a-stem is *-asa* or *-aha*.
[85] Kemper (1991: 33) suggests that: '... no ancient account outside Sri Lanka identifies Mahinda as Aśoka's son.' Regarding the person and time, here may be mythic elements to this story, given in Sv i 1, verses 6–8, As 1–2 verses 13–15 and Mhv XXXVII 228–230, but it is likely to have a kernel of truth: von Hinüber (2021: 114–118) concludes: 'To sum up, there is some direct and indirect evidence supporting the assumption that old explanations of the canonical texts were brought from India and were translated into Sinhalese.' I believe writing would be needed to effect such a translation, possibly centuries before the Tipiṭaka was written down in Sri Lanka in the 1st century BCE; Coningham et al. (1996) have concluded from radio-carbon dating of Brāhmī inscribed potsherds that there was in fact writing in Sri Lanka in the early 4th century BCE, pre-dating the Aśokan inscriptions by more than a century; one sherd, 17332, from the early 4th century reads *devasa*, 'Deva's'. Furthermore, Abeywardana et al. (2019: 99) considered 80 records from the Mahāvaṃsa and 131 from the Cūlavaṃsa when they concluded: 'The inscriptions, classical texts and chronicles of Sri Lankan historiography were written with a specific agenda, however, they provide trustworthy information on the development of the ancient water harvesting system.'
[86] Although Indrapala (1969: 63) plausibly concludes that major Tamil settlements in Sri Lanka occurred as late as the 13th century CE, he does not consider integrated settlements; while acknowledging the presence of Tamil traders from the 2nd century BCE, he tendentiously dismisses

reinforced the perception of Pali as a foreign introduction. Therefore, there was never internal pressure within the Buddhist communities of this zone to modernise the language of canonical written texts. Furthermore, on both the island and the southern mainland, the Theravada community was as ideologically conservative with its ecclesiastical language as with its Vinaya[87] with the consequence that Pali could be a means of communication between the mainland and island monastic communities. The fate of Pali as an ecclesiastical language on the mainland is not, to my knowledge, recorded and so my working hypothesis must be that it continued in ritual use in much the same way as in modern Theravada communities beyond c. 400 CE when the writer of the Vinaya commentary translated the Sinhala commentaries into Pali for the benefit of mainlanders.[88] Thus the foreignness of Pali, combined with Theravada ideology and its value as a common language ensured its survival in Sri Lanka and South India. By the mid-first millennium the Theravada Pali canon, as evidenced by the first Sarnath inscription, contrasted with other Buddhist canons in various stages of modernisation/standardisation/Sanskritisation.

This outline does not judge the authenticity of the Pali or Sanskrit canons on linguistic grounds; that judgment needs to be made on other criteria, if at

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(1969: 46) the Tamil kings of Sri Lanka, Sena, Guttika and Elāra, as 'adventurers' although they reigned collectively for 66 years (c. 177–155 and c. 145–101 BCE) and despite praise to them all for ruling righteously (Dīp XVIII 47–50); furthermore, there were five Tamil kings between c. 43 and c. 29 BCE and six Tamil kings between c. 433 and c. 460 CE (all the above approximate dates from Mendis 1940: 150–152). I do not claim these contacts amounted to a South Indian–Sri Lankan cultural zone, but I argue that the conditions for mutual influence between mainland and island Buddhist communities were present. For example, Mhv XXXVII states that Saṅghamitta Thera came from the continent to consecrate King Mahāsena (c. 334–362 CE); Mp v 98 states that Buddhaghosa's commentary (on the Aṅguttara Nikāya) written at the Mahāvihāra at Anurādhapura in Sri Lanka was requested by a monk called Jotipāla who had lived together with Buddhaghosa in Kañchipuraṃ in Southern India.

[87] Dīp V 36 accuses the Vajjiputtakas of altering doctrines and Vinaya, and V 38 of altering language.

[88] Sp i 2 Verses 8–9 *saṃvaṇṇanā Sīharadīpakena, vākyena esā pana saṅkhaṭattā, na kiñci atthaṃ abhisambhuṇāti, dīpantare bhikkhujanassa yasmā, || tasmā imaṃ pālinayānurūpaṃ, saṃvaṇṇanaṃ dāni samārabhissaṃ.* 'But as that commentary was composed in the language of the island of Sīhara (var. Sīḷala-) and none of the meaning reaches a monastic on the continent, therefore I will now begin this commentary in the manner of the texts (*pālinayānurūpaṃ*).' Dhp-a i 1 Verses 5–9 have a similar sentiment. Von Hinüber (2021: 119–123) collects evidence of Theravada activity on the mainland of India.

all. Although it diverges greatly from the current academic consensus, I make no apologies for that. As Salomon (2018: 99) explains:

> This reconstruction of the gradual shift [from Gāndhārī manuscripts of individual sutras] towards written canons is admittedly provisional, and it is not at all unlikely that future discoveries and deeper analyses of the manuscripts already known will modify, perhaps even discredit, this scenario. But this is a risk scholars must take when all they have to work with are the random scraps of information that happened to have survived from antiquity; in such situations, hypotheses are made to be broken.

Modern computer searches now suggest that the old hypothesis that Pali is Sanskritised, Westernised Māgadhī is broken. Similarly, the evidence above for the transmission of texts in India is indeed scrappy and my outline, too, may well need future revision; but I must take that risk. However, the evidence for Pali as a standard, wide-spread evolving language is not scrappy. There is no shortage of Pali texts and there are hundreds of inscriptions across India that could be linked to Pali in the way already demonstrated above. Well-documented sound changes show that Monumental Prakrit is a later form of Pali and accordingly it should be recognised as Epigraphic Pali. As originally all Buddhist scriptures were in Pali, this paper returns us to exactly where I believe Lévi always wanted us: questions of authenticity cannot be resolved on the grounds of language. He arrived at that destination by denying any Buddhist canon was in the original, I arrive at the same place by claiming all early texts were originally in Pali. My hypothesis that the Buddha taught in Pali is therefore a non-sectarian statement, even though this is also a Theravada tradition. The difference here is simply a new appreciation of Pali, for as T.S. Eliot (2006: 414) writes:

> We shall not cease from exploration
>
> And the end of all our exploring
>
> Will be to arrive where we started
>
> And know the place for the first time.

Abbreviations

Abhidh-av-nṭ	Abhidhammatthavikāsinī (Commentary on Abhidhammāvatāra)
As	Atthasālinī (Commentary on Dhammasaṅgaṇī)
As-mṭ	Atthasālinī-mūlaṭīkā
Be	Burmese edition (used by DPR)
CPD	Critical Pali Dictionary
Dhp-a	Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā
Dīp	Dīpavaṃsa
DOP	Dictionary of Pali
DPPN	Dictionary of Pali Proper Names
DPR	Digital Pali Reader
Geiger	Geiger (1984). *A Pāli Grammar*
GRETIL	Göttingen Register of Electronic Texts in Indian Languages
It-a	Paramatthadīpanī (Itivuttaka-aṭṭhakathā)
Ja	Jātaka and Jātaka-aṭṭhakathā
Kkh-ṭ	Vinayatthamañjūsā (Commentary on Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī)
M(N)	Majjhima Nikāya
Mhv	Mahāvaṃsa (and Cūlavaṃsa)
MIA	Middle-Indo-Aryan
Moh	Mohavicchedanī
Mp	Manorathapūraṇī (Aṅguttaranikāya-aṭṭhakathā)
Mp-ṭ	Sāratthamañjūsā (Commentary on Mp)
Mūla-s	Mūlasikkhā
Mūla-s-ṭ	Mūlasikkhāṭīkā
Pāc-y	Pācityādiyojanā
Pālim	Pāḷimuttakavinayavinicchayasaṅgaha (Vinayasaṅgaha)
Pālim-nṭ	Vinayālaṅkāraṭīkā (Commentary on Pālim)
PED	Pali-English Dictionary
Pischel	Pischel 1957 *Comparative Grammar of the Prākrit Languages*

Ps	Papañcasūdanī (Majjhimanikāya-aṭṭhakathā)
Ps-pṭ	Līnatthappakāsanā (Commentary on Ps)
PTS	Pali Text Society
S(N)	Saṃyutta Nikāya
Sadd	Saddanīti
Sp	Samantapāsādikā (Vinaya-aṭṭhakathā)
Spk	Sāratthappakāsinī (Saṃyuttanikāya-aṭṭhakathā)
Spk-pṭ	Līnatthappakāsanā (Commentary on Spk)
Sp-ṭ	Sāratthadīpanī (Commentary on Sp)
Sv	Sumaṅgalavilāsinī (Dīghanikāya-aṭṭhakathā)
Sv-pṭ	Līnatthappakāsanā (Commentary on Sv)
Th	Theragāthā
Ud-a	Paramatthadīpanī (Udāna-aṭṭhakathā)
Vibh-a	Sammohavinodanī (Vibhaṅga-aṭṭhakathā)
Vin-vn	Vinayavinicchaya
Vin-vn-pṭ	Vinayatthasārasandīpanī (Commentary on Vin-vn)
v.l.	varia lectio (variant reading)
Vmv	Vimativinodanī
Vin	Vinaya
Vism	Visuddhimagga
Vism-mhṭ	Paramatthamañjūsā (Commentary on Vism)
Vv-a	Paramatthadīpanī (Vimānavatthu-aṭṭhakathā)

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Beyond Conventional Existence
and Fundamental Emptiness:
Kuiji's Logical Analysis of Bhāviveka's
Two Inferences for the Emptiness of All Dharmas[1]

Ernest Brewster

ABSTRACT—During the sixth century CE, Bhāviveka (c. 500–560 CE), the South Asian Buddhist philosopher, enlisted the 'three-part inference' (Sanskrit, hereafter, Skt.: *trairūpya*; Chinese, hereafter, Chi.: *sanzhi zuofa* 三支作法), a form of logical reasoning based in the 'science of reasons' (Skt.: *hetuvidyā*; Chi.: *yinming* 因明) to expound the Madhyamaka doctrine of the 'emptiness' (Skt.: *śūnyatā*; Chi.: *kongxing* 空性) of all dharmas, the fundamental constituents making up the entirety of reality. In the *Jewel in the Palm of the Hand* (Skt.: **Hastaratna*; Chi.: *Zhangzhen lun* 掌珍論), a seminal Madhyamaka treatise preserved only in the seventh-century CE Chinese translation by Xuanzang (602?–664), Bhāviveka formulated two inferences intending to prove that all 'conditioned dharmas' (Skt.: *saṃskṛtadharmāḥ*; Chi.: *youwei fa* 有爲法) and 'unconditioned dharmas' (Skt.: *asaṃskṛtadharmāḥ*; Chi.: *wuwei fa* 無爲法) are universally empty, in terms of 'ultimate truth' (Skt.:

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paramārthasatya; Chi.: *shengyi di* 勝義諦). This paper examines how Kuiji 窺基 (632–682), an eminent Sinitic scholar-monk, puts pressure on Bhāviveka's inferences by contending that they erroneously attribute the property of omnipresent emptiness to all conditioned and all unconditioned dharmas. In his rejoinder to Bhāviveka's two inferences, Kuiji hews closely to the doctrinal sources of Yogācāra Buddhism in which 'reality as it really is' (Skt.: **tattva*; Chi.: *zhenshi* 真實) is characterised by an 'ultimately real nature' (Skt.: **dravyatva*; Chi.: *zhenshi* 實性) that is unconditioned, neither arising, nor ceasing, and neither conventionally existent, nor fundamentally empty.

Introduction

The *Jewel in the Palm of the Hand* (Sanskrit, hereafter, Skt.: **Hastaratna*; Chinese, hereafter, Chi.: *Zhangzhen lun* 掌珍論), a śāstra composed in the sixth century by Bhāviveka (c. 500–560 CE), a Buddhist philosopher of likely South Indian descent, illustrates how early Mādhyamika philosophers applied Indic systems of logic and reasoning to formulate doctrinal arguments. In this seminal Madhyamaka treatise, preserved only in the seventh-century CE Chinese translation by the scholar-monk Xuanzang 玄奘 (602?–667), Bhāviveka uses two 'three-part inferences' (Skt.: *trairūpya*; Chi.: *sanzhi zuofa* 三支作法) to defend the doctrine of the 'emptiness' (Skt.: *śūnyatā*; Chi.: *kongxing* 空性) of all dharmas, the fundamental constituents comprising the entirety of reality. Bhāviveka's use of the three-part inference demonstrates his deep understanding of the 'science of reasons' (Skt.: *hetuvidyā*; Chi.: *yinming* 因明), a system of logic refined by the logician Dignāga (c. 400–480).[2] In his attempt to prove that all 'conditioned dharmas' (Skt.: *saṃskṛtadharmāḥ*; Chi.: *youwei fa* 有爲法) and all 'unconditioned dharmas' (Skt.: *asaṃskṛtadharmāḥ*; Chi.: *wuwei fa* 無爲法) are universally empty, Bhāviveka employs two *trairūpya* inferences. The first inference intends to prove that all conditioned dharmas

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[2] While the five-part model of formal inference, originated within the Brahmanical Nyāya tradition, preexisted him, Dignāga was responsible for streamlining the basic form of the inferential method (*anumāna*), using three, instead of five, parts.

are empty of 'intrinsic nature' (Skt.: *svabhāvāḥ*; Chi.: *zixing* 自性) in terms of 'ultimate truth' (Skt.: *paramārthasatya*; Chi.: *shengyi di* 勝義諦); the second inference aims to prove that all unconditioned dharmas are empty of 'causal efficacy' (Skt.: *kāritra*; Chi.: *zuoyong* 作用) and, therefore, 'fundamentally unreal' (Chi.: *wuyou shi* 無有實). The argumentation advanced by Bhāviveka stands as an articulation of the Madhyamaka doctrine of the omnipresent emptiness of the dharmas and offers a clear and vibrant illustration of how the specific rules of the science of reasons, standardised by Dignāga, were used by Mādhyamika authors.

The Abhidharma teachings he argues against draw a basic distinction between conditioned dharmas and unconditioned dharmas. For them, conditioned dharmas are defined as 'impermanent' (Skt.: *anitya*; Chi.: *wuchang* 無常), in that they are generated by 'causes and conditions' (Skt.: *hetupratyaya*; Chi.: *yinyuan* 因緣), the activities and spatiotemporal contexts of other conditioned dharmas. Conditioned dharmas are understood to possess causal efficacy, the energy required to function as a cause and condition—that is, to activate another dharma. Upon arising, conditioned dharmas abide only long enough so as to discharge a momentary burst of causal efficacy before immediately decaying and ceasing to be.[3] Unconditioned dharmas are defined as 'perpetually abiding' (Skt.: *nitya*; Chi.: *changzhu* 常住), in that they are not generated by the causes and conditions of other dharmas and, therefore, do not arise, change, or cease to be; they continually abide and do not serve as either a cause or a condition for any other dharmas. While conditioned dharmas are understood to be modifiable and 'mutable' (Chi.: *bianyi* 變異), unconditioned dharmas are regarded as unmodifiable and 'immutable' (Chi.: *wu bianyi* 無變異).

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[3] Different Abhidharma theorists diverge over the issue of whether these four stages of alteration—arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing—are incurred by an individual conditioned dharma over one moment (i.e., the present moment), or over two moments (the future and present moments); see Brewster (2021, 28–30). Ronkin (2018) comments on the traditional objection to the view that an individual conditioned dharma withstands four stages of alteration in a single present moment in time: 'That a single event undergoes four phases within a given moment, inevitably infringes upon its momentariness.' However, it is important to point out that for Sarvāstivāda theorists such as Saṅghabhadra (fl. c. fifth–sixth century), conditioned dharmas arise in the future (T^0), before abiding, changing, and ceasing in the present moment (T^1). Sarvāstivāda theorists envision a moment as consisting in a finite, though meagre, temporal duration equivalent to 0.013333 of second; see Sanderson (1994, 42).

In his argumentation for the omnipresent emptiness of all dharmas, Bhāviveka hews to Madhyamaka teachings regarding the characterisation of the conditioned dharmas as ultimately lacking in intrinsic nature, the fundamental core of a dharma that makes it 'ultimately real' (Skt.: *paramārthasat*; Chi.: *shengyi you* 勝義有) according to Abhidharma doctrine. For Bhāviveka, while conditioned dharmas possess a causal efficacy that validates their existence in conventional reality, unconditioned dharmas are not causally productive in that they are defined as lacking causal efficacy and are therefore ultimately non-existent. In the *Jewel in the Palm of the Hand*, Bhāviveka uses two three-part inferences to argue: firstly, that all conditioned dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature in terms of 'ultimate truth' (Skt.: *paramārthasatya*; Chi.: *zhendi* 真諦, *shengyi di* 勝義諦); and secondly, that all unconditioned dharmas, because they lack causal efficacy, are fundamentally unreal. Using two inferences, Bhāviveka concludes that all dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature. Following the rules of the science of reasons, Bhāviveka determines that emptiness is a universal property exemplified equally by all dharmas and thus 'omnipresent' (Chi.: *zhoubian* 周遍) throughout the universe.

In advancing his two inferences for omnipresent emptiness, Bhāviveka follows Nāgārjuna's doctrine of two truths that denies the Abhidharma doctrine of the fundamental existence of dharmas as the ultimately real constituents making up the entirety of reality.[4] For Nāgārjuna, conventional truth designates the provisional existence of composites made up of individual dharmas with intrinsic natures; ultimate truth designates the emptiness of composites and individual dharmas of inherent existence, making them separate from the myriad causes and conditions that produce them. Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma thinkers envision dharmas—conditioned and unconditioned—as the ultimately real and indivisible constituents of reality as it really is by virtue of possessing intrinsic natures that are not borrowed

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[4] Siderits (2007, 182) characterises the Abhidharma teachings on two truths as based upon a 'metaphysical' reading of the two truths, wherein conventional truth provides an account for conventional reality populated by composite wholes and other conceptual fictions, and ultimate truth provides an account of the 'ultimate nature of reality'. By contrast, Siderits describes the Madhyamaka doctrine of two truths as based upon 'the rejection of the idea of ultimate truth' and characterises this doctrine—as it rejects the notion that ultimate truth designates any mind-independent ultimate reality that is the way it is no matter what—as fundamentally anti-realist. He also describes it as 'semantic non-dualism' in that, ultimately, there is only one kind of truth—conventional truth.

from other entities. In upholding the Madhyamaka doctrine of the two truths, Bhāviveka proposes that the dharmas that comprise the phenomenal world 'exist' (Skt.: *sat*; Chi.: *you* 有) as discrete entities with intrinsic natures and distinct causal efficacies according to a conventional truth based on the force of mental construction, while they 'do not exist' (Skt.: *asat*; Chi.: *wu* 無) as discrete entities according to an ultimate truth that designates dharmas as 'empty' (Skt.: *śūnya*; Chi.: *kong* 空) of any intrinsic nature not borrowed from the myriad of causes and conditions that produce them.

Roughly a century after Bhāviveka flourished, Kuiji 窺基 (632–682)—an eminent disciple of Xuanzang—examined the Madhyamaka doctrine of the omnipresent emptiness of dharmas. Immersed in the analyses and translations of several Indic treatises, including the *Jewel in the Palm of the Hand*, Kuiji took issue with Bhāviveka's understanding that all dharmas—conditioned and unconditioned—are ultimately empty. Enlisting the same rules of *hetuvidyā* as used by Bhāviveka, Kuiji argued that the two three-part inferences employed by Bhāviveka to prove the omnipresent emptiness of dharmas in fact lead to the conclusion that the ineffable reality comprised by all dharmas cannot be determined as either 'empty' or 'non-empty' (Skt.: *aśūnya*; Chi.: *bukong* 不 空). In his attempted refutation of Bhāviveka's proof of the emptiness of all dharmas, Kuiji upholds the Yogācāra teaching that ultimate reality cannot be characterised in terms of a polarity between emptiness and existence.

Bhāviveka's Two Inferences for the Emptiness of All Dharmas

The Chinese translation of the *Jewel in the Palm of the Hand* opens with a single stanza, rendered by Xuanzang into five-characters-per-line Chinese verse (Chi.: *wuyan shi* 五言詩) that encapsulates the two inferences for the emptiness of all dharmas. The treatise is organised into two fascicles: the first devoted to an analysis of the inference for the emptiness of all conditioned dharmas and the second dedicated to that of the inference for emptiness of all unconditioned dharmas. Because the original Sanskrit version of the *Jewel in the Palm of the Hand* has not survived, the Chinese translation put together by Xuanzang with his disciples stands as an important record of Bhāviveka's use of the science of reasons to advance the Madhyamaka doctrine of omnipresent emptiness.

As presented in the Chinese translation, Bhāviveka structures his opening argument to prove the emptiness of all dharmas into two three-part inferences, which strictly adhere to the rules of *hetuvidyā*, standardised by Dignāga,

wherein deductive and inductive forms of reasoning are employed to validate a thesis. A formal inference is comprised of at least three parts:[5] a 'thesis' (Skt.: *pratijñā*; Chi.: *zong* 宗), a 'reason' (Skt.: *hetu*; Chi.: *yin* 因), and a 'concordant example' (Skt.: *sapakṣa*; Chi.: *tongpin* 同品). For example, to prove the thesis that there is a fire on a mountain, both a reason for inferring the presence of fire on the mountain (such as the appearance of smoke on the mountain) and a concordant example of something that has both the properties of fire and smoke (such a cooking fire in a kitchen) must be provided.

As mentioned above, a valid trairūpya inference is comprised of at least three parts:

1. The thesis: A statement in which the 'target property' (Skt.: *sādhyadharma*; Chi.: *suoli fa* 所立法), which is the property to be inferred (the presence of fire), is ascribed to the 'property-possessor' (Skt.: *dharmin*; Chi.: *youfa* 有法), which is the bearer of the target property (the mountain).

2. The reason: A statement in which the 'inferring property' (Skt.: *sādhanadharma*; Chi.: *nengli fa* 能立法), which is the basis upon which the target property is inferred (the presence of smoke), is ascribed to the property-possessor (the mountain).

3. The concordant example: An 'example' (Skt.: *dṛṣṭānta*; Chi.: *yu* 喻), such as a cooking fire in the kitchen, exemplifies the coincidence of both the inferring property (the presence of smoke) and the target property to be inferred (the presence of fire).

According to the rules of *hetuvidyā*, if a reason ascribing a particular inferring property to a property-possessor (the mountain) within a thesis is to be considered valid, three conditions must be met:

1. The inferring property (the presence of smoke) of the reason is exemplified by the property-possessor (the mountain) of the thesis.

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[5] For a concise summary of secondary scholarship analyzing the debates in classical Indic Buddhism regarding whether a 'negative example' (*vipakṣa*) is also required in all cases, see Westerhoff (2018, 229-230, n. 47) in which he points out that very early Indic discussions of formal inference do not mention the negative example.

2. The concordant example (the cooking fire in the kitchen) exemplifies both the target property to be inferred (the presence of fire) and the inferring property (the presence of smoke).

3. The inferring property of the reason (the presence of smoke) is not exemplified in any other examples lacking the target property to be proven (the presence of smoke does not occur in the absence of fire).[6]

Bhāviveka's two inferences to disprove the fundamentally real existence of conditioned and unconditioned dharmas as the impartite entities that make up the entirety of the universe are formulated as follows:[7]

Inference one:
真性有爲空
緣生故
如幻

Thesis: Ultimately, conditioned dharmas are empty.
Reason: Because they are dependently arisen.
Concordant example: Like an illusion (Skt.: *māyāvat*).

Inference two:
無爲無真實
不起故
如空華

Thesis: Ultimately,[8] unconditioned dharmas are not intrinsically

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[6] These are the three characteristics of an inferential sign (*liṅga*) or of a reason as stipulated by Dignāga: 1) *pakṣadharmatva*, 2) *tattulye sadbhāva*, and 3) *asati nāstitā*; see Hayes (1988, 239–242).

[7] See *Jewel in the Palm of the Hand* (T30, no. 1578, 268b21–b22). La Vallée Poussin (1933, 70, n. 1) has reconstructed the Sanskrit of the two inferences as follows: *tattvataḥ saṃskṛtāḥ śūnyā māyāvat pratyayodbhavāḥ | asaṃskṛtās tv asadbhūtā anutpādāt khapuṣpavat ||*.

[8] In the second inference, the qualifier 'ultimately' (Skt.: *tattvatas*; *paramārthatas*; Chi.: *zhenxing* 真性) is understood to be implied, *metri causa*, and therefore not explicitly stated in the opening verse of Bhāviveka's *Jewel in the Hand*. He (2015) and La Vallée Poussin (1933, 70) reconstruct the corresponding Sanskrit as *tattvatas*, while Moro (2020, 295) reconstructs it as *paramārthatas*.

real entities.
Reason: Because they do not (causally) arise or produce.
Concordant example: Like a sky-flower (Skt.: *_khapuṣpavat_).[9]

In the first inference, Bhāviveka reasons that, if the target property—being empty—is to be proven to inhere in all conditioned dharmas, then being 'dependently arisen' (Chi.: _yuansheng_ 緣生) must be positively concomitant with, or 'pervade' (Skt.: √_vyāp_; Chi.: _bian_ 遍),[10] all entities that are empty. Furthermore, the concordant example—'like an illusion'—must exemplify both the target property of being empty and the inferring property of being dependently arisen. Because illusory entities exemplify both the properties of being empty and dependently arisen, the first inference is considered valid.

In the second inference, Bhāviveka further contends that if the target property of being fundamentally unreal is to be proven to inhere in all unconditioned dharmas then 'not arising' (Chi.: _buqi_ 不起)[11] must pervade the class of all entities that are fundamentally unreal. Since the concordant example of 'like a sky-flower' exemplifies the target property of being fundamentally unreal and the inferring property of not arising, the second inference is considered valid.

Taken together, the two inferences attempt to prove that conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty (in that they are, in the first example, like illusions that arise dependently) and, in the second example, fundamentally unreal (in that they do not arise in the first place). Because conditioned dharmas possess causal efficacy, yet do not possess intrinsic natures that ultimately exist, they can be regarded as empty, just like illusions. Because unconditioned

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[9] Insofar as a flower does not spontaneously arise in the sky, a sky-flower is likened to an unconditioned dharma which neither arises nor possesses the power to produce anything else, even conventionally.

[10] Bhāviveka follows the rules of _hetuvidyā_, systematised by Dignāga, in which 'pervasion' (_vyāpti_) is taken to mean that the inferring property of the reason applies to a broader class of entities than the property-possessor does. Thus, the property-possessor should be pervaded by the inferring property, but not vice versa. For this definition of _vyāpti_, see Fong (2015, 23) and Katsura (1986, 62).

[11] See _Jewel in the Palm of the Hand_: 'What is not causally productive is commonly known in ordinary cognition. Its nature is fundamentally unreal. It can be likened to a sky-flower.' 諸不起者, 愚智同知。其性無實, 猶如空花. (T30, no. 1578, p. 273, c15–c16); 'spatiality (_ākāśa_) is established as not even really existent in terms of conventional truth, as it does not arise, just like a sky-flower.' 若就世俗, 所立虛空亦非實有, 以不起故, 猶如空花 (T30, no. 1578, p. 273, c28).

dharmas neither arise nor possess causal efficacy to produce effects, they are also regarded as empty. Thus, by way of two inferences, Bhāviveka has given the outline of his proof of the Madhyamaka thesis that all conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are universally empty.

Bhāviveka on the Inference for the Emptiness of All Conditioned Dharmas

In the prose commentary to the first inference, located within the first fascicle of the *Jewel in the Palm of the Hand,* Bhāviveka defines the property-possessor—all conditioned dharmas—to be comprised of 'twelve sense-loci' (Skt.: *āyatana*; Chi.: *chu* 處), that is, the 'six sense faculties' (Skt.: *ṣaḍāyatana*; Chi.: *liugen* 六根) and the six types of corresponding sensory objects. Bhāviveka stipulates, however, that the four types of mental objects that correspond to the cognitive field of the sixth sense, the 'mental faculty' (Skt.: *manas*; Chi.: *yigen* 意根), fall outside the scope of the property-possessor of all conditioned dharmas. The four types of mental objects include: 'spatiality' (Skt.: *ākāśa*; Chi.: *xukong* 虛空), 'cessation realised through analytical meditation' (Skt.: *pratisaṃkhyānirodha*; Chi.: *zemie* 擇滅), 'cessation realised without analytical meditation' (Skt.: *apratisaṃkhyānirodha*; Chi.: *fei zemie* 非擇滅), and 'thusness' (reality as it really is; Skt.: *tathatā*; Chi.: *zhenru* 真如).[12] Bhāviveka determines that these four types of mental objects are within the scope of the property-possessor of the unconditioned dharmas and addresses them in the second inference.

Bhāviveka states that in the thesis of the first inference, he deliberately chooses the qualifier 'ultimately' (Skt.: *paramārthatas*, *tattvatas*; Chi.: *zhenxing* 真性) to indicate that the emptiness of the conditioned dharmas can be validated in terms of an ultimate truth, and not merely a conventional truth that conforms to the ordinary sense perception of things composed of conditioned dharmas. In terms of the conventional truth of conditioned dharmas, Bhāviveka understands that both individual conditioned dharmas, and composite entities

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[12] In *his Jewel in the Palm of the Hand*, Bhāviveka stipulates that the reference of the property-possessor in his first inference excludes only these four types of mental objects: 'Conditioned' means produced and formed by a myriad of conditions. It refers to the twelve sense-loci. It only excludes one part of the locus of the dharmas (i.e., mental objects of the mental faculty)—i.e., spatiality, cessation realised through analysis, cessation realised without analysis, and thusness.' 眾緣合成有所造作故名有為, 即十二處, 唯除法處一分虛空、擇非擇滅及真如性 (T1578.30.268c14–15).

that are comprised of multiple conditioned dharmas, have functions that are perceived through the senses, and therefore can be verified as conventionally existent. By using 'ultimately' in the thesis, Bhāviveka, eliminates the possibility that the emptiness of the conditioned dharmas could be invalidated by the commonplace perceptions of the conditioned dharmas as conventionally real.

His prose auto-commentary on the first inference is encapsulated in the opening stanza and reads:

> 此中世間同許有者, 自亦許為世俗有, 故世俗現量生起因緣亦許有。故眼等有為世俗諦攝, 牧牛人等皆共了知, 眼等有為是實有故。勿違如是自宗所許、現量共知, 故以真性簡別立宗。真義自體說名真性, 即勝義諦。就勝義諦立有為空, 非就世俗.[13]

> Here [in the first inference] what is granted to exist among ordinary folk in the world is also granted by the disputant to exist conventionally. Therefore, the causes and conditions that produce direct perception at the conventional level are also believed to exist. Hence, the existence of the visual faculty, etc., is subsumed under the conventional truth. This is because of the fact that cowherders, etc., all know that existents such as the visual faculty, etc., really exist. So as not to violate what is thus granted in the disputant's own tradition, and commonly known via direct perception, we thus use the qualifier 'ultimately' to restrict the thesis that is established [in the first inference]. Reality as it really is, is designated by the qualifier 'ultimately', and is identical to the ultimate truth. It is in terms of ultimate truth that existence is proven to be 'empty', *not* in terms of conventional truth.

In this passage, Bhāviveka defends his using 'ultimately' as a 'specifying phrase' (Chi.: *jianbie ci* 簡別詞) to restrict the scope of the entire thesis of the first inference. He states that the temporary existence of conditioned dharmas can be perceived by the senses and is therefore subsumed under conventional truth. Therefore, to eliminate the possibility of invalidating ordinary sense perception based upon the conventional existence of impartite dharmas and the composite entities made up of conditioned dharmas, Bhāviveka restricts the thesis to the ultimate truth of the emptiness of conditioned dharmas.

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[13] T1578.30.268c8–13.

According to the rules of *hetuvidyā* systematised by Dignāga, non-existent entities cannot serve as property-possessors as they, by definition, cannot possess properties. By using 'ultimately' as a qualifier, Bhāviveka avoids the error of ascribing a property to a conventionally non-existent property-possessor (Fong 2019, 797). Bhāviveka thus meets the requirement that the existence of the property-possessor of all conditioned dharmas is *not* negated in terms of conventional truth. While Bhāviveka grants that all conditioned dharmas exist conventionally, he denies that they possess an intrinsic reality in terms of ultimate truth. He is thus in a position to argue that ultimately empty entities can serve as property-possessors that bear tangible properties in terms of conventional truth.

In his commentary on the first inference, Bhāviveka makes two overarching points: First, that both conditioned dharmas and the composites made of dharmas that comprise conditioned reality can be perceived; secondly, that conditioned dharmas and the composites made of dharmas are not ultimately real. He argues in the *Jewel in the Palm of the Hand* that both conditioned dharmas and composites of dharmas are ultimately 'like an illusion' (Skt.: *māyāvat*; Chi.: *ru huan* 如幻), in that they ultimately lack intrinsic natures that differentiate them as entities that exist separately from the myriad of causes and conditions that produce them:

> 眾緣所起男、女、羊、鹿諸幻事等, 自性實無, 顯現似有。所立、能立法皆通有, 為同法喻, 故說如幻。隨其所應, 假說所立、能立法同, 假說同故, 不可一切同喻上法, 皆難令有。如說女面端嚴如月, 不可難令一切月法皆面上有。[14]

> Illusory entities produced by the myriad of conditions such as 'deer', 'lamb', 'man', 'woman', etc., are devoid of intrinsic natures. They are [mere] appearance and [only] seeming existence. The target property to be inferred (i.e., 'being empty') and the inferring property of the reason ('being dependently arisen') are both present and share the same target property [dharma] (i.e., lacking an intrinsic nature) as the concordant example [*dṛṣṭānta*] (i.e., 'like an illusion'), therefore [conditioned dharmas] are said to be 'like an illusion'. According to the requirements [of this logical system of

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[14] T1578.30.268c20–25.

hetuvidyā], the concordant example, shares the same property as the inferring property and the property to be inferred. In that they share precisely this property [of lacking intrinsic nature] with the concordant example, you can't fault us that [the inferring property and the property to be inferred] must share all of the properties of the concordant example. If someone says that a woman has a face that is beautiful like the moon, you can't fault them in that not all the properties of the moon are present in her face.

Throughout his analysis of the first inference, Bhāviveka takes a consistently anti-realist stance regarding the fundamentally illusory nature of composite entities such as 'deer', 'lamb', 'men', or 'women'. He also rejects the fundamentally real existence of impartite dharmas that possess unique intrinsic natures of their own. Because Bhāviveka denies the intrinsic reality of both composite entities and the individual dharmas that comprise them, Fong notes that '... the claim that some conditioned things are more real than others is untenable.'[15] Precisely because they lack intrinsic natures that are uniquely their own or render them as distinct from the myriad of causes and conditions of all other conditioned dharmas, for Bhāviveka, all conditioned entities are no different from illusions.

Bhāviveka on the Inference for the Emptiness of All Unconditioned Dharmas

In his second inference, Bhāviveka aims to prove the unreality of unconditioned dharmas in terms of ultimate truth. In the commentary—although he contends that unconditioned dharmas are ultimately 'non-existent entities' (Chi.: *wuyou shi* 無有事)—Bhāviveka posits unconditioned dharmas as existent entities in terms of conventional truth. He reclaims the four mental objects that he eliminated from the property-possessor of all conditioned dharmas and ascribes them as part of the property-possessor of all unconditioned dharmas. In the second inference 'all unconditioned dharmas' are established as a conventionally existing property-possessor based upon the 'power of mutual designation' (Chi.: *gongxu li* 共許力):

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[15] Fong (2015, 181) elaborates: 'This is not because these things all have an inherent existence. It is rather because they all lack an inherent existence. In the opponents' words, they all lack the nature of a real thing, which is real because of its possession of an inherent nature or an ultimate existence.'

想施設力許有假立虛空等故, 不顯差別, 由共許力總立有法, 差
別遮遣非所共知立為宗法, 彼不起等共所了知立為因法, 是故
無有立宗、因過。所說空花雖無有事, 是不起等法之有法, 無性
性故, 由是能成所成立義, 故無有法不成過失.[16]

Because the power of designation of the mind is granted to
provisionally establish [dharmas such as] spatiality, etc., without
specifying their particular properties (*viśeṣa). Through the
power of mutual designation, the property-possessor (i.e., all
unconditioned dharmas) is established as a general concept. It
specifies and negates that which is not cognised as established
in the target property of the subject-locus (*pakṣadharma). That
which is generally known not to causally arise [or produce] is
established as the target property to be inferred (*sādhyadharma).
For this reason, there is no logical error in the subject-locus
(*pakṣābhāsa) or in the reason (*hetvabhāsa). Although sky-
flowers are non-existent entities, the target property (dharma)
[to be proven], 'being [causally] unproductive' inheres in the
property-possessor because the intrinsic nature [of the property-
possessor] is the absence of intrinsic nature. Thus, the inferring
(sādhana) and inferred properties (sādhya) are both established
and therefore there is no error of the property-possessor being
unestablished (*asiddha).

Unlike his Ābhidharmika and Yogācāra opponents, who envision
unconditioned dharmas as ultimately real,[17] Bhāviveka views the unconditioned

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[16] T30n1578_p0274b11–15.

[17] The position that unconditioned dharmas are ultimately real is attested in Yogācāra
sources that survive in Chinese. For example, Xuanzang's translation of *Asvabhāva's
*Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya (Chi.: She Dasheng lun shi 攝大乘論釋) cites a passage, ascribed to
the *Mahaprajñāpāramitāsūtra (Chi.: Da bore boluomiduo jing 大般若波羅蜜多經), which contains
Śākyamuni Buddha's teaching to Maitreya (Chi.: Cishi 慈氏) that the 'thoroughly-real nature'
(Chi.: yuancheng shixing 圓成實性; Skt.: pariniṣpannasvabhāva)—the nature of the dharmas
as they really are, free from distorting mental superimpositions—consists in 'ultimately real
existence' (Chi.: zhenshi you 真實有): 'The imputational nature is absolutely non-existent. The
other-dependent nature is merely names, concepts, designations, and verbalisations. The
thoroughly-real nature consisting in emptiness and the absence of selves, is ultimately real
existence.' 諸遍計所執性決定非有。諸依他起性, 唯有名想施設言說。諸圓成實空無我性,
是真實有 (T1598.31.382c7–9). This particular passage does not appear to be paralleled in the

dharmas as causally unproductive and, ultimately, unreal. Because the sky-flower neither arises nor engenders anything else, it is taken by Bhāviveka in his second inference to be a positive example that exemplifies both the target property of emptiness and the inferring property of being neither causally produced nor productive.

For Bhāviveka, the unconditioned dharmas included in the taxonomies of his Buddhist interlocutors are merely erroneously cognised conditioned dharmas and lack intrinsic reality. As Fong (2019, 800) describes: 'Bhāviveka shows that, in some circumstances, unconditioned things are in fact conditioned things which are erroneously conceptualised as unconditioned. To him, they are actually conventional realities.' Bhāviveka regards unconditioned dharmas as misconstrued conditioned dharmas that exist with intrinsic natures in terms of conventional truth. For example, he regards spatiality as lacking intrinsic nature as it simply consists in the absence of a physically resistant entity in a particular spatio-temporal locus. In other words, the occurrence of space is merely a particular occurrence of non-resistance. As non-resistance merely consists in the absence of physical resistance, it is not a real entity possessing a distinct causal efficacy. Spatiality cannot be a real cause because nothing can be a cause that does not have a real effect. The absence of physical resistance does not produce any tangible sensation in the observer. Nor can spatiality be an effect, as nothing could be the cause of the absence of physical resistance in the environment, as absences are not created. For example, the hammer blow does not create the cessation or absence of the existence of the pot. Bhāviveka reasons that because spatiality itself is neither cause nor effect, it is a pseudo-entity that does not 'arise' in the first place.

Yogācāra doctrine maintains that both thusness and the non-conceptual cognition that directly discerns thusness correspond to the inexpressible ultimate truth. For Kuiji, who upholds the Yogācāra position, ultimate reality exists and is ultimately real. By contrast, Bhāviveka denies the existence of any ultimate reality beyond the constant flux of conditioned dharmas. Ultimately, emptiness itself—the 'cognitive object' (Skt.: *ālambana*; Chi.: *suoyuan* 所緣) of putative non-conceptual cognition—is 'empty' of intrinsic reality; it is a

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Tibetan rendering of *Asvabhāva's commentary, made by Jinamitra, Śīlendrabodhi and Ye-shes-sde (D 4051). I have been unable to locate the source of this particular passage in the body of Prajñāpāramitā literature extant in Chinese.

mere concept and is not ultimately real.[18] By identifying the cognitive object of non-conceptual cognition as conditioned in nature, Bhāviveka refutes the Yogācāra doctrine that non-conceptual cognition has thusness—defined as an unconditioned dharma—as its cognitive object.[19] He writes in his *Jewel in the Palm of the Hand* that thusness as an ultimately existent 'unconditioned dharma' is a misnomer:

> 於唯無有一切, 所執立為真如.[20]

> Thusness is simply posited on the basis of nothing but the absence of all [dharmas].

Thus, the postulate of thusness—defined as neither arising nor ceasing—is predicated upon the negation of the existence of all dharmas that arise and cease. Bhāviveka further argues that the putative non-conceptual cognition of thusness, believed to correspond to ultimate truth in Yogācāra doctrine, is in actuality conceptual cognition of emptiness:

> 緣真如智非真出世無分別智, 有所緣故, 及有為故, 如世緣智.[21]

> The discernment which has thusness as its cognitive object (*ālambana*) is not authentic supramundane cognition, since it has a cognitive object, and because it is conditioned. Just like cognition of worldly conditions.

Bhāviveka reasons that if the non-conceptual discernment taught in Yogācāra doctrine could cognise or directly realise thusness, it would cease to be non-conceptual, as it would bear a cognitive object which always involves conceptualisation; it would therefore be conditioned, like other cognitions based on mundane conditions. For Bhāviveka, the realisation of emptiness neither

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[18] In his *Jewel in the Palm of the Hand*, Bhāviveka formulates this argument in the form of a three-part inference: 'The thusness of the other tradition (i.e., Yogācāra) is not ultimately real, since it is a cognitive object, just like physical stuff (*rūpa*), etc.' 又彼真如非真勝義, 是所緣故, 猶如色等 (T1578.30.274c13–14).

[19] Fong (2015, 51) writes: 'For Madhyamaka holds that ultimate existence is not possible; the former being a discriminative knowledge of emptiness, both itself and its object are also refuted as real ultimately.'

[20] *Jewel in the Palm of the Hand*, T1578.30.274b10.

[21] *Ibid.*, T1578.30.274c5–c7.

arises nor ceases and is therefore without an image. It is not seen in terms of ordinary perception involving the duality of 'grasper' and 'grasped', 'inside' and 'outside'. Bhāviveka thus upholds the Madhyamaka doctrine wherein emptiness is itself 'empty' of intrinsic reality. As Westerhoff (2018, 204) describes: 'Because emptiness itself is empty, there is no bottom level we could postulate that is not conceptually imputed on something else and that could therefore act as an objective foundation of all that exists in the world.' Bhāviveka is adamant that both thusness, and the non-conceptual cognition which is believed by his Yogācāra opponents to access it, are part of conditioned reality.

Bhāviveka on the Omission of the Discordant Example (Vipakṣa)

Typically, the logical form of the three-part 'inference for others' (Skt.: *parārthānumāna*; Chi.: *ta biliang* 他比量)[22] includes a 'discordant example' (Skt.: *vipakṣa*; Chi.: *yipin* 異品) that exemplifies neither the target property to be inferred nor the inferring property. The discordant example is included in order to demonstrate that the property to be inferred and the inferring property are absent in all entities that do not possess the target property to be inferred.[23] In the example of the smoke on the mountain, the discordant example provided by the disputant would be 'like a lake', because a lake fails to exemplify the possibility of the presence of either smoke or fire. Quite notably, the two three-part inferences constructed by Bhāviveka do not, according to the rules of the 'inference for others' laid down by Dignāga, include the standard discordant example.

Matilal (1970, 83)[24] and Westerhoff (2018, 144–145), make the trenchant

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[22] Dignāna argued that there are two kinds of formal inferences: Inferences 'for oneself' (*svārthānumāna*) and inferences 'for others' (*parārthānumāna*). In essence, the former are inferences enacted in one's own mind to obtain inferential knowledge of some matter, and do not require adducing both a positive and a negative example to be considered valid. The latter are inferences set forth in a public context so that another individual can use them to acquire their own inferential knowledge based on them and require adducing both a positive and a negative example to be considered valid. For this twofold analytical distinction in Dignāga's theory of inference, see Westerhoff (2018, 227-229).

[23] According to Dignāga, the basic purpose of discordant examples is to indicate the dissimilar instances, which neither exemplify the target property to be inferred as inhering in the property-possessor nor the inferring property. This is in order to exclude these dissimilar instances from the domain of positive instances, which instead may exemplify the inferring property. See Katsura (1986, 63–65).

[24] Matilal (1970, 83) argues that for Madhyamaka Buddhist doctrine, the usage of conceptual fictions—or ultimately 'empty' terms in the thesis (*pakṣa*) of inferences—is valid: '... it is possible

point that a discordant example cannot—based upon the reason that it is dependently arisen based on a myriad of impermanent causes and conditions— be provided in a three-part inference intended to prove the emptiness of all conditioned dharmas. They reason that, if all conditioned entities are understood to be empty of intrinsic natures (according to Madhyamaka doctrine), and there are no conditioned entities that possess intrinsic natures but are not empty, then a discordant example of a conditioned dharma that is not empty cannot be provided.

Bhāviveka anticipates the counterargument of a lacking discordant example. He reasons that, because all discordant examples necessary to prove the emptiness of the dharmas have already been proven to be empty—via individual inferences that are intended to prove the emptiness of each and every individual dharma—then the requirement of a discordant example is moot. Therefore, Bhāviveka's omission of discordant examples in his two inferences is intentional and legitimate.[25]

In his *Jewel in the Palm of the Hand*, Bhāviveka argues that the purpose of discordant examples is to eliminate via the process of 'negation' (Chi.: *zhe* 遮)[26] any potential counterexamples of entities that would exemplify the inferring property—but not the property to be inferred—thus invalidating his inferences by revealing the lack of 'positive concomitance' (Skt.: *anvaya*; Chi.: *he* 合) between the inferring property and the property to be inferred:

> 為遮異品, 立異法喻, 異品無故, 遮義已成, 是故不說.

> An example with discordant properties (Skt.: *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*; Chi.: *yifayu* 異法喻) is established in order to negate discordant

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to talk about fictitious objects or empty properties because, otherwise, one cannot even deny successfully their existence.'

[25] Fong (2015, 43) argues: 'As there is no locus for the properties "not empty" and "real" to occur in, the second characteristic is secured while the third characteristic has become impossible.'

[26] Fong (2015, 43) notes: 'This elimination is achieved by non-implicative negation, which negates without implying the affirmation of the opposite of what is negated.' That is, the existence of each and every conditioned and unconditioned dharma as an ultimately real constituent of reality is negated without implying 'the existence of its absence' (Skt.: *abhāvabhāva*). See Keira (2004, 30), who points out that the usage of implicative negation in the context of Madhyamaka thought would '… lead to the nihilist extreme, where the negation becomes an absolute reality— the subtle point of Mādhyamika philosophy is always that neither the affirmation nor negation of things is ultimate.'

examples. Since there are no discordant examples with the process of the negation [of the intrinsic reality of all dharmas] being completed, discordant examples are not mentioned.

According to Bhāviveka, there are no legitimate discordant examples sufficient to disprove either of his inferences; namely, entities which are produced by impermanent causes and conditions but are not empty, or which are not causally productive but are real.

Bhāviveka on the Conventional and Ultimate Truths of All Dharmas

Bhāviveka's two inferences aim to prove that the dharmas are, without exception, empty of any 'fundamentally real nature' (Skt.: *dravyatva*; Chi.: *shixing* 實性) and produced by the mental force of conceptual construction. Bhāviveka adheres to the inherited Abhidharma definition of the real nature of dharmas in terms of causal efficacy, the energy required to achieve their characteristic functions. However, by way of two inferences, he dispels with the Abhidharma tenet that the individual dharmas are ultimately real entities owing to their fundamentally real intrinsic natures that are not borrowed from other dharmas. In combating the Abhidharma ontological tenet ascribing ultimate reality to impartite dharmas with intrinsically real cores, Bhāviveka stresses that all reality that the individual dharmas possess flows from their status as mere conventions—conceptual fictions that nonetheless possess functional efficacy.[27] For Bhāviveka, individual dharmas are no more real than the composite entities they serve as the basis of—such as 'jars', 'chariots', 'armies', or 'forests'. While composite wholes derive the entirety of their causal efficacy from their constituent parts, individual dharmas derive the entirety of their causal efficacy from the myriad of causes and conditions that generate them. For Bhāviveka, in the final analysis, both individual dharmas and composites are essentially conceptual constructions,

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[27] As Westerhoff (2018, 117) describes, Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka doctrine of the universal emptiness of all dharmas of intrinsic natures does not deny that dharmas possess causal efficacy: 'Nāgārjuna stresses the fact that even though things like chariots and pots are neither fundamentally real nor based on something fundamentally real, they can still perform various functions such as carrying wood or water.' Westerhoff points to the example of fiat currency, which has no intrinsic value nor is based upon anything with intrinsic value, but nonetheless can serve as a valid medium of exchange by relying on the beliefs and expectations of the participants in economic exchanges.

and are as fundamentally unreal as the illusory hairs superimposed on the moon by an eye stricken with cataracts.[28] However, for Bhāviveka, although the existence of discrete dharmas with intrinsic natures is ultimately illusory, that does not mean that the dharmas are 'absolutely non-existent' or pseudo-entities like the 'son of a barren woman'.[29] Conditioned dharmas produced by impermanent causes and conditions nonetheless exist conventionally and are able to produce effects and to causally interact with other dharmas; otherwise, they are absolutely non-existent (i.e., even conventionally).

Kuiji's Yogācāra Counterargument to Bhāviveka's Two Inferences for the Emptiness of All Dharmas

A century later in his *Study Notes on the Treatise Demonstrating Nothing but Consciousness* (Chi.: *Cheng weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記), Kuiji contends that the two inferences of Bhāviveka are founded on a 'mistaken interpretation of the doctrine of emptiness' (Skt.: *durgṛhītā śūnyatā*; Chi.: *equ kong* 惡取 空). In his attempted refutation of Bhāviveka's two inferences, Kuiji defends the Yogācāra position that there is an ultimate reality, designated by the term 'thusness' (the ultimate nature of the dharmas as they really are), that

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[28] Bhāviveka adduces the example of illusory hairs superimposed upon the perception of the moon by someone stricken with cataracts in his *Jewel in the Palm of the Hand* at T1578.30.269a26-27.

[29] Bhāviveka envisions the target property of 'being empty'—that is to be proven as inhering in the property-possessor of 'all conditioned dharmas'—as like an illusion or a false appearance, which is existent conventionally and thus able to produce an effect, unlike the 'voice of the son of a barren woman', which is a complete pseudo-entity and causally impotent; see Fong (2015, 154–155). Bhāviveka's *Jewel in the Palm of the Hand* records the objection that: 'If [all conditioned dharmas] are empty of intrinsic natures, then the target property to be inferred and the inferring property (i.e., being dependently arisen) are both unestablished (Skt.: *asiddha*), like the voice projected by the son of a barren woman. The inferring property pervades conditioned dharmas, therefore it is the same as the target property to be proven (i.e., 'being empty') inasmuch as its nature is empty. Owing to the fact that both are empty, neither the inferring property nor the property to be inferred are established. Both negate the intrinsic reality of the target property to be inferred and the inferring property. This amounts to negating the specific attributes of the property-possessor, and reveals itself to be a logical error in establishing the thesis' (Skt.: *pakṣābhāsa*). 若自性空所立能立皆不成就, 如石女兒所發音聲, 能立攝在有為中故, 同彼所立其性亦空, 以俱空故, 所立能立並不成就。彼遣所立能立法體, 即是遣於有法自相, 顯立宗過. (T1578.30.270a14–17). For Bhāviveka, conditioned dharmas that are ultimately empty nonetheless exist conventionally. As such, the establishment of the property that infers and the property to be inferred does not undermine the establishment of the property possessor of 'all conditioned dharmas'.

can be accessed by the mind and physical sense faculties of Buddhas and awakened sages. Relying on a variety of Yogācāra doctrinal sources, most notably the *Treatise Demonstrating Nothing but Consciousness* (Chi.: *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論)—the compilation of which Kuiji participated in—Kuiji holds that the nature of this ultimate reality cannot be circumscribed in terms of a dichotomy between fundamental emptiness and conventional existence. Based upon these Yogācāra treatises, Kuiji defends the Yogācāra stance that unconditioned reality is ineffable and ultimately real.

Kuiji on the Property-Possessors of Bhāviveka's Two Inferences

In his logical analysis of the two inferences for the emptiness of all dharmas, Kuiji contests Bhāviveka's deployment of the word 'ultimately' when used to qualify the property-possessors of all conditioned dharmas and all unconditioned dharmas. While the underlying Sanskrit correlate is difficult to corroborate, given that Bhāviveka's original Sanskrit is not extant, Xuanzang's translation of 'ultimately' as *zhenxing* 真性 in Bhāviveka's two inferences remains elusive and is disputed by commentators.[30] Kuiji understands *zhenxing* as a partial descriptor of the property-possessors of all conditioned and unconditioned dharmas[31] rather than as an adverb

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[30] In his *Lamp of the Definitive Meaning of the Treatise Demonstrating Nothing but Consciousness* (Chi.: *Cheng weishi lun liaoyi deng* 成唯識論了義燈), Huizhao 慧沼 (648–714) diverges from his teacher Kuiji in regarding the terminology 'ultimately' (Chi.: *zhenxing* 真性) to take broad scope over the entire thesis, including both the target property to be inferred of 'being empty' and the property-possessor of 'all conditioned dharmas'. In asserting that this terminology does not specifically comprise a component of the property-possessor, he rejects Kuiji's reading, which takes the term to comprise a component of the property-possessor as an indication of the unconditioned nature of ultimate reality: 'There is no error of the property-possessor being unacceptable [to one party] in the thesis [of Bhāviveka's first inference], since [the terminology] 'ultimately' isn't [part of] the property-possessor. Because the purpose of including this 'ultimately' is to take [all] conditioned dharmas as the property-possessor, we now say that [Kuiji's interpretation] is erroneous. The opponent's (i.e., Bhāviveka's) inclusion of [the qualifier] 'ultimately,' indicates the omnipresent emptiness [of all dharmas]; it is not a conditioned dharma. The original purpose [behind Bhāviveka's inclusion of this qualifier] is not to take 'ultimately' to be [part of] the property-possessor. In their ultimate nature [conditioned dharmas] are ineffable.' 宗中無法不極成過。以其真性不是有法。舉此真性意, 取有為以為有法故, 今謂是過。彼舉真性, 真性皆空無有為法。本意不取真性為有法。於真性中復不可言說. (T1832.43.733b16–19).

[31] He (2015) observes that such a reading misconstrues Bhāviveka's inclusion of the qualifier

modifying both the target property to be inferred and the property-possessor.

In his reading, Kuiji understands 'in their ultimate nature' (Chi.: *zhenxing* 真性) as a partial component of the property-possessor. He then views the complete property-possessor of the first inference as 'all conditioned and unconditioned dharmas in their ultimate nature'. To Kuiji, the phrase 'in their ultimate nature' is understood to include both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas within the property-possessor. In this reading, the underlying referent of the property-possessor 'all conditioned dharmas in their ultimate nature' is unconditioned reality.[32] Thus, Kuiji understands Xuanzang's Chinese rendering (*zhenxing*) to designate the unconditioned nature of ultimate reality, rather than indicating the perspective or register of ultimate truth from which all conditioned dharmas are seen as empty of intrinsic natures.

In his *Study Notes on the Treatise Demonstrating Nothing but Consciousness*,

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'ultimately' in order to modify the entire thesis (*pratijñā*), including the property-possessor and the target property ascribed to it, 'being empty', such that it exemplifies this property in terms of ultimate truth. To assert that the property of 'being empty' is exemplified by conditioned dharmas in terms of conventional truth is to deny their real causal efficacy within conventional reality. He (2015) notes: '... one cannot take 'ultimate nature' to be just one part of the property-possessor, or a restriction only on the property-possessor.' 而不能把'真性'看作是'有法'的一部分或者僅是對'有法'的限定.

[32] In his investigation of Nara-period exegesis on the *Treatise Demonstrating Nothing but Consciousness*, Green (2020) poses the provocative question: '... in Yogācāra, are [conditioned] dharmas strictly *saṃskṛta* or could it be that there is a true nature of *saṃskṛta*?' (Brackets added.) This study contends that the position maintaining that the true nature of conditioned dharmas is unconditioned thusness is represented in a variety of Yogācāra doctrinal sources, such as the *Pañcaskandhakaprakaraṇa* (Chi.: *Wuyun lun* 五蘊論), which defines thusness in terms of the omnipresent nature of all dharmas (Chi.: *faxing* 法性). Xuanzang's translation of this treatise reads: 'What is thusness? It refers to the intrinsic nature of each and every dharma, which [all] are devoid of the nature of selfhood.' 云何真如?謂諸法法性、法無我性 (T1612.31.850a23). Xuanzang's rendering of *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (Chi.: *Dasheng Apitadamo zaji lun* 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論), a Yogācāra-inflected work of exegesis on Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, attributed to Sthiramati within East Asian tradition, through to Jinaputra by the Tibetan tradition, expresses a similar doctrinal stance in ascribing ultimate existence to the nature of all conditioned and unconditioned dharmas as characterised by the lack of individual essences or 'selves' (*ātmānaḥ*): 'The nature of dharmas as being devoid of selfhood is designated by 'thusness.' Its nature of being devoid of selfhood is ultimately real existence.' 諸法無我性, 是名真如。彼無我性真實有故. This statement is paralleled in the Tibetan counterpart of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* at D4054.135.143b.3.

Kuiji argues that Bhāviveka's first inference incurs the logical error when 'the property-possessor (i.e., conditioned dharmas in their ultimate nature) is well known [to exist] (Skt.: *aprasiddha*) by one party',[33] namely, the Yogācāra opponent. The conclusion is based on a false premise, and therefore unsound:

> 彼依《掌珍》真性有為空等似比量。撥無此識及一切法, 皆言無體。言似比量者, 謂約我宗, 真性有為無為非空不空, 有法一分非極成過.

> Bhāviveka's [argumentation] in his *Jewel in the Palm of the Hand* that 'conditioned dharmas in their ultimate nature are empty', etc., amounts to a pseudo-inference. It negates as non-existent all dharmas, including our own consciousness, describing them as all lacking intrinsic reality (Chi.: *ti* 體). It is said to be a pseudo-inference because in our tradition (of Yogācāra), conditioned and unconditioned dharmas in their ultimate nature are neither empty nor non-empty. The inference incurs the logical error of the property-possessor (i.e., 'all conditioned and unconditioned dharmas in their ultimate nature') being unacceptable to one party (i.e., the Yogācāras).

Kuiji states that Bhāviveka deploys an illegitimate property-possessor in his first inference. By referring to 'the ultimate nature [of conditioned dharmas]', Bhāviveka improperly expands the scope of the property-possessor of his first inference beyond conditioned dharmas to include unconditioned dharmas such as thusness. In his rejoinder to Bhāviveka, Kuiji's construes 'ultimate nature' as referring to the entirety of unconditioned reality. Therefore, Bhāviveka's

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[33] Also referred to as 'the error of the qualificand being well known [to exist]' (Skt.: *aprasiddhaviśeṣya*; Chi.: *suobie bu jicheng guo* 所別不極成過). As the paradigmatic case of this type of logical error, Dignāga's Nyāyapraveśa gives the example of when an adherent of the Sāṃkhya tradition (Chi.: *Shulun* 數論) asserts the thesis that '*ātman* is sentient' (Chi.: *wo shi si* 我是思) in a debate with a Buddhist opponent. To Buddhist opponent, it is well established that there exists the property of sentience, but not that there exists an *ātman* to which this property can be properly ascribed. In other words, the predicate or qualifier (Skt.: *viśeṣaṇa*; Chi.: *nengbie* 能別) is well known to exist by the opponent, but not the subject or qualificand (Skt.: *viśeṣya*; Chi.: *suobie* 所別). See Xuanzang, trans., *Nyāyapraveśa* (T1630.32.11b26) for the full three-part inference; for the corresponding original Sanskrit, see Dhruva (1987, 3); for English translation, see Tachikawa (1971, 122).

attempt to restrict the property of being empty to all conditioned dharmas in terms of ultimate truth—without ascribing this property to them in terms of conventional truth—is denied. Kuiji thus rejects Bhāviveka's contention that unconditioned dharmas are ultimately empty, hewing to the Yogācāra tenet of 'nothing but consciousness', wherein all conditioned dharmas are produced by the real force of mental construction.

Ultimate Reality Is Neither Empty, Nor Non-Empty

In his analysis of Bhāviveka's two inferences, Kuiji adheres to the Yogācāra doctrine formulated in the *Treatise Demonstrating Nothing but Consciousness*, which envisions the nature of thusness as 'departing from both existence and non-existence' (真如離有離無性):[34]

> 我法非有, 空識非無。離有離無, 故契中道.[35]

> Self and [illusory] dharmas are [ultimately] non-existent; emptiness and consciousness are not [ultimately] non-existent: in departing from existence and non-existence one thereby tallies with Middle Way.

Based upon the characterisation of the nature of thusness in the *Treatise Demonstrating Nothing but Consciousness* as 'neither existence nor non-existence', Kuiji maintains that Bhāviveka's two inferences negate the 'intrinsic reality' (Chi.: *ti* 體) of thusness. For Bhāviveka, the term 'thusness' is merely a 'designatory label' (Skt.: *prajñapti*; Chi.: *jiaming* 假名) that ultimately refers to nothing beyond the reality of conditioned dharmas. All designatory labels are conditioned and therefore do not designate any ultimate reality. In his *Study Notes on the Treatise Demonstrating Nothing but Consciousness*, he avers that thusness is characterised in the treatise as existent in order to combat the view that it is an 'absolutely non-existent' (Chi.: *quanwu* 全無) entity without any intrinsic reality of its own:

> 遮惡取空、及邪見者撥體全無, 故說為有。體實非有非不有.[36]

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[34] *Cheng weishi lun*, T1585.31.46b16–17.

[35] T1585.31.39b2. Reference has been made to translations of Mayer (2017, 2372) and Wei Tat (1976, 510).

[36] Kuiji, *Study Notes on the Treatise Demonstrating Nothing but Consciousness*, T1830.43.291c4–5.

> It [thusness] is spoken of as 'existent' in order to dispel with the mistaken interpretation of the doctrine of emptiness and the pernicious views which negate its intrinsic reality as absolutely non-existent. Its intrinsic reality is, in actuality, neither existence nor the absence of existence.

Kuiji alleges that, within Bhāviveka's first inference, the target property of being empty is improperly ascribed to both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas, whereas the Yogācāra opponent's doctrinal sources maintain that the ultimate nature of unconditioned dharmas—such as thusness—cannot be determined as either 'empty' or as 'non-empty'. For Kuiji, the logical error of the property-possessor being unacceptable to one party is incurred because thusness, in the ultimate analysis, is not regarded as 'empty' by the Yogācāra opponent and thus cannot serve as a valid locus in which the target property of 'being empty' could inhere.

Conclusion

By applying the inferential method both to conditioned and unconditioned dharmas, Bhāviveka aims to prove that all dharmas, without exception, lack ultimately existent intrinsic natures.[37] He argues that unconditioned dharmas, like conditioned dharmas, ultimately lack intrinsic natures, and that they are merely misperceived conditioned dharmas existing as conventionalisms produced through the sheer force of mental construction. By denying that unconditioned dharmas ultimately exist, Bhāviveka upholds a doctrinal understanding that takes Nāgārjuna to contend that nothing exists beyond the conditioned reality. While Bhāviveka deploys the Madhyamaka doctrine of two truths to expose that conditioned dharmas are ultimately empty of intrinsic natures, he does not deny that conditioned dharmas are without intrinsic natures conventionally. To deny that conditioned dharmas lack distinguishing natures even conventionally would invalidate the accurate perceptions of conventionally existent entities.

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[37] Keira (2004, 30–31) articulates two distinct readings of the scope of the qualifier, 'ultimately', attached to the theses of Bhāviveka's two inferences in terms of Madhyamaka thought. On the first reading, Mādhyamika thinkers indicate that—from an ultimate point of view (i.e., in terms of ultimate truth)—all dharmas are without intrinsic natures. On the second reading, all dharmas are understood as without an ultimately existing intrinsic nature. Keira (2004, 30) elaborates that: 'In the second case, the qualifier pertains to what is negated, i.e., intrinsic nature, and thus ensures that it is not all intrinsic natures which are being negated but rather ultimately existing intrinsic natures.'

In his logical analysis of Bhāviveka's two inferences, Kuiji faithfully follows Yogācāra doctrinal sources, according to which the ultimate nature of unconditioned dharmas is not reducible to the conventional existence of conditioned dharmas in constant flux. Rather, there is an ultimately real nature of unconditioned dharmas that does not consist in a conceptual superimposition on conditioned dharmas. This ultimately real nature cannot be determined as 'empty' as it includes all dharmas in their quiescent and undifferentiated state. However, it cannot be determined as 'non-empty,' in that such a positive description poses the risk of leading to the reification of the dharmas as substantially existent entities.

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Many for One: An Exegetical Method
in Mahāvihāra Buddhism

Aruna Keerthi Gamage

for Jonathan Walters

ABSTRACT—The Theriya/Mahāvihāra[1] exegetes teach their audience to read a text, especially the canon[2], without always sticking to the literal meaning. The intended meaning of such words occurring in the Tipiṭaka is narrower than their literal meaning would suggest. If one does not clearly see these semantic shifts, one is likely to proffer many misinterpretations that were never intended by the original authors of these texts. When exegetes of the Mahāvihāra school encounter an expression in the canon whose literal meaning does not fully or partially match the relevant context, they offer specific hermeneutical strategies to teach the reader

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[1] In line with traditional records like Dīpavaṃsa (c. 3rd century CE) and Mahāvaṃsa (5th century CE), the Theravāda branch of Buddhism was likely first established in Sri Lanka around the 3rd century BCE. See Dīp VIII 53,$_{24}$–54,$_{15}$; Mhv XII 82,$_{1-16}$. This branch was split into three schools during the first millennium as 1) Mahāvihāra, 2) Abhayagiri and 3) Jetavana. However, the Mahāvihāra is the only surviving school. This school transmitted all its texts in Pali, a Middle Indian language. In contemporary parlance, we use 'Theravāda Buddhism' or 'Theriya Buddhism' to denote the teachings transmitted by the Mahāvihāra school.

[2] The canon of the Mahāvihāra school is called Tipiṭaka ('Triple Basket'), which consists of three sections—Vinayapiṭaka or basket of monastic law, Suttapiṭaka or basket of teachings and Abhidhammapiṭaka or basket of higher teachings. This school has extensive exegetical literature elucidating the meaning of the Tipiṭaka, including commentaries (Aṭṭhakathā) and sub-commentaries (Ṭīkā), which can be dated from the 4th century CE.

to properly understand that expression. This article provides examples of how the authors of Aṭṭhakathās interpret some words with semantic transpositions found in the Tipiṭaka as well as how the authors of Ṭīkās interpret such words found in the Aṭṭhakathās, examining the relevance of these interpretations in understanding the teachings—both in the canon and commentaries—of the Mahāvihāra school.

KEYWORDS: rūḷhi, Mahāvihāra, aṭṭhakathā, ṭīkā, exegetical tradition

Rūḷhi and *samudāyavohāra*

According to Pali commentators, some terms found in the sources of the Mahāvihāra school, namely, canon, commentaries and sub-commentaries, witness two synecdochic features, namely: 1) substitution of a part for the whole or 2) the substitution of whole for a part.[3] When the commentators encounter such a term, they typically label it as a *rūḷhi* ('convention of speech').[4] But more specifically, they further label such terms as either 1) *samudāye ekadesavohāra/samudāye avayavavohāra* ('a common way of speaking about a part with respect to a whole') or as 2) *ekadese samudāyavohāra/avayave samudāyavohāra* ('a common way of speaking about a whole thing with respect to a single part'). From now on, the first of these will be referred to in this paper as the 'part-for-the-whole method' while the second will be referred to as the 'whole-for-a-part method.' This study focuses primarily upon the second of these two categories, examining how the Mahāvihāra exegetes deal with words that differ from their literal meaning. In this article, I will show how the exegeses of the expressions with *ekadese samudāyavohāra* (i.e., whole-for-a-part method) help in gaining a clear understanding of some crucial concepts in the Vinaya, Dhamma and the Abhidhamma.

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[3] Bullinger offers a great deal of examples of synecdoches appearing in the Bible. (See Bullinger 1898). In his words, the first category can be called 'synecdoche of the species' while the second category can be called 'synecdoche of the genus.' See Bullinger 1898, 613. When a word expands beyond its literal meaning into a larger semantic field, it belongs to the first category. On the other hand, if a word is used in a narrower semantic range than its literal meaning suggests, then it falls into the second category.

[4] With some examples, I have discussed elsewhere how the *rūḷhi* that resembles synecdoche of the species appear in the sources of the Mahāvihāra school. (Gamage 2024 Forthcoming)

1. Cities = city

In the Apadāna there is a reference to a cake-maker who lived in the city of Aruṇavatī at the time of the Buddha, Sikhī.[5] The commentary on the Apadāna[6] explains why this city was given this name as follows:

> *tatiyāpadāne* **Aruṇavatiyā nagare** (Ap I 218,22–23, V. 233a) *ti āsamantato ālokaṃ karonto uṇati* (Ce udeti) *uggacchatī ti aruṇo. so tasmiṃ vijjatī ti Aruṇavatī. tasmiṃ nagare ālokaṃ karonto suriyo uggacchatī ti attho. sesanagaresu pi suriyuggamane vijjamāne pi visesavacanaṃ. sabbacatuppadānaṃ mahiyaṃ sayane* (Ce omits *sayane*) *pi sati* (Ce *vasati*) *mahiyaṃ sayatī ti mahīso ti vacanaṃ viya rūḷhivasena vuttan ti veditabbaṃ.*

> In the third Apadāna, **in Aruṇavatī city** means: because [it] rises (*uṇati*?), i.e., it goes up illuminating all sides up to [their end] (it is called) Aruṇa. Because this [Aruṇa] is found there (i.e., in that city) (=) Aruṇavatī. The meaning is that the sun rises shedding light on that city. Although sunrise is also found in the rest of the cities, [this] is a name specific to [a particular place]. [One] should know that [it] is stated by virtue of a convention of speech, just as, a *mahīsa* (buffalo) is so-called because [it] sleeps on the ground, although all quadrupeds sleep on the ground.

This gloss provides a creative etymological explanation for the term Aruṇa, stating that it is a synonym for the sun.[7] Since the sun illuminates this city, it is called Aruṇavatī (lit. 'having the sun'). The sun illuminates all cities, especially those in tropical countries like India. However, these cities are not called Aruṇavatī and it is used as a convention of speech (*rūḷhi*) only for this city. The commentator explains this usage with a nice analogy. The literal meaning of

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[5] Ap I 218,22–23, V. 233 (=) B^e I 246,1–2; C^e I 380,17–18, V. 233. Se I 327,14–15, V. 235:
Aruṇavatiyā nagare ahosiṃ pūviko (B^e C^e *pūpiko*) *tadā,*
mama dvārena gacchantaṃ Sikhinaṃ addasaṃ Jinaṃ.
'In Aruṇavatī city I was a cake-maker back then. I saw Sikhī [Buddha], Victor, traveling through a gate of mine."
Walters 2017, 2432. See DOP, s.v. *pūvika*: 'a seller of cakes.'
[6] Ap-a 466,25–467,2 (=) B^e II 187,5–10; C^e I 399,20–25; S^e II 227,13–17.
[7] CPD, s.v. *aruṇa*; pw, s.v. *aruṇa*.

mahīsa is 'the one who sleeps on the floor.' But *mahīsa* does not denote all those who sleep on the ground, and is limited only to the quadruped called 'buffalo'. The literal meaning of *mahīsa* suggests a broader semantic field, while its use as *rūḷhi* is restricted to a narrower sense. Likewise, one should understand the usage of Aruṇavatī.[8]

2. Houses = a house

The Therīgāthā[9] has the following stanza:

> *hitvā ghare pabbajitvā hitvā puttaṃ pasuṃ piyaṃ,*
> *hitvā rāgañ ca dosañ ca avijjañ ca virājiya,*
> *samūlaṃ taṇham abbuyha upasant' amhi nibbutā ti.*

> 'Giving up my house, having gone forth, giving up son, cattle, and what was dear, giving up desire and hatred, and having discarded ignorance, plucking out craving root and all, I have become stilled, quenched.'[10]

In his commentary on the Therīgāthā[11], Dhammapāla explains the term *ghare*:

> **ghare** (Thī 125,[11] V. 18a) *ti gehaṃ. gharasaddo hi ekasmim pi abhidheyye kadāci bahūsu bījaṃ viya rūḷhivasena vohārīyati.*

> **Houses** means: a house. For the term *ghara*, although [it] designates something singular, sometimes is used idiomatically with respect to many [houses] by virtue of a convention of speech (*rūḷhi*), just as a [single] seed is commonly spoken of when [referring to] many [seeds].[12]

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[8] Here the terms Aruṇavatī and *mahīsa* are similar in that they both are *yogarūḍha* 'etymologico-conventional', from the point of view of Indian language philosophers. The *nirukti* of some terms expresses their general meaning while the conventional meanings of them refer to more specific senses. Indian philosophers of language recognize such kinds of terms as *yogarūḍhis* ('etymologico-conventional'). Edgerton (1938, 709) explains *yogarūḍhi* as follows: '[S]ometimes the results of interpretation by *rūḍhi* and by *yoga* coincide.' See also Kunjunni-Raja 1963, 46, 59, 61–62; Dash 1993; Phillips 2012, 76.

[9] Thī 125,[11–13] v. 18.

[10] Norman 1971, 3.

[11] Thī-a 23,[7–9].

[12] See also Pruitt 1998, 37; Norman 1971, n. 61–62.

The term *ghare* ('houses') in this context, denotes *gharaṃ* ('house') as an idiomatic usage or *rūḷhi*. That is to say, here many is used for one. The commentator further states that the opposite of this is also possible. As a *rūḷhi*, *bījaṃ* ('a seed') is sometimes used to denote *bījāni* ('many seeds'). Once one understands that *ghere* is a *rūhi* of contraction here, it can be translated as a singular term. Rhys Davids[13] and Norman[14] were probably influenced by Dhammapāla's gloss when they translated this term in the singular as 'home' and 'house', respectively.

3. Buddha = bodily relics of the Buddha

The Samantapāsādikā[15] has the following statement:

> *athāyasmā Mahā-Mahindo vutthavasso pavāretvā Kattikapuṇṇamāyaṃ uposathadivase rājānaṃ etad avoca: mahārāja amhehi ciradiṭṭho Sammā-Sambuddho, anāthavāsaṃ* (E[e] *anāthavassaṃ*) *vasimha, icchāma* (B[e] adds *mayaṃ*) *Jambudīpaṃ gantun ti.*

> 'And now the venerable Mahā-Mahinda having spent the Rains-residence and performed the Invitation ceremony (at the end of the rains), on the uposatha day of the full moon of Kattikā, said to the King, "Great King, it is a long time since we have last seen the Perfectly Enlightened One; we have lived as destitutes. We wish to go to Jambudīpa."'[16]

After spending a rainy season in Laṅkā, the Elder Mahā-Mahinda says that he must return to Jambudīpa (i.e., India) to see the Buddha. When the Elder Mahā-Mahinda makes this statement, the Buddha has already passed away. Seeing the Buddha in the flesh is therefore impossible in the truest sense of the word. Immediately following this statement, the Samantapāsādikā—the commentary on the Vinaya—explains that *Sammā-Sambuddho* refers to the 'bodily relics'[17] (*sarīradhātuyo*[18]) of the Buddha. In

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[13] Rhys Davids, 1948, 21.
[14] Norman 2007, 70 n. 18.
[15] Sp I 83,$_{5-8}$ (=) B[e] I 62,$_{1-4}$; C[e] I 48,$_{33}$–49,$_{1}$; S[e] I 84,$_{2-5}$.
[16] Jayawickrama 1962, 73.
[17] Sp I 83,$_{15}$.
[18] Jayawickrama 1962, 74.

his commentary on the Samantapāsādikā entitled Sāratthadīpanīṭīkā[19], Sāriputta explains thus:

> *ciradiṭṭho Sammā-Sambuddho* (Sp I 83,$_7$) *ti Satthussa sarīrāvayavo ca Sammā-Sambuddho* (Sp I 83,$_7$) *yevā ti katvā avayave samudāyavohāravasena evam āhā ti daṭṭhabbaṃ, yathā: samuddo diṭṭho ti.*

> [One] should know that [the Elder Mahā-Mahinda] says thus: **it is a long time since we have last seen the Perfectly Enlightened One**, having considered: 'a part of the teacher's body is also **the Perfectly Enlightened One**, indeed', by virtue of the whole-for-apart method, just as [in the statements]: '[he] saw the sea.'

When one sees only a very small part of the sea, one usually says: 'I saw the sea.' But that does not mean one has seen the whole sea. The principle of this usage is that a single part (*avayave*) stands in for the whole (*samudāya*). In the same way, Sammā-Sambuddha is identified here with his relics.[20] The relics represent a part of the physical body (*sarīrāvayava*) of the Buddha, which stands for the whole.[21] Sāriputta's gloss teaches the reader to understand the term *Sammā-Sambuddho*, which appears here in accordance with the whole-for-a-part method.

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[19] Sp-ṭ I 170,$_{3–6}$.

[20] In his sub-commentary on the Samantapāsādikā entitled Vimativinodanīṭīkā, Coḷiya Kassapa also identifies that here Sammā-Sambuddha is used to denote the relics of the Buddha. See Vmv I 34,$_{12}$: *ciradiṭṭho Sammā-Sambuddho* (Sp I 83,$_7$) *ti dhātuyo sandhāy' āha.* 'With reference to relics, [the Elder Mahā-Mahinda] says: **it is a long time since we have last seen the Perfectly Enlightened One.**'

[21] There is also a very similar account in the Vimānavatthu. See Vv 68,$_{30–31}$, V.5 (=) Vv B^e 66,$_{5–6}$, V.5; Vv C^e 110, $_{18–19}$, V.5; Vv S^e 82,$_{5–6}$, V.5.
Satthu sarīram uddissa vippasannena cetasā,
nāssa maggaṃ avekkhissaṃ na taggamanasā (C^e *tadaggamanasā*; S^e *tadaṅgamanasā*) *sati.*
'[Since I was with] an extremely clear mind with reference to the Teacher's body, I did not look at his [i.e., the cow's] path, as [my] mind was not on that.' See also Kennedy 1942, 8.
In the commentary on the Vimānavatthu, Dhammapāla glosses *sarīraṃ* as follows (Vv-a 201,$_{12–13}$): *sarīran* (Vv 68,$_{30}$ V.5a) *ti sarīrabhūtaṃ dhātuṃ. avayave cāyaṃ samudāyavohāro yathā: paṭo ḍaḍḍho, samuddo diṭṭho ti ca.* '**Body** means: the relics as the body of [the Buddha]. And, this whole-for-a-part method, as in [the statements]: "the cloth is burnt" and "I saw the sea".

4. *Sutta* = quote from a *sutta*

The author of the Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā[22] states that the Buddha thought as follows:

> *anāgate mama sāvako mahāpañño Moggaliputtatissatthero nāma uppannaṃ sāsanamalaṃ sodhetvā tatiyasaṅgītiṃ karonto bhikkhusaṅghassa majjhe nisinno sakavāde pañca suttasatāni paravāde pañcā ti suttasahassaṃ samodhānetvā imaṃ pakaraṇaṃ bhājessatī ti.*

> In the future, my disciple named the Elder Moggaliputtatissa, of great wisdom, having cleansed the impurities that have arisen in the *sāsana*, performing the third communal recitation, seated in the midst of the monastic community, will arrange this treatise, by putting together one thousand *suttas*: five hundred *suttas* concerning [one's] own theory [and] five [hundred *suttas*] concerning the other's theory.

The Elder Moggaliputtatissa, as the commentaries of the Mahāvihāra school state, authored the Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa having incorporated a thousand *suttas*.[23] In this context, if we understand the term *sutta* to mean an entire discourse, this appears problematic. For the received Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa does not contain a thousand complete discourses. Horner renders *sutta* in this context as 'discourse' in this context.[24] But obviously, *sutta* here refers to a quotation from a particular *sutta*. Nyānaponika takes *sutta* here to mean *Anschnitt* ('smaller section'), which is correct.[25] The Pañcappakaraṇa-anuṭīkā states:

> ***suttasahassāharaṇañ*** (≠ Kv-a B^e 105,20) *c' ettha paravādabhañjanatthañ ca sakavādapatiṭṭhāpanatthañ ca. suttekadeso pi hi suttan ti vuccati, samudāyavohārassa avayavesu pi dissanato, yathā paṭo daḍḍho, samuddo diṭṭho ti ca. te pan' ettha*

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[22] Kv-a B^e 105,17–20.
[23] As 4,25–30; Sp-ṭ I 148,26–149,5.
[24] Mil 12,26–28: *sakavāde pañcasuttasatāni paravāde pañcasuttasatānī ti suttasahassaṃ samodhānetvā vibhattaṃ Kathāvatthuppakaraṇaṃ.* Tr. Horner 1969, 17: 'The *Kathāvatthu*-composition, divided by combining a thousand discourses—five hundred from our own speakers, five hundred from dissenting speakers.' See also As 4,28; Tin 1920, 6.
[25] On As 4,28, see Nyānaponika 2005, 11.

suttapadesā atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno (Kv 13,$_{26–27}$) *ti ādinā āgatā veditabbā.*[26]

And in this context, **citing one thousand *suttas***, i.e., [citing them] in order to defeat the other's theory and to establish one's own theory. For, a part of a discourse is also called a discourse, because a common way of speaking about the whole thing is also seen with respect to parts, just as in the [statements] such as: 'the cloth is burnt' and '[he] saw the sea.' In this context, [one] should, furthermore, understand that those portions of discourses are transmitted [in the Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa] such as: 'is there a person who is practicing for [his] own welfare?'[27]

By reading the entirety (*samudāya*) into individual parts (*avayavesu*), an excerpt from a *sutta* can be referred to as a *sutta*. In addition to the analogy of seeing the sea, the author of this commentary provides the reader here with the analogy of a burnt cloth. Although only a small part of a garment is burned, we commonly refer to it with the statement 'the garment is burnt.'[28] This explanation shows that the terms *sutta*[29] and *suttanta*[30], which appear in the primary sources of the Mahāvihāra school, refer not only to the entire discourses but also to small parts of the discourses.

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[26] Pp-nṭ 59,$_{10–14}$.

[27] See also Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids 1915, 16.

[28] In a similar way, the author of the Nettippakaraṇa-Aṭṭhakathā explains the phrase *dasannaṃ suttānaṃ* ("of [these] ten discourses") found in the Nettippakaraṇa (Nett 117,$_{31}$), by pointing out that the term *sutta* is sometimes used to mean only a part of some discourses. See Nett-a B^e 203,$_{4–7}$.

[29] For example, the commentary on the Vibhaṅga (Vibh-a 51,$_{27–32}$) uses the term *sutta* for a brief statement from a discourse of the Saṃyuttanikāya (S IV 251,$_{16–20}$); in the commentary on the Majjhimanikāya, Buddhaghosa uses the same term (Ps II 363,$_{21–25}$) for a short sentence of the Majjhimanikāya (M I 301,$_{15–16}$).

[30] The Kathāvatthu (Kv 425,$_{24–26}$), for example, uses the term *suttanta* to refer to a brief statement occurring in the Majjhimanikāya (M III 281,$_{8–9}$) and the Saṃsuttanikāya (S II 72,$_{5–6}$).

5. Robes = a robe

Every monk should refrain from traveling and stay in a specific monastery during the rainy season every year. This period is called *kaṭhina*.[31] The opening of the *kaṭhina* period is indicated by spreading a set of three robes, later also only one robe, that were made following specific rules only for this purpose. The community of monks decides which monk to give these robe materials to and acts accordingly. During the *kaṭhina* period a monk may go around within the *sīmā* ('ceremonial boundary') with less than three robes—outer robe, upper robe and lower robe.[32] But when the *kaṭhina* period comes to an end, the usual rules apply again, and therefore a monk who has been separated from any of these three robes is guilty of the *nissaggiyapācittiya*-offence. The Vinaya reads the law code:

> *niṭṭhitacīvarasmiṃ bhikkhunā ubbhatasmiṃ kaṭhine ekarattim pi ce bhikkhu ticīvarena vippavaseyya, aññatra bhikkhusammutiyā, nissaggiyaṃ pācittiyan ti.*[33]

> The robe [matters] having been settled by a bhikkhu, the kaṭhina having been removed, if any bhikkhu should live apart from the three robes, even for one night, other than with the agreement of the bhikkhus, there is an offence entailing expiation with forfeiture.[34]

In this context, the three robes are considered an inseparable unit. Therefore, living without any of them is an offence that entails expiation for a monk. The author of the Samantapāsādikā[35] explains this further:

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[31] DOP, s.v. *kaṭhina*: 'a framework (covered with a mat) to which the cloth for making robes was attached while being sewn.'

[32] The Padabhājanīya ('word-analysis')-section of the Vinaya followed by this law code defines *ticīvara* as follows (Vin III 199,$_{31-32}$): ***ekarattim pi ce bhikkhu ticīvarena vippavaseyyā*** (Vin III 199,$_{31-32}$) *ti saṅghāṭiyā vā uttarāsaṅgena vā antaravāsakena vā.* '**If any bhikkhu should live apart from the three robes, even for one night** means: either from an outer robe or from an upper robe or from a lower robe.' See also BD II 15.

[33] Vin III 199,$_{24-26}$ (=) Pāt 28,$_{10-12}$.

[34] Based on Norman et al. 2018, 187 and Norman 2001, 29. See also Norman et al. 2018, 571, Appendix 20 and 21.

[35] Sp III 652,$_{4-8}$.

*tattha **ticīvarenā** (Vin III 199,₂₅; Pāt 28,₁₁) ti adhiṭṭhitesu tīsu cīvaresu yena kenaci. ekena vippavuttho pi hi ticīvarena vippavuttho hoti, paṭisiddhapariyāpannena vippavutthattā. ten' ev' assa padabhājane **saṅghāṭiyā vā** (Vin III 199,₃₂) ti-ādi vuttaṃ.*

In this context, **from the three robes** means: from any of the three robes that have been formally taken possession of. For, [one] who lives apart from even one of the robes, [one] is [considered] ['one who] has lived apart from the three robes', on account of the fact that [one] has lived apart from that which is included within what is prohibited. Because of the exact same reason, [it] is stated in its (i.e., the third *nissaggiyapācittiya*-offence) Padabhājanīya ('word-analysis'): **either from an outer robe, etc**.

Sāriputta's words[36] in the Sāratthadīpanīṭīkā make it clear that 'the three robes' occurs in this context in the sense of 'a single robe':

ticīvarena vippavuttho hotī *(Sp III 652,₆) ti rukkho chinno, paṭo daḍḍho ti-ādīsu viya avayave pi samudāyavohāro labbhatī ti vuttaṃ.*

[One] is [considered] ['one who] has lived apart from the three robes' means: because [it] is found the common way of speaking of the whole with respect to a part, just as in the [statements] such as: 'the tree is cut' [and] 'the cloth is burnt', [it] is stated [in the Samantapāsādikā].

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[36] Sp-ṭ II 393,₂₁₋₂₂ (≠) Kkh-pṭ 288,₂₂₋₂₆. See also Vmv I 318,₁₋₂: *paṭisiddhapariyāpannenā (Sp III 652,₆₋₇) ti vippavasituṃ paṭisiddhesu tīsu cīvaresu antogadhena. ekena ca avayave samudāyopacāraṃ dasseti.* '**From that which is included in what is rejected** means: from that which is contained in the three robes apart from those which are rejected to live [for a monk]. And, with this [*etena?* statement], [the author of the Samantapāsādikā] shows the metonymical application with respect to a part.'

6. Offences = offence

The first *saṅghādisesa* ('the offence entails a formal meeting of the monastic community') in the Vinaya forbids monks from intentionally emitting semen.[37] The Padabhājaniya[38] defines the meaning of *saṅghādisesa* as follows:

> **saṅghādiseso** (Vin III 112,$_{17-18}$) *ti saṅgho 'va tassā āpattiyā parivāsaṃ deti, mūlāya paṭikassati, mānattaṃ deti, abbheti; na sambahulā, na ekapuggalo. tena vuccati:* **saṅghādiseso** (Vin III 112,$_{17-18}$) *ti. tass' eva āpattinikāyassa nāmakammaṃ adhivacanaṃ. tena pi vuccati:* **saṅghādiseso** (Vin III 112,$_{17-18}$) *ti.*

> [Offence] **entailing a formal meeting of the Order** means: the Order places him on probation on account of the offence, it sends him back to the beginning, it inflicts the *mānatta* (i.e., penance) discipline, it rehabilitates; it is not many people, it is not one man. Therefore, it is called an [offence] **entailing a formal meeting of the Order**. [This is] an appellation, a designation of the very same group of offences. For that is also why it is called an [offence] **entailing a formal meeting of the Order**.[39]

According to the Padabhājaniya, the term *saṅghādisesa* is a designation for a group of offences. The Samantapāsādikā[40] explains why the Padabhājaniya uses *āpattinikāya* to introduce this term:

> **tass' eva āpattinikāyassā** (Vin III 112,$_{28-29}$) *ti tassa eva āpattisamūhassa. tattha kiñcāpi ayaṃ ekā va āpatti, rūḷhīsaddena pana avayave samūhavohārena vā* **nikāyo** (≠ Vin III 112,$_{29}$) *ti vutto, eko vedanākkhandho* (Dhs 11,$_{14}$)*, eko viññāṇakkhandho* (Dhs 11,$_{15-16}$) *ti-ādīsu viya.*

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[37] Vin III 112,$_{17-18}$ (=) Pāt 12,$_{5-6}$: *sañcetanikā sukkavissaṭṭhi aññatra supinantā saṅghādiseso.* Tr. Norman 2001, 13: 'Intentional emission of semen other than in a dream, entails a formal meeting of the saṅgha.' BD I 195.

[38] Vin III 112,$_{26-30}$.

[39] In this translation by Horner (BD I 196–197), I have replaced some words. See also Norman et al. 2018, 129.

[40] Sp III 522,$_{19-23}$.

Of the very same group of offences means: of the very same assemblage of offences. In this context, although this is only a single offence, [either] in accordance with a term of convention of speech or in accordance with a common way of speaking of the assemblage with respect to a part, it is stated: **a group**, just as in the [statements] such as: 'a single aggregate of sensation' [and] 'a single aggregate of consciousness', etc.

According to the author of the Samantapāsādikā, the collective noun *nikāya* ('group') is used to denote the term *saṅghādisesa* although here it refers only to a single offence. The peculiarity of this gloss is that the commentator uses *rūḷhi* ('convention of speech') and *avayave samūhayavohāra* ('common way of speaking of the assemblage with respect to a part') as two separate usages of language. The commentator gives two examples from the Abhidhamma: *eko vedanākkhandho* ('a single aggregate of sensation') and *eko viññāṇakkhandho* ('single aggregate of consciousness'). As the context clearly demonstrates, the Dhammasaṅgaṇī uses these two phrases just to refer to a single sensation and a single consciousness, respectively.

The following gloss in the Vajirabuddhiṭīkā (a sub-commentary on the Samantapāsādikā)[41] leads us to believe that its treats *rūḷhi* and *avayave samūhavohāra* as two separate literary devices:

> **avayave** *samūhavohārena* **vā** (Sp III 522,$_{21-22}$) *ti ettha sākhacchedako rukkhacchedako ti vuccatī ti-ādi nidassanaṃ. vedanākkhandh-ādi* (D III 233,$_{23-24}$; M III 17,$_3$ etc.) **ruḷhisaddassa** (≠ Sp III 522,$_{21}$) *nidassanaṃ.*

> In this context: **or in accordance with a common way of speaking of the assemblage with respect to a part**, is exemplified with cases such as: '[one] who cuts a branch [of a tree] is called [one] who cuts a tree', etc. [Whereas] 'Aggregate of sensation,' etc., is an example **of a term of common way of speaking**.

As he says, *vedanākkhandha* ('aggregate of sensation') etc., are examples of *rūḷhi*. Even if someone just cuts down a branch of a tree, he is commonly referred to as cutting a tree (*rukkhacchedako*). This is an example of *avayave samūhavohāra*.

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[41] Vjb 179,$_{16-18}$.

It seems that Sāriputta[42] thinks that *rūḷhi* and *avayave samūhavohāra* do not refer to the same thing although they bear great resemblance. He defines *rūḷhi* nicely and explains well how these two literary devices are related:

samudāye rūḷho (Bᵉ niruḷho) nikāya-saddo tad ekadese pavattamāno pi tāya eva ruḷhiyā pavattatī ti āha: **ruḷhīsaddenā** (Sp III 522,₂₁) *ti. atha vā kiñci nimittaṃ gahetvā sati pi aññasmiṃ taṃnimittayutte kismiñcid eva visaye sammutiyā cirakālatāvasena nimittavirahe pi pavatti rūḷhi nāma* (Bᵉ *pavattaniruḷho ruḷhī nāma). yathā: mahiyaṃ setī ti mahīso* (Bᵉ *mahiṃso), gacchatī ti go ti. evaṃ nikāya-saddassa pi ruḷhibhāvo veditabbo. ekasmim pi visiṭṭhe sati pi sāmaññā viya samudāye pavattavohāro avayave pi pavattatī ti āha:* **avayave samūhavohārena vā** (Sp III 522,₂₁₋₂₂) *ti.*

The term group (*nikāya*), which conventionally [refers to] the whole, when it comes to refer to a part of that group, does so with the same convention of speech. As such, [the author of the Samantapāsādikā] says: **in accordance with a term of convention of speech**. Or rather, although (a word) has a certain reason for use (*nimitta*), what is known as a *rūḷhi* word may come to refer by longstanding convention to another particular scope connected with that reason, even if the (original) reason for usage has gone (i.e., is (no longer) relevant), just as [in the statements]: 'because it sleeps on the ground [it] is a buffalo' [and] 'because it walks [it] is a cow.' In this manner, [one] should know the nature of convention of speech also of the term *nikāya*. Because even though only a single [object] is specified, the common way of speaking occurred to the whole, as a popular expression, occurs also on a part, [the author of the Samantapāsādikā] says: **or in accordance with a common way of speaking of assemblage with respect to a part**.[43]

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[42] Sp-ṭ II 314,₁₉₋₂₆ (=) Cᵉ II 656,₁₇₋₂₅.

[43] Coḷiya Kassapa follows Sāriputta and goes on to say that the reason for *rūḷhi*, is *avayave samūhavohāra*. See Vmv I 255,₂₄₋₂₇: **rūḷhisaddenā** (Sp III 522,₂₁) *ti ettha samudāye nipphannassāpi saddassa tad' ekadese pi pasiddhi idha ruḷhī nāma. tāya ruḷhiyā yutto saddo ruḷhīsaddo, tena. ruḷhiyā kāraṇam āha:* **avayave** (Sp III 522,₂₁) *icc'ādinā.* 'In this context, **in accordance with a term of convention of speech** means: even though [the usage] of a term is accomplished on the whole,

In this passage it is clear that Sāriputta considers *avayave samūhavohāra* to be an elaboration of *rūḷhi*. As is evident from this gloss, the commentator holds that *rūḷhi* is conventional expression in general, and *avayave samūhavohāra* is a type of *rūḷhi*. In the case of *vedanākhandha*, it is conventional because in reality there is no real heap of sensations, but it is as if all the sensations of the past, present and future are put together. It is conventionally referred to metaphorically as 'heap of sensations' or 'aggregate of sensations.'

7. One who is covered = one in whom one of the three orifices is covered

In the first *pārājika*-section of the Vinaya[44], there is the following paragraph:

> *bhikkhupaccatthikā manussitthiṃ bhikkhussa santike ānetvā vacchamaggena … pa … passāvamaggena … pa … mukhena aṅgajātaṃ abhinisīdenti santhatāya asanthatassa … pa … asanthatāya santhatassa … pa … santhatāya santhatassa … pa … asanthatāya asanthatassa.*

> [If] opponent monks, having brought a human woman into a monk's presence, make [her] come down on [his] sexual organ with [her] vagina [or] with [her] rectum [or] with [her] mouth; of a covered [woman], of an uncovered [monk]…; … of an uncovered [woman], of a covered [monk]…; … of an covered [woman], of an covered [monk]…; … of an uncovered [woman], of an uncovered [monk].[45]

As is evident from this paragraph, opponent monks (*bhikkhupaccatthikā*) force their fellow monks to have intercourse with human women. They bring a woman and force her to sit (*abhinisīdenti*) with her rectum (*vacchamaggena*) and vagina (*passāvamaggena*) on the fellow monk's penis (*aṅgajātaṃ*). In addition, the woman is forced to put the fellow monk's penis in her mouth (*mukhena*).

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the well-known [meaning] [of the same usage] even on a single part of it, is called the convention of speech in this context. The term having that convention of speech (resolution of compound) (=) the term of convention of speech; with that term. [The author of the Samantapāsādikā] says the reason for convention of speech: with the [statements] **with respect to a part** etc.'

[44] Vin III 30,$_{38}$–31,$_4$.
[45] See also BD I 49–50.

In this paragraph, three orifices of a woman, the three orifices of a woman—rectum, vagina, and mouth—and a man's penis are used in the context of sexual intercourse. The paragraph also contains four specific words, namely, 1) *santhatāya*, 2) *asanthatāya*, 3) *santhatassa* and 4) *asanthatassa*. All of these words are in the genitive singular, and their nominatives are *santhatā*, *asanthathā*, *santhato*, and *asanthato*, respectively. The first two are in the feminine, the latter two are in the masculine. The literal meanings of the words *santhatā* and *santhato* connote a woman and man, respectively, who are 'covered'. Although the Vinaya does not define any of these words, the Samantapāsādikā[46] explains them:

> *tattha* **santhatāya asanthatassā** (Vin III 31,$_{2-3}$) *ti-ādīsu:* **santhatāya** (Vin III 31,$_{2-3}$) *itthiyā* **vaccamaggena** (Vin III 31,$_{1}$) **passāvamaggena** (Vin III 31,$_{1-2}$) **mukhena** (Vin III 31,$_{2}$) **asanthatassa** (Vin III 31,$_{3}$) **bhikkhussa** (Vin III 30,$_{32}$–31,$_{1}$) **aṅgajātaṃ** (Vin III 31,$_{2}$) **abhinisīdentī** (Vin III 31,$_{2}$) *ti iminā nayena yojanā veditabbā. tattha* **santhatā** (≠ Vin III 31,$_{2-3}$) *nāma yassā tīsu maggesu yo koci maggo paliveṭhetvā vā anto vā pavesetvā yena kenaci vatthena vā paṇṇena vā vākapaṭṭena vā cammena vā tipusīsādīnaṃ paṭṭena vā paṭicchanno.* **santhato** (≠ Vin III 31,$_{3}$) *nāma yassa aṅgajātaṃ tesaṃ yeva vatth' ādīnaṃ yena kenaci paṭicchannaṃ.*

In this context, in the [statements] such as: **of a covered** [**woman**] [and] **of an uncovered** [**monk**], [one] should understand the [grammatical] construction in accordance with the method as follows: [they] **make a covered** [woman's] **rectum, vagina** [and] **mouth sit on** a monk's sexual organ. In this context, **a covered** [woman] refers to **a** [woman], **any of** [whose] **three paths** (i.e., rectum, vagina or mouth), having [it] wrapped around or inserted is covered either with any cloth or a leaf or a plate of tree-bark or a plate of tin and lead etc. **A covered** [monk] is called a [monk whose] sexual organ is covered with any of those exact same cloth, etc.

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[46] Sp I 266,$_{29}$–267,$_{4}$.

When a woman covers any of the three orifices such the vagina, she is called *santhatā*. When a man covers his penis, he is called *santhato*. Only 'a part' (i.e., sexual organ etc.,) of a body of a man and a woman is covered; yet it is considered that they covered their 'entire bodies.' In his Sāratthadīpanīṭīkā, Sāriputta[47] glosses:

> ***santhatāyā*** (Vin III 31,$_{2-3}$) *ti ekadese samudāyavohāro paṭo daḍḍho ti-ādīsu viya. tathā hi paṭassa ekadese pi daḍḍhe paṭo daḍḍho ti voharanti, evaṃ itthiyā vaccamaggādīsu kismiñci magge santhate itthī* ***santhatā*** (Sp I 266,$_{32}$) *ti vuccati. tenāha:* ***santhatā nāmā*** (Sp I 266,$_{32}$) *ti-ādi. vatthādīni anto appavesetvā bahi ṭhapetvā bandhanaṃ sandhāya* ***paliveṭhetvā*** (Sp I 267,$_1$) *ti vuttaṃ. ekadese samudāyavohāravasen' eva bhikkhu pi* ***santhato*** (Sp I 267,$_3$) *ti vuccatī ti āha:* ***santhato nāmā*** (Sp I 267,$_{3-4}$) *ti-ādi.*

> **Of a covered** [**woman**] means: the whole-for-a-part method, just as in the [statements] such as 'the cloth is burnt.' For, when even a part of a cloth is burnt [people] commonly say: 'the cloth is burnt', so in the same manner, when any of the paths [orifices] of a female such as the rectum is covered, it is said: 'the female **is covered**.' Therefore, [the author of the Samantapāsādikā] says: **a covered** [**woman**] **is called** etc. With reference to binding the cloth etc., placing [them] outside without inserting [them] into [the rectum etc.,], [in the Samantapāsādikā,] [it] is stated: **having wrapped around**. Because by virtue of the whole-for-a-part method indeed, a monk is also called **a covered**, [so, the author of the Samantapāsādikā] says: **a covered** [**monk**] **is called**, etc.

As Sāriputta's words suggest, these two words function as whole-for-a-part presentations in the Vinaya. According to him, by transposing the whole (*samudāya*) onto a single part (*ekadese*), both words are given as *santhatā* and *santhato*. However, in his Vimativinodanīṭīkā, Coḷiya Kassapa takes the opposite view of the use of these two words. He[48] criticises Sāriputta's opinion:

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[47] Sp-ṭ II 92,$_{26}$–93,$_5$.
[48] Vmv I 146,$_{22}$–147,$_7$.

santhatāyā (Vin III 31,₂₋₃) *ti samudāye ekadesavohāro daḍḍhassa paṭassa chiddan ti-ādīsu viya. yathā hi paṭassa ekadeso 'va vatthato daḍḍho ti vuccati, taṃ ekadesavohāraṃ samudāye paṭe upacārato āropetvā puna taṃ samudāyaṃ daḍḍhappadesasaṅkhātachiddasamb andhībhāvena 'daḍḍhassa paṭassa chiddan' ti voharanti, evam idhāpi itthiyā maggappadesavohāraṃ samudāyabhūtāya itthiyā āropetvā puna taṃ itthiṃ santhatamaggasambandhiniṃ katvā **santhatāya itthiyā vacchamaggenā** (Sp I 266,₃₀) *ti-ādi vuttaṃ. Sāratthadīpaniyaṃ pan' ettha:* **ekadese samudāyavohāro** (Sp-ṭ II 92,₂₆) *ti vuttaṃ, taṃ na yuttaṃ, avayavavohārena samudāyass' eva paṭīyamānattā. itarathā hi* **santhatāya vaccamaggenā** (≠ Sp I 266,₃₀) *ti itthiliṅgatā maggasambandhitā ca na siyā. ekadese samudāyopacārassa pana ekadeso 'va attho, sākhāya chijjamānāya rukkho chijjatī ti-ādīsu viya. vatthādīni maggassa anto appavesetvā bahi yeva veṭhanaṃ sandhāya:* **paliveṭhetvā** (Sp I 267,₁) *ti vuttaṃ. samudāye avayavūpacāren' eva bhikkhu pi* **santhato nāmā** (Sp I 267,₃₋₄) *ti-ādi vuttaṃ.*

Of a covered [**woman**] means: the part-for-the-whole method, as in the [statements] such as: 'the hole of the burnt cloth.' As only a part of cloth from a garment is called 'burnt', having ascribed that common way of speaking about a part with respect to the whole of the cloth according to the metonymical application, [people] once more, commonly call that totality: 'the hole of the burnt cloth', due to the connection of the hole reckoned as the burnt spot, in the same manner, here too, having ascribed the common way of speaking for the spot of the female's paths (i.e., three orifices such as the rectum) on the female [who is] the totality, once more, having considered that female being connected with the covered path, [in the Samantapāsādikā,] [it] is stated: **with a covered woman's rectum**, etc. But in the Sāratthadīpanī, here [it] is stated: **a common way of speaking about a part with respect to the whole**. That is not correct, on account of the fact that in accordance with the common way of speaking of a part, only the whole is being understood. For, otherwise there would not be the femininity and the connection of the path (i.e., rectum): **with a covered** [**woman**]**'s rectum**, etc. But in the metonymical application of the whole with respect to a part, only

a part is meant, just as in the [statements] such as: 'when cutting a branch, [it refers to] "a tree is being cut". With reference to wrapping the cloth etc., only outside, without inserting [them] into the path (i.e., the rectum etc.,), [in the Samantapāsādikā,] [it] is stated: **having wrapped around**. In accordance only with the metonymical application of a part with respect to the whole, [in the Samantapāsādikā,] [it] is stated: a monk is also **called a covered** etc.

Arguing persuasively and correctly, Coḷiya Kassapa shows that *santhatā* and *santhato* are used through the transposition of a single potion (*ekadesa*) on the whole (*samudāya*). That is to say, these two words are examples of part-for-the-whole method. The next example also shows that Sāriputta is sometimes confused when it comes to distinguishing between part-for-the-whole method and whole-for-a-part method.

8. Grass hut = a hut with grass roof

The following sentence occurs in the second *pārājika*-section of the Vinaya.

> tena kho pana samayena sambahulā sandiṭṭhā sambhattā bhikkhū Isigilipasse tiṇakuṭiyo karitvā vassaṃ upagacchiṃsu.[49]

> Now at that time a large company of monks who were friends and intimate friends[50], having made grass huts on the Isigili mountain-slope, went up there for the rains.[51]

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[49] Vin III 41,$_{2-4}$.

[50] *sandiṭṭhā* and *sambhattā*. The first term refers to friends in general, while the second term refers to close friends. See Sp II 286,$_{1-5}$: **sandiṭṭhā** (Vin III 41,$_3$) *ti nātivissāsikā na daḷhamittā vuccanti* (Bᵉ omits vuccanti). *tattha tattha saṅgamma diṭṭhattā hi te* **sandiṭṭhā** (Vin III 41,$_3$) *ti vuccanti.* **sambhattā** (Vin III 41,$_3$) *ti ativissāsikā* (Eᵉ; Sᵉ *vissāsikā) daḷhamittā* (Eᵉ *daḷhamittā ti) vuccanti* (Bᵉ omits *vuccanti*). *te hi suṭṭhu bhattā bhajamānā ekasambhogaparibhogā ti katvā* **sambhattā** (Vin III 41,$_3$) *ti vuccanti.* '**sandiṭṭhā** are called those who are not very confiding; the friends who are not steady. On account of the fact that [they] have seen having come together here and there, they are indeed called **sandiṭṭhā**. **sambhattā** are called the friends who are very confiding and steady. For, having considered that they are well associated with, associating with [and] having eaten and lived together, [they] are called **sambhattā**.' Cf. Sv II 546,$_{14-16}$; Spk III 201,$_{26-28}$.

[51] BD I 64.

The Samantapāsādikā[52] glosses the phrase *tiṇakuṭiyo karitvā* ('having made grass huts') as follows:

> **tiṇakuṭiyo karitvā** (Vin III 41,$_{3-4}$) *ti tiṇacchadana-sadvārabandhā kuṭiyo katvā.*

> **Having made grass huts** means: having made the huts with grass roofs and connected with their own doors.

The gloss of the Samantapāsādikā reveals that *tiṇa* ('grass') is an ellipsis of *tiṇacchadana* ('grass roofs'). In the Sāratthadīpanīṭīkā, Sāriputta[53] points out that the interpretation *tiṇacchadanā kuṭiyo* ('huts with grass roofs') can be justified either due to the elision of the word *chadana* 'roof' in *tiṇakuṭi* or due to substitution of the whole with respect to a part:

> **tiṇacchadanā kuṭiyo** (≠ Sp II 286,$_{12-13}$) *majjhepadalopīsamāsaṃ katvā, ekadese vā samudāyavohāravasena* **tiṇakuṭiyo** (Vin III 41,$_{3-4}$; Sp II 286,$_{22}$) *ti vuttā.* **vassaṃ upagacchiṃsū** (Sp II 286,$_{24}$) *ti vacanato vassūpagamanārahā sadvārabandhā* (Sp II 286,$_{12}$) *eva veditabbā ti āha:* **tiṇacchadanā sadvārabandhā kuṭiyo** (Sp II 286,$_{12}$) *ti.*

> **Huts with grass [covering]** (=) having made the compound through the elision of the middle term. Or, by virtue of the whole-for-a-part method, [it] is stated: **grass huts**. Since [one] should know only the [huts] connected with [their] own doors [that] are suitable for going up for the rains, because of the [phrase]: [**they**] **went up there for the rains**, [the author of the Samantapāsādikā] says: **huts with grass [covering and] connected with [their] own doors**.

The roof is only part of a hut and is covered with grass (*tiṇa*). The other parts of a hut like walls and doors can be built from different materials like clay, wood, etc. When naming this hut, regardless of the other materials used in its construction, only the material used to cover the roof (i.e., grass) is taken into account. Therefore, it is called a *tiṇakuṭi*. In the Sāratthadīpanīṭīkā, Sāriputta says that this usage arose by virtue of the whole-for-a-part method.

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[52] Sp II 286,$_{12-13}$.
[53] Sp-ṭ II 114,$_{8-11}$.

In fact, this is the exact opposite of what Sāriputta thinks. That is to say, the huts with grass roofs are called *tiṇakuṭiyo* due to the part-for-the-whole method. Thus, *tiṇakuṭiyo* is an example of the part-for-the-whole method. As we have seen Horner translates *tiṇakuṭiyo* as 'grass huts'. But through the lens of the Mahāvihāra exegetes, the correct rendering of *tiṇakuṭiyo* is 'huts with grass roofs.'

9. *Jhāna* = an object of the *jhāna*

The Saṅgītisutta[54] of the Dīghanikāya enumerates three wholesome thoughts:

> *tayo kusalavitakkā: nekkhammavitakko, avyāpādavitakko, avihiṃsāvitakko.*

> Three kinds of wholesome thought: the thought of renunciation, the thought of non-ill will, and the thought of non-cruelty.[55]

In the commentary on the Dīghanikāya entitled Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, Buddhaghosa shows how the thought of renunciation (*nekkhammavitakko*) occurs in various forms in the process of meditative absorption:

> *nekkhammapaṭisaṃyutto vitakko* **nekkhammavitakko** (D III 215,$_5$). *so asubhapubbabhāge kāmāvacaro hoti, asubhajjhāne rūpāvacaro. taṃ jhānaṃ pādakaṃ katvā uppannamaggaphalakāle lokuttaro.*[56]

> Thought coupled with renunciation (resolution of compound) (=) **thought of renunciation**. That [thought] becomes [something belonging to] the sphere of sensual experience at the prior stage [of the meditative absorption] on foulness[57]; [it becomes something belonging to] the fine-material sphere in the meditative absorption on foulness. At the moment of the emergence of paths and fruits having made the support of that meditative absorption, [it becomes something belonging to] the supramundane.

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[54] D III 215,$_{5-6}$.

[55] Here, I rely on Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995, 207. See also Walshe 1987, 483. See also Rhys Davids 1921 III 208.

[56] Sv III 986,$_{13-16}$.

[57] See Sv-pṭ III 241,$_{5-6}$: **asubhapubbabhāge** (Sv III 986,14) *ti asubhajjhānassa pubbabhāge*. 'At the prior stage on foulness means: at the prior stage of the meditative absorption on foulness.'

As this gloss states, the thought of renunciation belongs to the fine-material sphere in the *asubhajjhāna* ('meditative absorption on foulness'). Although Buddhaghosa uses the term *asubhajjhāna*, there is no such meditation absorption. Buddhaghosa used the word *asubha* to denote the object (*ārammaṇa*) that is predominant in the first *jhāna*. In the sub-commentary on the Dīghanikāya, Dhammapāla glosses:

> ***asubhajjhāne*** (Sv III 986₁₄) *ti asubhārammaṇe paṭhamajjhāne. avayave hi samudāyavohāraṃ katvā niddisati, yathā: rukkhe* (Eᵉ *rukkha*) *sākhā ti.*[58]

> **In the meditative absorption on foulness** means: in the first meditative absorption having foulness as the object. For, having used the whole-for-a-part method, [Buddhaghosa] explains, just as in the [statement]: 'a branch on a tree.'

The object on foulness (*asubhārammaṇa*) is only a part of the first meditative absorption. However, that part is used in this context to denote the entire *jhāna*. Although the term *jhāna* is used here, it actually means the main object thereof. If the first *jhāna* resembles a tree, the foulness resembles its branch (*sākhā*). Thus, through the lens of Dhammapāla, the thought of renunciation belongs to the fine material sphere when one focuses on foulness in the first *jhāna*. Although this explanation in the sub-commentary to the Dīghanikāya is quite brief, it is extremely helpful for the reader to clearly understand two important factors related to an Abhidhammic teaching of the Mahāvihāra school. Firstly, the reader learns that there is no identical state called *asubhajjhāna*, although the Sumaṅgalavilāsinī uses it as an example of the whole-for-a-part method. Secondly, he realises that *asubhajjhāna* simply refers to one of the objects that occurs in the first meditative absorption.

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[58] Sv-pṭ III 241,₁₀₋₁₂.

10. Beautiful mind = happiness of thoughts

The Brahmajālasutta[59] of the Dīghanikāya presents an exhortation from the Buddha as follows:

> *mamaṃ vā bhikkhave pare vaṇṇaṃ bhāseyyuṃ, dhammassa vā vaṇṇaṃ bhāseyyuṃ, saṅghassa vā vaṇṇaṃ bhāseyyuṃ, tatra tumhehi* (Eᵉ *tumhe*) *na ānando na somanassaṃ na cetaso ubbillāvitattaṃ karaṇīyaṃ.*

> "And if, bhikkhus, others speak in praise of me, or in praise of the Dhamma, or in praise of the Sangha, you should not give way to jubilation, joy, and exultation in your heart."[60]

Buddhaghosa[61] comments on the term *somanassaṃ* ('joy') in the Sumaṅgalavilāsinī thus:

> *sumanassa bhāvo **somanassaṃ*** (D I 3,[20]), *cetasikasukhass' etaṃ adhivacanaṃ.*

The state of good mind (=) **joy**.[62] This is a designation of mental happiness.

Somanassa, according to Buddhaghosa's interpretation, represents the happiness among mental concomitants. In the sub-commentary on the Dīghanikāya, Dhammapāla[63] further clarifies Buddhaghosa's statement in the following manner:

> *sobhanaṃ mano assā ti sumano, sobhanaṃ vā mano sumano. tassa bhāvo **somanassan*** (D I 3,[20]; Sv I 53,[24]) *ti tadaññadhammānam pi sampayuttānaṃ somanassabhāvo āpajjatī ti. nāpajjati, ruḷhīsaddattā, yathā paṅkajan ti dassento: **cetasikasukhass' etaṃ adhivacanan*** (Sv I 53,[24]) *ti āha.*

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[59] D I 3,[18–21] (=) Bᵉ I 3,[16–18]; Cᵉ I 6,[1–4]; Sᵉ I 4,[11–13].
[60] Bodhi 2007, 3.
[61] Sv I 53,[23–24].
[62] See also Tin 1920, 162; Nyānaponika 2005, 223.
[63] Sv-pṭ I 78,[12–17].

Because one who has a beautiful mind (resolution of compound) is *sumana* (*bahuvrihi*-compound). Or, a mind that is beautiful (resolution of compound) is *sumana* (*karmadhāraya*-compound). If one would argue that there not be the unwanted consequence that the other [mental] factors, have the state of *somanassa* too, [then we say:] 'no', on account of the fact that [it] is a term of convention of speech. Showing that [it] is just like [the term] *paṅkaja* (lit. 'mud-born' i.e., 'a lotus'), [Buddhaghosa] says: **this is a designation of mental happiness**.

Dhammapāla interprets *somanassa* in two ways. As he explains, it means the state of [having a] beautiful (*sobhana*) mind. But not all[64] beautiful mental concomitants occurring in the mind are called *somanassa*. Although the literal meaning of the term *paṅkaja* includes all those born in the mud, the word really only refers to a lotus flower. In the same manner, although *somanassa* literally means the state of [having a] beautiful mind, its usage is delimited only to mental happiness (*cetasikasukha*) as a *rūḷhi*. In this *rūḷhi*, the semantic range of *somanassa* has been narrowed down. In other words, *somanassa* is an example of the whole-for-a-part method. The explanations of Dhammapāla teach the reader how to understand the mental concomitant *somanassa* from the Abhidhammic perspective without being misled by its literal meaning.

11. Consciousnesses = a consciousness

The Dhammasaṅgaṇī[65] describes *citta* ('cognizance') with a number of synonyms as follows:

> *katamaṃ tasmiṃ samaye cittaṃ hoti? yaṃ tasmiṃ samaye cittaṃ mano mānasaṃ hadayaṃ paṇḍaraṃ mano manāyatanaṃ manindriyaṃ viññāṇaṃ viññāṇakkhandho tajjā manoviññāṇadhātu. idaṃ tasmiṃ samaye cittaṃ hoti.*

> What [kind of] cognizance does exist on that occasion? Whatever cognizance, mind, mentation, heart, lucidity, mind, mind-sense-

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[64] The Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha lists nineteen universal beautiful mental-factors (*cetasikā sobhanasādhāraṇā*), including *saddhā* ('faith'). See Bodhi 1999, 85.

[65] Dhs 10,$_{11-15}$.

base, mind faculty, consciousness, consciousness-aggregate, [and] the element of mind-consciousness that suits [the particular thought that exists] on that occasion. This [kind of] cognizance exists on that occasion.[66]

Of these synonymic designations, *viññāṇakkhandho* ('consciousness-aggregate') is the only collective noun, while all others obviously refer to a single entity (i.e., *citta*). Literally, *viññāṇakkhandha* refers to an accumulation of consciousness. Differently put, *viññāṇakkhandha* is the totality of many *viññāṇa*s. The commentary[67] on the Dhammasaṅgaṇī entitled Atthasālinī teaches that while *viññāṇakkhandha* literally suggests many consciousnesses, it actually denotes only one consciousness:

> *vijānātī ti **viññāṇaṃ** (Dhs 10,₁₃) viññāṇam eva khandho **viññāṇakkhandho** (Dhs 10,₁₄). tassa rāsi-ādivasena attho veditabbo. mahā-udakakkhandho tv' eva saṅkhaṃ gacchatī (S V 400,₁₂₋₁₃; A II 55,₂₃₋₂₄) ti ettha hi (Eᵉ omits hi) rāsaṭṭhena khandho (Eᵉ khandhajo) vutto. sīlakkhandho samādhikkhandho (D III 229,₁₄₋₁₅) ti-ādīsu guṇaṭṭhena. addasā kho Bhagavā mahantaṃ dārukkhandhan (S IV 179,₈) ti ettha paññattimattaṭṭhena. idha pana rūḷhito khandho vutto. rāsaṭṭhena hi viññāṇakkhandhassa ekadeso ekaṃ viññāṇaṃ. tasmā yathā rukkhassa ekaṃ desaṃ chindanto rukkhaṃ chindatī (Vin IV 34,₄) ti vuccati, evam eva viññāṇakkhandhassa ekadesabhūtaṃ ekaṃ pi viññāṇaṃ rūḷhito **viññāṇakkhandho** (Dhs 10,₁₄) ti vuttaṃ.*

[It is called] **consciousness** because [it] cognises. Consciousness itself is the aggregate (resolution of compound) (=) **consciousness-aggregate** (= kammadhāraya compound). One should know the meaning of that [*khandha*] in terms of a mass, etc. For, in the context: 'but it is reckoned simply as a great mass of water', [the term] *khandha* is stated in the sense of mass; in [the statements] such as: 'the aggregate of virtuous behaviour, the aggregate of concentration', [the word *khandha* is stated] in the sense of [good] quality; in the context: 'the Blessed One saw a great log

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(*dārukkhandha*)', [it is stated] in the sense of mere designation. But in this context, [the term] *khandha* is stated in accordance with convention of speech. For, in the sense of mass, a part of the aggregate of consciousness is a single consciousness. Therefore, just as [when] cutting a part of a tree, [it is] said [that] '[one] cuts a tree', in the same manner, even a single consciousness, which is a part of the aggregate of consciousness (resolution of compound) is called **aggregate of consciousness** (compound) in accordance with convention of speech.[68]

The author of the Atthasālinī begins the gloss by emphasizing that both *viññāṇa* and *viññāṇakkhandha* are synonymous. He then uses canonical examples to point out the diverse meanings of the term *khandha* ('aggregate'). Even though a *viññāṇa* ('a consciousness') is a part of *viññāṇakkhandha* ('consciousness-aggregate'), in this context, the latter is used to denote the former as a *rūḷhi*. The analogy given here—although in reality only a part of a tree is cut, we simply say 'a tree is cut'—is helpful in understanding how the aggregate of consciousness is used to refer to a single consciousness. The exegesis in the Atthasālinī teaches the reader how the Mahāvihāra school understands *viññāṇakkhandha* ('consciousness-aggregate') in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī—although the literal meaning of *viññāṇakkhandha* indicates a plurality it should be understood as a referent to a single entity.

Conclusion

Convention of speech (*rūḷhi*) can be identified as a special literary device. It appears in two modes—expansion and contraction of literal meaning. Substitution of a part for the whole and of the whole for a part are the functions of these two modes of *rūḷhi*, respectively. The Mahāvihāra exegetes often use *rūḷhi* as a hermeneutical strategy (*naya*). This strategy obviously reflects awareness relating to the philosophy of language of the school. The Mahāvihāra exegetes use this strategy when they encounter particularly important teachings not only in the canon but also in the commentaries.

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[68] See also Tin 1920 I 186–187; Nyanaponika 2005, 249–250. Commenting on the term *cittaṃ* ('mind') in Dhs 9,$_2$ and As 63,$_{31}$–64,$_{12}$, the author of the Dhammasaṅgaṇīmūlaṭīkā also offer a quite similar interpretation. See As-pṭ 65,$_{7-9}$.

With this strategy, they teach the audience to achieve the text-author's intention without grasping the literal meaning of the words contained in them. Thus, a lack of knowledge of this particular usage can potentially prevent the reader from gaining an accurate understanding of these teachings. On the contrary, with the awareness of *rūḷhi*-exegeses, one is able to read these teachings accurately. Needless to say, knowledge of these exegeses helps those who translate these texts. This complex and flexible hermeneutical method of the Mahāvihāra exegetes insists that one should carefully consider all the different levels of meaning of words in both canonical and commentarial texts before interpretation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

Ap	Apadāna
Ap-a	Apadāna-Aṭṭhakathā
As	Atthasālinī
BD	Horner 1938–1966
B^e	Burmese Chaṭṭhasaṅgīti Tipiṭaka Edition
C^e	Ceylonese Edition
CPD	Trenckner et al. 1924

D	Dīghanikāya
Dhs	Dhammasaṅgaṇī
Dīp	Oldenberg, 1879
DOP	Cone and Straube, 2001–
E[e]	European Edition
It	Itivuttaka
It-a	Itivuttaka-Aṭṭhakathā
Kkh	Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī
Kkh-pṭ	Kaṅkhāvitaraṇīpurāṇaṭīkā
Kv	Kathāvatthu
Kv-a	Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā
M	Majjhimanikāya
M	Milindapañha
Mhv	Geiger, 1912
Nett	Nettippakaraṇa
Nett-a	Nettippakaraṇa-Aṭṭhakathā
Nidd	Niddesa
Nidd-a	Niddesa-Aṭṭhakathā
Pālim	Pālimuttakavinayavinicchaya
Pāt	Pātimokkha
Paṭis	Paṭisambhidāmagga
Paṭis-a	Paṭisambhidāmagga-Aṭṭhakathā
Pp	Puggalapaññatti
Pp-nṭ	Puggalapaññatti-Anuṭīkā
Ps	Papañcasūdanī
PSED	Apte, 1890
pw	Böhtlingk 1856–1884
S	Saṃsuttanikāya
S[e]	Siamese BuddSir Edition
Sp	Samantapāsādikā

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Spk	Sāratthappakāsinī
Sp-ṭ	Sāratthadīpanīṭīkā
Sv	Sumaṅgalavilāsinī
Sv-pṭ	Sumaṅgalavilāsinīpurāṇaṭīkā
Thī	Therīgāthā
VedPari	Adhvarīndra, 1942
Vibh	Vibhaṅga
Vibh-a	Vibhaṅga-Aṭṭhakathā
Vin	Vinaya
Vin-vn	Vinayavinicchaya
Vin-vn-ṭ	Vinayavinicchayaṭīkā
Vjb	Vajirabuddhiṭīkā
Vmv	Vimativinodanīṭīkā
Vv	Vimānavatthu
Vv-a	Vimānavatthu-Aṭṭhakathā

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A Mindful Bypassing: Mindfulness, Trauma and the Buddhist Theory of No-Self

Julien Tempone-Wiltshire and Tra-ill Dowie

ABSTRACT—This article examines the Buddhist idea of *anātman*, 'no-self' and pudgala, 'the person' in relation to the notion of 'self' emerging from contemporary cognitive science. The Buddhist no-self doctrine is enriched by the cognitive scientist's understanding of the multiple facets of selfhood, or structures of experience, and the causative action of a functional self in the world. A proper understanding of the Buddhist concepts of *anātman* and *pudgala* proves critical to mindfulness-based therapeutic interventions: this is as the 'person', as constituted by various structures of selfhood, including—the ecological, interpersonal, extended, private, narrative, relational and conceptual selves—which may be disrupted by traumatic events which disorder one's experience of time, defence, relationality, memory, resource and agency. In the absence of this understanding, the no-self doctrine might encourage a sort of bypass, in which traumatic facets of selfhood are overlooked in the quest for spiritual liberation. With a proper understanding of the function served by the Buddhist concepts of no-self and 'person', psychotherapeutic work may be situated as a necessary 'preliminary practice' for meditative exploration of deeper transpersonal domains and soteriological goals.

KEYWORDS: mindfulness, trauma, buddhism, no-self, *ātman*, *anātman*, *pudgala*

Mindfulness and no-self

In recent years a large number of studies have focused upon the scientifically demonstrated benefits of mindfulness in many different aspects of life—ranging from sex and eating to venture capitalism, workplace productivity and self-seeking. These currents of discourse are emerging rapidly and largely uncritically[1]. The world is now rife with conferences, courses and celebrity personalities promoting the notion that Buddhism is a unique spiritual exception to the rule, in that unlike other faiths it can be readily made secular, rational and profoundly compatible with science. Indeed, that Buddhism constitutes a well-formed science of the mind that may be adopted wholesale to the profitable transformation of Western culture (McMahan, 2008). Growth in recent years has occurred in the use of mindfulness practices not only in therapeutic contexts, but also in research within the cognitive sciences. It is in this context that we see the clinical applications of Buddhist metaphysical principles, such as no-self, adopted in a limited form.

In this work I examine the Buddhist concept of *anātman*, no-self, a doctrine according to which the 'self' is understood to be illusory. We examine this doctrine in relation to the notion of self that has emerged in contemporary cognitive science. We suggest that the Buddhist notion of *pudgala*, 'the person', is validated by the cognitive scientist's understanding of the multiple facets of 'selfhood', or structures of experience, which prove critical to the causative action of a functional self in the world. While issues at the personal level remain developmentally unaddressed, we contend that mindfulness-based therapeutic intervention, relying on a misconception of no-self doctrine, may lead to a mode of 'spiritual bypass'. As such, we suggest, a proper understanding of the Buddhist concepts of *anātman* and *pudgala* proves critical to mindfulness-based therapeutic interventions, in providing a lens through which to understand the disorganising effects of various developmentally connected forms of psychopathology. We argue that there is an imperative to intervene at the level of the causative frameworks underpinning experiential phenomena, particularly within the domain of 'personal identity' or selfhood. Such intervention would seem most salient in cases where structural disorganisation manifests as psychopathological conditions, notably in presentations such as trauma and developmental omissions; that is, various types of neglect or abuse experienced in the formative, developmental stages of life.

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[1] Purser, 2019

The personal and transpersonal

To begin with a terminological explanation: in the scholarly discourse surrounding the transpersonal domain, the term 'transpersonal' is conventionally understood to describe experiences wherein the locus of selfhood expands beyond the individualistic or egoic framework to incorporate broader dimensions of human existence, the natural world or even the cosmos itself (Walsh & Vaughan, 1993, pp. 199–207). Although William James was the first to employ the term, he did so in a circumscribed manner, his utilisation appeared solely in an unpublished course syllabus at Harvard University, specifically for an introductory course in philosophy (Vich, 1998). James' original intent was primarily to elucidate the philosophical conundrum of objectivity. In James' nomenclature, an object is deemed 'Trans-personal' when it is perceptually shared: 'when my object is also your object.' Importantly, following from James' use of the term in 1905, Carl Jung employed the term *überpersönlich* in 1917, a term later translated into English as 'superpersonal', and subsequently rendered as 'transpersonal' (Jung, 1917). Additionally, R.D. Laing introduced the term 'transpersonal' in a series of papers in 1966, later anthologised in his seminal work, 'The Politics of Experience' (Laing, 1990, p. 31). These concepts were subsequently developed by Stanislav Grof, who characterises the transpersonal as an experiential state where 'the feeling of the individual [is] that his consciousness expanded beyond the usual ego boundaries and the limitations of time and space' (Grof, 2016, p. 31). Hence, for the purposes of the ensuing analysis, we shall adopt the term 'transpersonal' to signify those experiences and epistemological stances that transcend the confines of individual psychology.

The altered or expanded, non-ordinary states of consciousness described as transpersonal may be productively contrasted against what may be termed the 'pre-personal' and 'personal' levels of experience (Dowie & Tempone-Wiltshire, 2022; 2023). The pre-personal refers to the developmental stages that occur before the formation of a strong, separate ego or self, and developmentally include features such as the attachment period. The personal, by contrast, may be understood as constituted by various structures of experience or selfhood—including, illustratively, the ecological, interpersonal, extended, private, narrative, relational and conceptual selves. As we will contend in what follows, these organisational structures of 'self' may be disrupted through various psychopathological processes. This is particularly true of Complex or

Developmental Trauma. We will examine, the way in which trauma impacts these selfhood structures, by exploring the way trauma can disorder one's experience of time, defence, relationality, memory, resource and agency (Dowie & Tempone-Wiltshire, 2023).

At this point we can productively draw upon Ken Wilber's model of pre-personal, personal, and transpersonal stages of experience—a model Wilber utilises to identify the apparent similarities between regressive psychotic states (pre-personal) and experiences of mystical, transcendent union (transpersonal). Wilber explores these features through his notion of the 'pre/trans fallacy' (1982). According to Wilber the non-rational states (pre-rational and trans-rational) can easily be confused with one another (2001, p. 211). As a consequence, when organisational structures of the 'person' are disrupted, instances of the pre/trans fallacy may result; producing behaviours that are colloquially referred to as 'spiritual bypassing'. The notion of spiritual bypassing, introduced by Welwood (1984/2000) describes the various uses of spiritual practices to sidestep or avoid confronting unresolved personal or pre-personal issues—whether psychological wounding, unfinished developmental tasks or repressed emotional content. It is our contention that working psychologically with the structures of personhood—in Buddhist parlance: *pudgala*—proves necessary to preventing this misapplication of Buddhist-derived mindfulness techniques. With a proper understanding of the function served by the concepts of no-self and 'person' in Buddhist metaphysics, psychotherapeutic work may be situated as a necessary 'preliminary practice' for meditative exploration of deeper transpersonal domains and soteriological goals.

Is the self an illusion?

As shall become clear, the Buddhist philosophical conception of no-self, the illusory self, and the cognitive scientist's understanding of self, vary significantly. While the cognitive scientist offers a scientific redescription of what it is to be a self, albeit a 'constructed' self—a useful, functional construction—the Buddhist metaphysician, describes a soteriological and normative belief that the sense of being an independent self is a problematic illusion to be abandoned in order to attain liberation from suffering.

The question calls for addressing: is the self an illusion? While modern interpreters such as Siderits et al. (2011) have reinvigorated debate within

Buddhist circles concerning the nature of self, the usual Buddhist position is to deny the existence of the self. This is the doctrine of no-self or 'non-self' (Pali: *anattā*, Sanskrit: *anātman*). To clarify this doctrine, we can say *anattā*, or no-self, is the view that nothing exists within one's inner makeup that would qualify as an inner 'subject' or 'agent'. Whilst the *feeling* of self can be said to exist, it does not map to any real, independent thing—the self is illusory. Buddhist modernists commonly assert that findings in the cognitive sciences corroborate the truth of no-self (Wright, 2017). Those who could be called 'Neural' Buddhists, for instance, may hold the brain generates the illusion of self, then draw upon evolutionary theory to describe the 'functionality' in terms of evolutionary fitness, of operating under this delusion (Thompson, 2020). Indeed, Varela et al. in *The Embodied Mind* offered perhaps the seminal cognitive scientific account in support of the no-self view (1993/2017, chapters 4 and 6).

This is, for many, an attractive line of argument. A Buddhist modernist may assert that cognitive science suggests that what we term a 'person' refers only to a causally interconnected collection of mental and bodily events. Yet we commonly act as if an abiding subject of experience, or an agent of actions, exists and that this 'self' is the source of our identity. According to the Buddhist view, the positing of the self arises not merely as a result of cognitive delusion but from 'grasping' for such a self. Indeed, self-imputing may be understood as synonymous with the action of grasping. Buddhist practice may undo this egocentrism through forms of mental cultivation that induce a recognition of the error of self-grasping. On this view, Buddhism provides the perfect supplement to cognitive science in that while one demonstrates objectively the non-existence of self, the other offers subjective means of experientially observing how self-grasping gives rise to this illusion of self.

There exist, however, compelling critiques of this no-self picture. From an historical perspective, we must attend to the coevolution of the Buddhist *anātman* view (no-self) and the classical Indian philosophical notion of *ātman* (self). The debate between Buddhist and Brahminical thinkers, concerning the self and no-self developed in South Asia over a number of centuries; a co-evolution in which insights and revisions occurred on both sides. For a detailed exploration of debates in India between Buddhist and orthodox philosophers regarding the existence of the *ātman*, see Watson (2017) and also Thompson (2020, p. 88). Importantly, as will be contended, many of the

Brahminical critiques of the Buddhist *anātman* position may be understood as anticipating important insights about perception that emerged in cognitive science. In particular, as will be seen, cognitive science provides reasons to believe not that the self is an illusion, but rather a *construction*—an important distinction, and case made by both Thompson (2020) and Garfield (2022). Before we get into this argument, let us begin by offering a contemporary rendering of the Buddhist no-self view.

The Buddha held that the five aggregates—body, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness—are not fit to be regarded as a self, as these states of body and mind are transitory and impermanent (see e.g., the *Anatta-lakkhaṇa Sutta*; Harvey, 2009). In which case, turning to these aggregates to find any personal essence—the object of self-grasping—fails, as no personal essence will be found. This denial of self is made empirically by appeal to direct experience of the transitoriness of the aggregates. Indeed, many of the Vedic-Brahminical philosophers would have agreed with the Buddhist perspective that the 'five aggregates' are not-self; contending that the true self, *ātman*, transcends the aggregates. According to this view the true self lies beyond the body, feeling, sense perception, volition, sensory or mental consciousness (Thompson, 2020, p. 92). Brahminical thinkers identified *ātman* with an essence within a person—perhaps better understood as 'pure' awareness or pure consciousness—an awareness which lay beyond or *transcended* the aggregates, a quality that is eternal and unchanging, representing the individual soul. It is often described as beyond the physical body and the changing aspects of the mind. As such the existence of *ātman* was not necessarily in conflict with the Buddhist recognition that no self could be found within these transitory aggregates (Watson, 2017; Ganeri, 2012).

It may appear, at this point, as if Indian Brahminical philosophers and Buddhist metaphysicians are merely speaking past one another. However, it would be premature to assume consistency between the Buddha's teachings of no-self (elucidated in the Nikāyas) and the Vedic sense of Self (elucidated in the Upaniṣads). This is a deeply contested subject, and beyond the scope of our present work. Important to our purposes, however, is the fact that alongside the teachings of no-self the Buddha did allow for a sense of 'persons', or *pudgala*. He thus allowed that we may refer to the aggregates, an assemblage of parts, as a 'person', for convenience's sake. He held that in reality all that *is*, comes to *be*, and *falls away* are aggregates or transitory phenomena, and it

is the person (*pudgala*) that is the *bearer* of the burden of the five aggregates (Bhāra Sutta SN 22.22). Here is a well-known formulation in the Vajira Sutta, as translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000, p. 230), in the *Connected Discourses*:

> Just as, with an assemblage of parts,
> The word "chariot" is used,
> So, when the aggregates exist,
> There is the convention "a being."
>
> It is only suffering that comes to be,
> Suffering that stands and falls away.
> Nothing but suffering comes to be,
> Nothing but suffering ceases.

On this view the person is not ultimately, but only *conventionally*, real—that is, the person is a useful conventional designation for a collection of parts, a short-hand in speech that ultimately refers to no genuine entity, object, or subject. The major problem for Buddhist Reductionism, however, raised by cognitive scientists, is that while it may be reasonable to say that a car is only 'conventionally' real—that is, it exists as an assembly of impersonal parts, is inanimate, and gains its meaning through the function in language it serves— the same is not true of a person. After all, a person is a sentient being with an inner life, and indeed is defined by the subjective experience of being a unique individual. This coherent, subjective experience is not accounted for by a conventional designation alone.

To describe any principle of identity as merely 'conventional' leaves us with an explanatory gap: how do we account for the apparent unity of memory, perceptual recognition, and agentive action? The apparent integration of memory, action, perception, and desire cannot readily be accounted for by a view of the self as purely illusory—where all that exists are impersonal yet causally-related events—as it is the 'personal' character that causally unifies these events. That is, given we take ourselves to be one and the same subject of various sense perceptions at any moment and across time—without a principle of identity, we cannot account for the apparent coherence of a person's experience 'from the inside', and we would not be able to determine which events belong in a particular 'individual psychological stream' from among the huge causal network of events.

As Thompson suggests, something more is needed to impart a unity and coherence to the series of events identified as 'me'. He contends that the Naiyāyikas, Vedic Indian philosophers from the Nyāya school, identify the twinned problems that confront the Buddhist no-self doctrine, these issues are described in contemporary philosophical parlance as the 'binding' problem and the problem of the 'unity of consciousness' (2020, p. 174). In brief, we may state these problems as follows: *binding* qualities together appears necessary in order to simply *perceive* qualities as belonging to a coherent object. Furthermore, in order to have distinct perceptions of any object, the perceptions need to be *united* in belonging to a unified subject (Holmes, 2019; Bayne, 2009). From a cognitive science perspective, failures to address the binding and unity of consciousness problems, are significant. This need not imply that the self that unifies experience and perception is substantive, but it does require the postulation of a 'self' that goes beyond the merely conventional; unity and coherence must be imparted to experience to allow for the experience of an external world, in itself.

It is for related reasons that contemporary Western philosophers of mind, such as Galen Strawson (1999; 2004), have been understood as offering counterpoints to the Buddhist theory of no-self. Strawson, while underscoring the temporally-limited nature of the self, also advocates for a 'realist' or 'naturalistic' view, positing the self as a concrete, albeit temporally restricted, entity. While Buddhist philosophers have challenged the existence of a stable, enduring self, Strawson argues for the reality of 'episodic' or 'momentary' selves. These selves, he asserts, are deeply rooted in our immediate phenomenological experiences. For Strawson, the self is not an illusion to be transcended but rather an immediate, lived reality, constituted by consciousness and mental states in the 'here and now'. This has been understood as offering a significant departure from Buddhist perspectives, affirming the self's existence albeit in a narrowly temporal context, which impels the need for the stabilisation of this process, not its avoidance. However, as will be seen in this article, Strawson's argument in no way countermands the Buddhist doctrine of *anattā*, no-self, *when it is understood in relation to its necessary correlate* pudgala*, the person.* Positing the self as an illusion or a transient configuration of *skandhas* (aggregates), we can see that there is no necessary inconsistency between arguments by Strawson and Buddhist metaphysicians.

We may conclude then, with a challenge to the Neuro-Buddhist and the Buddhist modernist: that it is simplistic to claim cognitive science 'validates' the no-self view. Rather the 'self', constructed in the 'unity of perception', is demonstrably required in order for the world of objects to be experienceable by the subject. Contemporary cognitive science draws upon principles of brain organisation and the interrelation between mental contents in order to achieve such unity. Metzinger's (2004; 2009) notion of the brain's 'self-concept' as a process not a substance, illustrates such a view. An idea expanded upon in my own work on the 'process metaphysics' that both emerges from a hemispheric understanding of brain function *à la* McGilchrist (Tempone-Wiltshire, 2023) and provides the stronger basis for understanding psychological practice and the process of therapeutic change (Tempone-Wiltshire & Dowie, 2023b). The self, from the contemporary cognitive perceptive, we suggest, can be broadly identified as a socially-embedded subject of experience—a *construction*, yes, but not merely an *illusion*. Albahari (2006) provides one such contemporary analytical account of how the 'person' is constructed; however, descriptions of the 'person' among Western scholars, as a developmental and social construction, are not new, dating back to William James' *Principles of Psychology* (1983/1890) and Herbert Mead's *Mind, Self and Society* (2015/1934).

'The person' in Buddhism: self as structure of experience

While the Buddhist doctrine of no-self challenges the notion of the self as an unconstructed personal essence, we must ask: are they attacking a strawman conception of self? Do human beings intrinsically, in fact, hold such a view of self? Merleau-Ponty claimed to the contrary, not that we experience ourselves as unconstructed personal essences, but rather that we habitually experience ourselves as *living bodily subjects* who are *dynamically attuned* to the world (Henry & Thompson, 2017). Evidently, this is not the same thing as viewing the self as a substantive unconstructed owner of experience. We ought to conclude that the Buddhist theory of no-self, then, is not a reality empirically verified by cognitive scientists, as Buddhist Modernists may claim, but rather a normative and soteriological conceptual apparatus; that is a set of technologies for liberation. Yet soteriological concepts, as demonstrated when considering the contemporary quest for a neural correlate of 'awakening', are by their nature not subject to scientific verification (Tempone-Wiltshire, 2023, forthcoming). Furthermore, there are complex subjects that call for resolution yet remain

untouched by the clinical sciences, such as, for instance the nature of an enlightened being's epistemic processes. Does a Buddha, upon awakening, retain cognitive processes and warrants by which they perceive the world? Seeking neural correlates for soteriological projects like awakening, is a problematic undertaking whilst such questions remain unresolved (Thakchoe & Tempone-Wiltshire, 2019).

We are left then with a phenomenological sense of self as a 'structure of experience' whereby one experiences one's self *as* oneself. Evidently then, certain concepts of self are not merely illusory, but serve constructive, causative, and functional ends. Yet it is important to note, that the Buddhist conception of *pudgala*—the person—may be conceived as capacious enough to include these self-structures of experience. Buddhists metaphysics acknowledges the difference in kind that exists between a *chariot* and a *person*— in that, as opposed to the chariot, the construct of the 'person' possesses explanatory power beyond the merely designatory. The 'person' should be conceived then, as not merely a useful conceptual designation for an amalgam of parts, because the construct of the person proves necessary to explain the emergent behaviour, or downward causal action from higher levels within the system—such as the mind. The necessity to work therapeutically directly with the 'person', i.e., the structures of selfhood disrupted by trauma, arises precisely form the causal, functional action of the person.

These self-structures of experience can be said to be real on this view, and the 'person' said to exist, in that they do real causal work. In particular, for our purposes, what could be called the 'selfhood structures' of experience are causally relevant in that emergent neurobiological research demonstrates the manner in which they structure experience, and the manner in which trauma can disrupt their structuring of experience. They are consequently crucial concepts for mindfulness-educators, and mindfulness-based clinicians interested in developing a genuinely trauma-informed practice.

It can be concluded then, that when describing the various forms of selfhood identified as existent in the cognitive sciences—including narrative selves, constructed selves, social selves, enacted selves, and embodied selves— the selves being identified are not the target of the Buddhist no-self doctrine. These forms of selfhood can be encapsulated within the Buddhist concept of *pudgala*, or personhood. It is the notion of self as a *substantive entity* that is the object of negation in Buddhist metaphysics. It is important to keep

the 'substantive', or essentialist, conception of self and the 'structures of experience' notion of personhood conceptually distinct. While adherence to belief in a substantialist self has pernicious ramifications for our psychology, by contrast the 'person' is ultimately a necessary set of structures without which we would be incapable of experiencing anything. This necessity is demonstrated by the binding and unification problems. We contend that when selfhood, as structure of experience, is distinguished from the substantialist account of self, contemporary cognitive neuroscience may be said to be in congruence with the classical Buddhist doctrine of no-self.

Cognitive science and structures of selfhood

As illustrated, the Buddhist notion of *pudgala* is capacious enough to include aspects of selfhood that are not merely conventional designations but, rather, causative. We consider in what follows the 'structures of experience' associated with the concepts of ecological, interpersonal, extended, private and conceptual 'selfhood', as outlined by Ulrich Neisser (1988). While we might also include further dimensions of selfhood; such as the neurological-self, narrative-self, core-self, etc., for our purposes here we will focus upon Neisser's categories. The *ecological* self describes the experience of the environment and is connected to the phenomenological idea of *bodily* self-awareness; the *interpersonal* self, describes the experience of the self in relation to others, and is connected to *intersubjective* self-awareness; the *extended* or *temporal*, self describes the experience of having a recollected past and anticipated future, and is connected to *narrative* self-awareness; the *private* self refers to one's own inner experience, subjectivity and pre-*reflexive* awareness; and the *conceptual* self describes the mental representation of oneself and *reflective* self-awareness.

Thus, we have bodily, intersubjective, narrative, pre-reflexive, and reflective modes of self-awareness, tethered to these corresponding selfhood constructs. These aspects of selfhood are important conceptual tools which complement interpersonal neurobiological research concerning the disordering effects of trauma. As an introduction to this interpersonal neurobiology a reader may consider the literature on: affect regulation, mentalisation and the development of the self (Fonagy et al., 2018); the formative role of relationship in shaping selfhood (Siegel, 2020); and the emergence of the person through developmentally formative intersubjective experiences of

nonverbally communicated attunement and mutual regulation (Schore, 2021). Interpersonal neurobiological research offers not only a substantiation of the causative structures of experience that constitute the person, but also the disorders of selfhood produced by trauma. These prove essential to ensuring the clinician possesses an expansive understanding of the client's subjectivity. For instance, such research provides understanding of the interpersonal basis for the development of personality disorders, and the need for relationally grounded mentalisation approaches to treatment (Bateman & Fonagy, 2016). Such research is apparent also in the understanding offered by Porges (2018), through polyvagal theory, of the role of the autonomic nervous system in perpetuating inaccurate, trauma-shaped, schema by which we experience a projected hostile or unsafe environment. This, relates also, to MacLean's (1990) *Triune Brain*, or the Limbic theorists' attempt to establish the existence of another precognitive mind inhabiting the individual. Evidently then, these various constructs of selfhood, awareness and agency existing within the 'person'—and reinforced as they are through interpersonal neurobiological findings—prove critical to developing a genuinely trauma-informed approach to mindfulness-based psychological practice. Yet they in no way commit one to a substantialist notion of self as 'personal essence'.

Traumatisation and structures of selfhood

Trauma may be understood as inducing disorderings of the mind, and thus disruptions to structures of our experience, or selfhood. Trauma, as contended by Dowie, may be understood as involving the disordering of one's experience of time, defence, relationality, memory, resource, and agency (Dowie & Tempone-Wiltshire, 2022). All of these are configured around and through the five aggregates, as subjective experiences of being a 'person', *pudgala*. Trauma is, in essence, a disruption to these subjectivities within mind, thus trauma happens to an individual at the subjective level of their experience of themselves as a 'person' and needs to be repaired at the level of the personal, not bypassed or avoided through the misconstruing of Buddhist no-self doctrine.

To understand the importance of working clinically with structures of selfhood, drawing upon the work by Dowie and myself (2022), we will briefly elucidate the way in which trauma may be understood as a disorder of the following six domains of experience: namely, an individual's experience

of time, defence, relationality, memory, resource, and agency. As will be suggested, without engaging these facets of selfhood, no integrated or unified approach to trauma practice is possible. As such, a set of unifying principles for treatment depends upon a cohesive working model of trauma, and the manner in which trauma disrupts the causative facets of selfhood. This is important as incomplete thinking at foundational levels must also manifest at the level of applied practice, either explicitly or implicitly.

Firstly, we might begin with a definition of trauma. In simple terms, we might describe trauma as a response to experiences, with certain features of violence, risk, and danger, which disrupts the structures of selfhood. Importantly, in disrupting these causative facets of selfhood, trauma threatens one's identity and subjectivity; disrupting how an individual occupies their own lifeworld. This is true whether the trauma is single incident or chronic, a consequence of 'omission' or 'commission', acts of abuse or neglect (Courtois & Ford, 2009). The absence of safety, nurturance, or care in early life, alongside invasions and violations, may disrupt a child's developing immature sense of personhood. The developmental impacts of the absence of care—soothing and restorative experiences, was established first in the psychoanalytic literature, particularly in the area of object relations and attachment theory (Bowlby, 1979), whilst within Western philosophy this has been explored by Axel Honneth in his work on the 'struggle for recognition' and '*Selbstvertrauen*', or 'trust in oneself' (Honneth, 1995).

Trauma has, since the time of Charcot, Janet and Freud, been understood as a ubiquitous problem in mental health; whilst in contemporary research, too, it can be highly correlated as comorbid with a range of severe mental illnesses (Felitti et al., 1998; McCloskey & Walker, 2000; Van der Kolk, 2003; Read et al., 2005; Van der Kolk et al., 2005; Felitti & Anda, 2010). While trauma as a psychological process is often described by its neurobiological qualities, it should also importantly be described in more nuanced ways which pay careful attention to the interiority of the experience and the implicit meaning complexes bound up in such experience. Our contention here is that trauma plays an important role in psychological disturbances precisely because of the way it disrupts the phenomenal domains of *time*, *defence*, *relationality*, *memory*, *resource* and *agency*. We will demonstrate how these phenomenal domains, too, are intimately linked with the structures of selfhood identified in the preceding section.

Trauma and temporality: the narrative self

One key register common to the interiority of traumatic process is disruption to the temporal features of selfhood. Trauma can aptly be defined by its temporalised characteristics, or perhaps more accurately, its de-temporalised form. The traumatic process has a quality of repetition. In psychoanalytic language, trauma may be framed as an event that is locked into a recursive pattern and process within the person's lived or narrative experience (Terr, 1984). In this de-temporalizing sense, the narrative-self or temporal process of selfhood are adversely impacted by trauma.

In this sense, trauma has a quality of the never-ending; generating feelings of inescapability, absorbing an individual within a world of horror and fear; where tragically, the ability of the person to form new horizons or new ways of living free from the past, is profoundly compromised or non-existent. The temporal-self is ruptured and through this rupture of time, the experience of one's relationship to the world is brought into question (Fraser, 1981). This is as time is the quality that adds a unifying thread to one's experience and one's world, and because human beings by nature are historical beings—humans comport themselves into a future through a past (Heidegger, 1962)—a traumatic process that is unable to be placed into the past fully, due to sensate and affective disruption, is unable to be absorbed into the present, and therefore, by definition, discontinues and disallows the possibility of a future. In this way trauma shapes the temporal self—the self that owns its past, present, and future. Such a self is impossible, for the traumatised, as the horizon of trauma never collapses into the past.

It is when trauma is made into suffering that it becomes re-temporalised, and thus experienceable. It is through gradual, steady, slow, and repeated exposure in order to temporalise experience that traumatic process can be resolved (Siegel, 2016). And it is only through this process that feelings may begin to free themselves of their defensive enclosure so that memory may be processed, and understanding may occur so that the individual is able to retrieve some sense of a fluid narrative of self.

Trauma and defence: the temporal self

When discussing failures of 'selfhood' associated with trauma, the subject of 'dissociation', and other defensive organisations, are obvious and important features for understanding trauma as a process. Early in the theorization of dissociation, Breuer and Freud, (2009/1893) advanced the position that dissociation is the result of 'defence hysteria'; that is to say, that dissociation occurs when the ego actively represses memories of a traumatic event to protect itself from re-experiencing the painful effects that can be associated with the retrieval of such memories. It is interesting then, that in discussing the causative value of selfhood structures, that we come to understand the basis of repression and dissociation as the attempt to protect the 'ego' or sense of 'self' from material that is viewed as too dangerous for the psyche to consciously experience.

The defensive phenomenal process of the avoidance of experience, alongside the failure of defensive structures to ensure unintegrated experience of trauma, in many cases leads to traumatic material emerging slowly over years; often through indirect means, as symbol and symptom—traumatic experiences rushing in and engulfing the present (Liotti, 1999). In this way the 'relational' self, the self-in-the-world and the self-with others, is profoundly impacted as the trauma process can generate memories and experiences that possess the individual with a disorganised flood of negative affect, sensations, and projected experiences from the past, overwhelming and shaping their relationship with the present. Thus, when defensive structures fail, trauma process can generate memories and experiences that in effect possess the individual, rather than a series of contiguous events that the individual possesses as their history.

Trauma and relationality: the relational self

Trauma processes generate an affective rupture that makes being in relationships with the world almost, or completely, unbearable. The disruptions to relationality and communicability are the product of the past continually invading the present. Trauma by its nature is a process whereby positive, creative, and imaginal acts of the body are limited, and the body is forced to respond to the catastrophe of the world through a more passive state of symptom creation and psychological defence formation. As the past continues to invade the present, trauma can render important facets of relationship, *unbearable*. The traumatised may develop, and *carry forward*, rigidified psychological defence structures, and fixed models of the self-in-relation to the other and the world. This can produce both a brittleness or rigidity in the trauma sufferers' relational sense of self. These relational communicative disruptions are responsible for trauma sufferers' characteristic polarised responses of either affective blandness or over-reactive and unregulated affective qualities (Agorastos et al., 2019).

Trauma and Memory: the embodied/affective self

The dilemma of how a client reconciles their past and future can become a story of a kind of double memory, where clients, particularly those with dissociative and personality disorders, often demonstrate a profound split between who they are and the victimised, violently violated, and traumatised individual they have been, and perhaps feel themselves to secretly remain. In this way, trauma's impact on memory occurs alongside impacted embodied and affective selfhood structures. From a neurobiological perspective, it is hypothesised that the brain's memory retrieval pathways are not reinforced for experiences that are life-threatening or destructive (Staniloiu et al., 2020). The implications for this in the clinical treatment of trauma seem significant, as this suggests that the capacity of cognition to connect with affect and sensation may be radically reduced in trauma presentations, and it is this process that seems crucial in treatment. This is to say: that the way in which trauma impacts memory has consequences for structures of selfhood such as embodied self, and affective self.

Embodied selfhood, in cognitive science, describes an emphasis upon the formative role the environment plays in the development of cognitive processes.

While affective selfhood, refers to the emotional spectrum of experiences in relationship—a dynamic multidimensional continuum which makes up an individual's interpersonal world. Unfortunately, the disorganisation of the memory system may arise in tandem with metacognitive ruptures which ensure that an individual's reflective function, or capacity to relate their affect, to their sensations, or to cognitions is significantly impaired (Allen, 2018). This might speak to the way in which the traumatised inhabit their body; their bodily awareness; both proprioceptive, interoceptive and relational. Impotently this relates also to the awareness of the emotional life's connection to the bodily experience. Damage and disorganisation of implicit and explicit memory systems is an enduring feature of trauma process and comes in parallel with a range of malformed structures of selfhood (Dowie & Tempone-Wiltshire, 2023, p. 18).

Trauma and resource: the agential self

The agential facet of selfhood is the perception of one's own capacity to act in and on the world effectively; it is this structure that is perhaps most profoundly impacted by the experience of trauma. Trauma is definitionally a crisis; in that it is a manifestation of a lack of resources to deal with experience. It is for this reason that the degree of resourcing is often the best indicator of whether an individual will be traumatised by an experience or not. As described, those who have lacked the resources to face an experience, or later integrate an experience, tend to repress, dissociate from, and 'experientially avoid' what is overwhelming and impossible to confront (Nijenhuis & Van der Hart, 2011). The de-temporalising impacts on memory, relationship and defence are all products of the crisis of trauma—the individual's foundational lack of resource to be with the traumatic experience. It is for this reason that the individual is at root rendered powerless by trauma; not only were they powerless to prevent commissive or omissive events from happening to them, but they were powerless also to prevent the resurgence of the memories of those events, or the destructive surfacing of symptom and symbol of the events. In this way they have lost the capacity to act as a sovereign being in the world. As such, trauma creates a continual sense of lacking in sufferers. It often carries with it the subjective feeling of 'I can't', and this lack leaches into all registers of the trauma sufferer's world and experience. For this reason, one of the foundations for trauma recovery is the establishment of resources in the initial phase of treatment. Trauma, then, radically disrupts an individual's sense of their own agential capacities.

Buddhist exceptionalism and the science–Buddhism dialogue

We have explored the nature of the self, from the perspective of classical Buddhist thought and modern cognitive science, and its bearing on mindfulness-informed therapeutic practice. It is important, however, to contextualise this exploration in relation to the broader subject of religiosity meeting clinical science. The intersection of Buddhism and science is elucidated well by Evan Thompson in his 2020 book *Why I Am Not a Buddhist*. This work offers a provocative challenge to the emergent current of Buddhist Modernism within academia and society more generally. In his critique of what he terms 'Buddhist Exceptionalism', Thompson (2020) raises the question: what could the science–Buddhism dialogue look like were it not characterised by attempts to use science to legitimise, or even merge with, Buddhism? In this paper we have demonstrated one way it might look, by considering the Buddhist conception of no-self as it is utilised in mindfulness-based therapies and Buddhist-informed meditation practices. Our purpose has been to demonstrate that while both Buddhist teachers and mindfulness educators utilise the conception of no-self as a pedagogical and soteriological tool for insight, this comes with significant dangers for both contemplative practitioners and therapeutic clients, when failing to recognise the important role of the person, that is, the structures of experience which constitute selfhood. These include the threat of potential re-traumatisation alongside the inducement of breakdowns, dissociative conditions, and psychotic episodes.

Eastern philosophies have long utilised exercises of consciousness in the aid of self-development. Indeed, it is for this reason that many in the Western tradition are seeking a more extended cross-cultural dialogue across psychological traditions. Meditation, as a special form of contemplative consciousness, is thought to allow for a reworking of mental schemata in a unique and potentially enduring way. The theoretical crossing of these domains is in flux, however, with no specific integrative approach considered generally valid. Indeed, mindfulness in its extraction from Buddhist traditions as it has been exported to the West, has been divested of its cultural and religious trappings. This has had problematic implications for the possibility of spiritual bypassing, as will be illustrated.

Developmental models and spiritual bypassing

We attend here to the dangers of spiritual bypassing present when the no-self doctrine is taken out of context without awareness of the role of *pudgala* or the function of the *preliminary practices* for working with unaddressed *developmental* issues at the personal level. However, before turning explicitly to preliminary practices we might provide a basic sketch of the role of developmental models in clinical science. Developmental models offer various theoretical frameworks for understanding human psychological growth surrounding the pre-personal, personal, and post-personal nexus. These developmental frameworks can be broadly divided into *developmental* theories and *trait* theories. While the latter, like Five Factor Model, provides insight into psychological attributes, developmental theories offer a more dynamic understanding of human cognitive evolution. Thus, these developmental theories find partialised resonance in Buddhist thought.

Structural developmental theories can be attributed to the pioneering work of Piaget. Piaget's four-stage model—sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete-operational, and formal operational stages—still today underpin much of the theory of development in Western educational models. In Piagetian and neo-Piagetian structural theories of development, each developmental stage signifies a self-organising system, characterised by distinct cognitive operations. Maturation is seen as an integrative reorganisation of preceding cognitive frameworks, resulting in more complex capacity of mind.

Michael Commons (2008) develops upon the earlier work of Piaget and introduces post-formal stages that extend beyond formal operational stages. Commons' model has emphasised the increasingly complex systems of thought capable as the mind develops and complexifies. While these structural theories have been well-established, they are augmented with constructive developmental theories which have emerged in parallel. Researchers such as Loevinger's (2014) work on ego development, and notably Cook-Greuter's (2004) use of post-conventional stages of development, have enriched the developmental field in a manner that further augments our understanding of the development of self. Ken Wilber's (2007) AQAL Integral Theory model attempts to synthesis both the features of various Eastern models of developments with the Western psychological accounts of the development of self. Wilber's model offers a holistic account and understanding of adult development. The intersection of Buddhist and

Western accounts of development forms an alignment across traditions pointing to a profound insight into the nature, function, and form of the self. The collective understanding of these models may be summarised as recognising development as a pattern from the pre-personal to the personal, to the post-personal—and from the exterior to interior, with recursive elaborations from the coarse to the subtle.

We ought to understand Buddhist traditions as similarly oriented by developmental modelling. To illustrate: within the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, avoiding the danger of spiritual bypassing when striving towards the soteriological goal of 'awakening' has required *Ngöndro*, or the 'preliminary practices', which are thought to prepare the mind for the deeper dive into transpersonal realms (Rabten, 1974; Wilber et al., 1986). Insufficient scholarly attention has been given to the subject of developmental maps in Buddhist traditions. However, the work of Wilber, Engler and Brown (1986) stands out as seeking to develop cartographies that map the stages of contemplative development. These cartographies describe incorporation of the disciplined use of meditative practices at a 'transpersonal' developmental stage; that is, once issues at the pre-personal and personal level have already been redressed. In this way the authors attempt to articulate a 'full spectrum' model of human growth and development—that is, one inclusive of the Western stages of development investigated within conventional psychology, integrated with those stages of development evident and explored in the world's contemplative traditions. Such developmental models, highlight the need for the preliminary stages of personal development to be worked through to differing extents, prior to drawing upon non-ordinary state meditative practice technologies. Brown and Wilber (1986) contended that a comprehensible and integrated view of human development could be achieved by bringing the major religious traditions together in a mutually enriching fashion. Forty years after these initiatory attempts to bridge conventional and contemplative maps of development, mindfulness in the West is practiced in a haphazard fashion, and little attention is given to stages of development, or mapping how one may work at both personal and transpersonal stages.

There is an important argument to be made that in a Western context it is psychological practice that constitutes the 'preliminary' practices for the deeper dive into Buddhist meditative traditions. The work outlined here,

however, offers an important elucidation of the role of working with the causative structures of experience such as the various aspects of 'selfhood' that comprise *pudgala*, the person, before exploring transpersonal registrations of experience. Mindfulness practice, without attention to the disordering of these selfhood-structures resulting from unaddressed trauma, may readily constitute a means of spiritual bypass.

No-self and groundlessness

In what follows, in a related vein, we suggest that the conventional/ultimate distinction, arising from the Buddhist 'two truths' doctrine (*dvasatya*), can be understood to offer further caution against modes of spiritual bypass. Importantly, this is as if structures of selfhood (*pudgala*) are understood as part of conventional reality, then they are real and functional which cannot be simply dismissed in the search for liberation. The two-truth doctrine is crucial when engaging with the Buddhist notion of 'emptiness' (Sanskrit: *śūnyatā* or Pali: *suññatā*).

Nonetheless, as with the principle of no-self, a parallel problem has emerged in terms of the Western uptake of the Buddhist notion of 'emptiness'. *Śūnyatā*, whilst commonly translated as emptiness, may also be translated as groundlessness, vacuity or voidness. It is a central concept in Buddhist philosophy with multiple meanings depending on the doctrinal context within different traditions. It can be variously understood as an ontological feature of reality, a meditative state or a phenomenological analysis of experience. While in Theravadan Buddhism, *suññatā* sometimes merely refers to the notion of no-self, in Mahayana tradition *śūnyatā* refers to the tenet that all things are empty of intrinsic existence and nature (*svabhāva*), while in the Dzogchen tradition it refers to *primordial* or *empty* awareness. Naturally, complexity arises over the various understandings of emptiness/groundlessness in the tenet-systems of these different philosophical schools.

As with the subject of no-self, it is valuable to examine the relationship between the Buddhist understanding of *śūnyatā* and the sense of groundlessness emerging from the cognitive sciences and Western philosophy. Western scholars in recent years have attempted to establish parallels between *śūnyatā* and findings in contemporary cognitive research, arguing scientific findings have validated the sense of groundlessness as the lack of stable foundation for meaning or knowledge; or in order to demonstrate that human cognition

is better understood not as the grasping of an independent, external world by a separate self, but rather as the *bringing forth* or *enacting* of a dependent world through embodied action (Thompson, 2020). Similarly, the Western phenomenological tradition—inaugurated by Husserl, and continued by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty—has been put into fruitful dialogue with the Madhyamaka conception of groundlessness (Garfield, 2011).

As with the no-self doctrine, however, spiritual bypassing is a danger when groundlessness too, is misperceived such that there is a failure to acknowledge the distinction drawn in Buddhist metaphysics between conventional and ultimate reality. In Buddhist philosophy both the conventional and ultimate level of description possess a certain sense of truth or are understood as 'real'. As such *śūnyatā*, misconceived, can lead into a nihilistic dismissal not just of the self or person, but of the world entire, with clear clinical dangers (Keiji & Seisaku, 1971). Further work is required in order to examine both the best clinical application of the Madhyamaka sense of groundlessness, and its purported convergence with aspects drawn from cognitive science and the Western phenomenological tradition.

Conclusion

Mindfulness-based psychological interventions require a deeper understanding of, and engagement with, the metaphysical intentions out of which Buddhist meditative practices emerge. At present the superficial uptake of mindfulness within the clinical sciences is mirrored by a superficial engagement with the Buddhist notion of no-self. As illustrated in what has preceded, such an engagement proves not only distortive of Buddhist metaphysics and contemplative practice, but may also cause harm when applied clinically, through providing justifications for the bypassing of unworked-through personal material.

In this work we have drawn attention to the significant divergence that exists between contemporary scientific understandings of 'the self' and the Buddhist conception of no-self, *anātman*, and *pudgala*, the *person*. While contemporary cognitive science offers a redescription of the 'self' as a functional construction, the Buddhist doctrine of 'no-self' offers a metaphysical account according to which the independent self is a problematic illusion which ought to be abandoned in seeking liberation from suffering. We contend, however, that the Buddhist notion of *pudgala*, 'person',

may be understood in relation to a variety of 'selfhood' notions or structures of experience identified within cognitive science, which proves more than illusory—and, rather, serves constructive, causative, and functional ends. This provides an important metaphysical counter to the popularised understanding of the Buddhist conception of self as *merely* illusory—a belief which may frequently be utilised to justify modes of spiritual bypassing, and thus when applied therapeutically, may result in a failure to account for the disorganising effects of trauma on the various structures of experience.

A subtler understanding of the Buddhist apparatus of *anātman* and *pudgala* is of critical importance to mindfulness-based therapeutic interventions, as it provides a lens through which to understand the disorganising effects of trauma. The 'person' is constituted by various structures of experience including; the ecological, interpersonal, extended, private, and conceptual—organisational structures of selfhood that may be disrupted by trauma, which frequently involves the disordering of one's experience of time, defence, relationality, memory, resource and agency. We have contended that working psychologically with the person, *pudgala*, proves necessary to preventing this misapplication of Buddhist-derived, mindfulness techniques. With the proper understanding of no-self and the 'person' in Buddhist metaphysics, therapeutic work may be situated as a necessary 'preliminary practice' for meditative exploration of deeper transpersonal domains and soteriological goals.

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The *Sahassavatthupakaraṇa* III

Peter Masefield[†]

ABSTRACT—The *Sahassavatthupakaraṇa*, "An Anthology of Amusing Tales", was composed by a certain Raṭṭhapāla of the Guttavaṅka monastery in Sri Lanka, probably sometime between 900 and 1250 CE. Its oldest surviving manuscripts date to the 16[th] century; this is the third installment of these short, translated stories. For Parts I and II, see JOCBS 21 and 22.

KEYWORDS: Post-canonical Pali, narrative literature, medieval Sri Lanka, Theravada

11. Vessāmittāya vatthumhi atthuppatti

[20] Kosambiyanagare rañño mātugāmo Vessāmittā nāma raññā saddhiṃ Kosambiyavihāraṃ gantvā dhammaṃ sutvā saraṇesu patiṭṭhāya buddhamāmikā hutvā viharati. so aparabhāge Kosambiyarājā saṅgāmatthāya gacchanto attano mātugāmena saddhiṃ gantvā mātugāmaṃ khandhāvāre ṭhapetvā saṅgāmatthāya gacchanto rattapatākam ussāpemi, tena saññānena mamantarāye sati tvaṃ palāyitvā Kosambiyaṃ gacchāhī ti vatvā sayaṃ saṅgāmaṃ pāvisi.

tasmiṃ khaṇe patitassa rañño mātugāmo rattadhajaṃ disvā palāyamānā aññassa rañño manussā tam addasaṃsu te taṃ disvā attano rañño dassesuṃ. rājā taṃ disvā abhisekaṃ karohī ti āha. sā taṃ na icchi. kasmā na icchasī ti pucchi. sā ekassa rañño abhisekā hutvā tassa viyogadukkhena ativiya dukkhitā puna aññassa matakāle evam me bhavissatī ti abhisekaṃ na icchāmī ti āha.

rājā sace abhisekaṃ na gaṇhāsi aggimhi taṃ pakkhipāpemī ti vatvā mahantaṃ dārucitakaṃ kārāpetvā aggim ekapajjotakaṃ hutvā jalite tattha pavisāhī ti āha. sā aggiṃ na pavisati. sā rājānaṃ yācati mā mahārāja mam evaṃ karohī ti taṃ yācamānaṃ pi aggimhi pātesi. sā atīte aññaṃ mama saraṇaṃ n' atthī ti tisaraṇam eva saraṇaṃ karomī ti cintetvā saraṇattayam anussarantī aggimhi nisīdi.

Amusing Tales, Part III
Translation

11. The story of Vessāmittā

[20] This is the matter-arising as regards the story of Vessāmittā. In the city of Kosambiya, the king's wife, named Vessāmittā, went, together with the king, to the KosambiyaVihāra, heard Dhamma, became established in the refuges, and then dwelled as if the Buddha were her own. Later on, the Kosambiyan king, whilst going into battle, went together with the woman, left the woman in the encampment, and then, as he was going into battle, said: "Should there be any obstacle for me, I will hoist a red banner; if you see this sign, you should flee and go to Kosambiya," whilst he himself went into battle.

At the moment the other king's men saw the fallen king's wife fleeing, upon seeing the red flag. They presented her to their own king. When he saw her, the king said: "Consecrate her." She did not want this. He asked her why she did not want this. She said that she did not want to be consecrated, since she had [already] been consecrated by one king, and that there would again be painful distress in the extreme for her through separation upon the death of another.

The king told her that if she would not accept consecration, he would have her cast into the fire. He had them construct a huge wooden funeral pyre and, when the fire had become a single blaze, told her to enter the flames; but she would not enter the fire. She begged the king, saying "Great king, don't do this to me," but even as she was still begging him, she was cast into the fire. She then thought that, even though she had not had any other refuge in the past, she had now made the three refuges her refuge, and then seated herself on the fire, recollecting the refuge-triad.

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tassā ratanattayānubhāvena appamattakaṃ pi uṇhākāraṃ nāhosi. padumagabbhaṃ paviṭṭhā viya ahosi. rājā tam acchariyaṃ disvā saṃvegappatto hutvā vegena gantvā urena nipajjitvā mama accayaṃ khamāhi, ajja paṭṭhāya mama mātuṭṭhāne ṭhatvā **[21]** mama atthaṃ karohī ti vatvā mahantaṃ sakkārasammānaṃ akāsi. taṃ pāṭihāriyaṃ disvā rājā ca bahū manussā ca saraṇesu ca sīlesu ca patiṭṭhāya dānādīni puññakammāni katvā yathākammaṃ gatā ti.

Vessāmittayā vatthu paṭhamaṃ.

12. brāhmaṇaputtassa Sirināgassa vatthumhi atthuppatti

Sīhaḷadīpe Sirināgo Anurādhapure rājā bhavissāmī ti cintetvā dhanaṃ pariyesanto Dakkhiṇavihāre cetiye bahudhanam atthī ti sutvā cetiyaṃ bhindathā ti āha. rājapurisā cetiyasandhim apassitvā na passāmā ti āhaṃsu. imasmiṃ cetiye sandhiṃ ko nāma jānātī ti āha.

Goḷiyagāme caṇḍālaputto nāma jānātī ti āhaṃsu. rājā taṃ pakkosāpetvā imasmiṃ cetiye tvaṃ sandhiṃ jānāsī ti vadanti sandhiṃ ñatvā imaṃ cetiyaṃ bhindā ti āha. ahaṃ mahārāja saraṇagato upāsako n' āhaṃ Satthuno cetiyaṃ bhindāmī ti āha. rājā tassa kujjhitvā etaṃ jīvasūle uttāsethā ti āha. tassa caṇḍālassa sattaputtā atthi. te pi pakkosāpetvā cetiyaṃ bhindathā ti āha. te pi Satthuno cetiyaṃ na bhindāmā ti āhaṃsu. te pi jīvasūle utthāpethā ti āha.

imesaṃ saggasampattīnaṃ dassanatthaṃ devatā devalokato rathe ānetvā sabbesaṃ passantānaṃ yeva sabbe Tusitapuraṃ nayiṃsu. taṃ disvā rājā ca rājapurisā ca acchariyā ahesum ambho cetiyam abhindāpetvā nisinnajane devalokaṃ nayiṃsū ti.

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There was for her no appearance of heat, however trifling, owing to the majesty of the Jewel-triad. It was as if she had entered the cavity of a red lotus. The king, shocked upon seeing that marvel, went hurriedly, prostrated himself, and then said: "Please forgive my transgression; from today onwards, you will be as a mother for me, **[21]** looking after my welfare," and then showed her great honour and veneration. After seeing that miracle, the king and many people became established in the refuges and the precepts, performed meritorious deeds such as giving and so on, and then went on in accordance with their deeds.

The story of Vessāmittā is first.

12. Sirināga, the brahmin's son

This is the matter-arising as regards Sirināga, the brahmin's son. On the island of Sīhaḷa, Sirināga, thinking he would become king in Anurādhapura, heard, whilst seeking wealth, that there was much wealth in the Dakkhiṇavihāra Cetiya, and said: "Breach the temple (*cetiya*).[1]" The king's men, upon failing to behold the seam, said: "We cannot see it." He said: "Who knows about the seam in this temple?"

They said that the son of an outcast (*caṇḍāla*) in Goḷiyagāma knew of it. The king had him summoned and then said: "They say that you know the seam in this temple. If you know the seam, then breach this temple." He said: "I, great king, am a layfollower who has gone for refuge; I will not breach the Teacher's temple." The king, having become angry with him, said: "Impale this one on the execution stake." That outcast had seven sons. He had these summoned too and told them to breach the temple. These also said they would not breach the Teacher's temple, so he said: "Impale these also on the execution stake."

The deities (*devatā*s), so as to show those [outcasts'] successful attainment of heaven, brought chariots from the heavenly world (*devaloka*) and, as they were all still looking on, took them all to the city of Tusita. Upon seeing this, the king and the king's men became wonder-struck, saying: "Look here—after these seated folk refused to breach the temple, the deities have taken them to the heavenly world."

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[1] Editor's Note: Words, such as *cetiya*, that were left untranslated by P. Masefield have been translated into English, keeping the Pali term in round brackets at the first appearance.

tato pācīnapassaṃ gantvā Gaṅgārājiyaṃ Madhupiṭṭhigāmakamhi Madhupiṭṭhicetiyaṃ bhindāpetvā dhanaṃ gaṇhāpetvā dhanena **[22]** rajjaṃ gaṇhitvā pacchā dhanaṃ saṅkaḍḍhitvā sayaṃ sakaṭena āharāpetvā tasmiṃ cetiye patiṭṭhāpetvā cetiyaṃ kārapesi. atha so rājā aparabhāge kucchirogena upahato kucchiṃ phāletvā kālakiriyaṃ katvā mahāniraye nibbatti.

Brāhmaṇaputtassa Sirināgassa vatthu dutiyaṃ.

13. Saddhātissavatthumhi atthuppatti

Cūḷavaḍḍhitissāmacco nāma senāgamanaṃ gacchanto Anurādhapuraṃ gantvā Saddhātissamahārañño upaṭṭhānaṃ katvā attano nivesanagehaṃ gacchanto ekaṃ Sālacatukkamhi Sudassanapidhāgāmavāsiṃ Piṇḍapātiyatissattheraṃ disvā therassa hatthato gahetvā attano gehe bhattam alabhitvā attano hatthe aṭṭhakahāpaṇe datvā therassa piṇḍapātaṃ adāsi. thero arahattaṃ patvā pacchā piṇḍapātaṃ paribhuñji. rañño chatte adhivatthā devatā sādhukāram adāsi. rājā etaṃ pakkosāpetvā etassa mātāpitūnañ ca pakkosāpetvā Vaḍḍhamānanagaraṃ nāma adāsi.

atha aparabhāge Piṭṭhivālamhi nāma khandhāvāraṃ bandhanakāle udakaṃ dullabham ahosi. tasmiṃ kāle devatā tassa jātassaraṃ dassesuṃ. tato pānīyaṃ ghaṭena āhaṭakāle kālaṃ ghosāpetvā āgatānaṃ tiṃsasahassabhikkhūnaṃ pānīyam adāsi. rañño chatte adhivatthā devatā puna sādhukāram adāsi. tadā taṃ pakkosāpetvā rājā Atikoṭṭhadvāre Antaragaṅgaṃ nāma adāsi. atha Antaragaṅgaṃ gacchanto Kaṇḍadvāram āgatakāle amacco madhuramaṃsaṃ khāditukāmo ahosi. parivāramanussā **[23]** madhuramaṃsaṃ pucchitvā aññamaññaṃ codetvā madhuramaṃsaṃ na labhiṃsu.

Upon going from there to the eastern side, he had them breach the Madhupiṭṭhicetiya in the small village of Madhupiṭṭhi in Gaṅgārāji,[2] had them seize the wealth, **[22]** seized the throne with that wealth, after which he had them collect the wealth, had it brought in his own wagon and then had them build a temple, establishing it on [the site of] that temple. Later on, the king, assailed by an abdominal illness, split open his abdomen, finished his time and came into being in the Great Hell.

The story of Sirināga, the brahmin's son, is second.

13. The story of Saddhātissa

This the matter-arising as regards the story of Saddhātissa. As the privy councilor named Cūḷavaḍḍhitissa was marching with the army, he reached Anurādhapura, performed a service for the great king Saddhātissa and then, as he was going to the house in which he lived, he saw the elder Piṇḍapātiyatissa who was a resident of the village of Sudassanapidhā at the Four Hall complex; he took [the bowl] from the elder's hand but, upon failing to acquire any food in his own home, placed eight coins (*kahāpaṇa*s) in his hand, thereby supplying the elder with his almsround. The elder attained arahantship, and afterwards consumed his almsfood. The deity (*devatā*) that resided in the king's umbrella said "Excellent (*sādhu*)!". The king had him summoned, had his mother and father also summoned, and then gave them the city named Vaḍḍhamāna.

Later on, when a caravan camp was being set up at Piṭṭhivāla, water became difficult to obtain. On that occasion, the deities pointed out to him a natural lake. When drinking water had been fetched therefrom in a pitcher, he had the fact announced and then gave drinking water to thirty thousand monks who had arrived. The deity that resided in the king's umbrella once again said "Excellent!". The king had him summoned and then gave him Antaragaṅga at Atikoṭṭhadvāra. Then, as he was going to Antaragaṅga, the privy councilor, upon reaching Kaṇḍadvāra, became desirous of eating sweetmeat. The people in his entourage **[23]** enquired after sweetmeat but, upon failing to acquire any, reprimanded one another.

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[2] Cp DPPN sv: A district to the east of Anurādhapura, where Kaniṭṭhatissa built the Anuḷatissapabbata Vihāra. Mhv, xxxvi,15.

tadā devatā devasaṅghena saddhiṃ bahuṃ madhuramaṃsaṃ āharitvā tassa adaṃsu. etaṃ pi bhikkhusaṅghassa datvā paribhuñji. puna chatte adhivatthā devatā sādhukāram adāsi. atthassa aparabhāge rājā Cetiyapabbate Ambatthale mahāthūpe manosilāvilepanaṃ gaṇhāpetukāmo hutvā tena amaccena saddhiṃ Cetiyapabbatavihāraṃ gantvā attano manorathaṃ pūretvā sakalacetiye manosilāvilepanam akāsi. tadā so amacco dvādasasahassānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ ticīvaram adāsi.

bhikkhū tena dinnaṃ manosilāvaṇṇañ cīvaraṃ pārupitvā dvādasasahassabhikkhū manorathaṃ pūretvā manosilāvilepanaṃ vicittaṃ cetiyaṃ padakkhiṇaṃ katvā otaranti. tesam otarantānaṃ rājā ca amacco ca disvā sotāpannā ahesuṃ. te tato paṭṭhāya dānaṃ datvā sīlaṃ rakkhitvā uposathakammaṃ katvā tidasapuraṃ pūresun ti.

Saddhātissavatthu tatiyaṃ.

14. Sīvalittherassa vatthumhi atthuppatti

ayaṃ pana Sīvalitthero atīte satasahassānaṃ kappānaṃ matthake Padumuttarabuddhakāle mahallakabrāhmaṇo hutvā attano jagganaṭṭhāne nihitaṃ dhanaṃ disvā taṃ vissajjetvā mahādānaṃ datvā arahattaṃ patthetvā aparabhāge tato cavitvā Bārāṇasiyaṃ seṭṭhiputto hutvā Paccekabuddhānaṃ catupaccayaṃ datvā yāvajīvaṃ paṭijaggitvā aparabhāge Vipassīsammāsambuddhakāle Bandhumatī nāma nagare aññatarasmiṃ kulagehe nibbattitvā Senagutto nāma parassa kammakāro ahosi.

Then the deity, along with the congregation of gods (*devas*), fetched a lot of sweetmeat and gave it to him, which he consumed, once he had given it to the community of monks (*bhikkhusaṅgha*). The deity that resided in the umbrella yet again said "Excellent!". Then, later on, the king, having become desirous of giving the great stūpa at Ambatthale on Mount Cetiya a coating of red arsenic, went to the Monastery of the Mount Cetiya, together with the privy councilor, where he fulfilled his wish, giving the entire temple a coating of red arsenic, after which the privy councilor gave the three robes to twelve thousand monks.

The monks wrapped themselves about with the robe, that was the color of red arsenic, that had been given by him, whereupon the twelve thousand monks descended, after having fulfilled their wish by circumambulating the temple decorated with the coating of red arsenic. Upon seeing them descending, the king and the privy councilor became stream-enterers (*sotāpannas*). From then on, they gave alms, kept the precepts, and observed the Uposatha, later filling the city of the Thirty[-three].

The story of Saddhātissa is third.

14. The story of Sīvalitthera

This is the matter-arising as regards the story concerning the elder Sīvali. In the past, atop of a hundred thousand aeons, the elder Sīvali, being an old brahmin during the time of the Buddha Padumuttara, saw some buried treasure at the place where he had been brought up; he gave this away, gave a great almsgiving, making a wish for arahantship. Later on, he fell from there and became the son of a wealthy merchant in Benares, gave the four requisites to some Paccekabuddhas, and tended to them as long as life lasted.

Later still, during the time of the Perfectly Self-Enlightened One Vipassī, he came into being in the house of a certain good family in the city of Bandumatī where, under the name of Senagutta, he became the laborer of some other.

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tadā upāsakagaṇo Satthāraṃ nimantetvā mahādānaṃ datvā Satthussa mahāpariveṇaṃ kārāpetvā pariveṇe yeva mahādānaṃ dadantā dānagge avijjamānaṃ khajjakam upadhārentā ambiladadhiñ ca **[24]** daṇḍenāhatamadhuñ ca adisvā sahassaṃ datvā etaṃ pariyesathā ti payojesuṃ.

te sahassaṃ gahetvā dadhiñ ca madhuñ ca upadhārentā vicariṃsu. tadā ayaṃ Senagutto attano sāmikassa dadhiñ ca madhuñ ca ādāya āgacchanto dvārantare dadhimadhukatthāya ṭhitā manussā taṃ passitvā ekakahāpaṇam ādiṃ katvā yāva sahassenā pi yācantānaṃ kim atthāya gaṇhathā ti vatvā Satthu dānatthāyā ti vutte aham eva dassāmī ti jīrakamaricādīhi saddhiṃ sakkharamadhuphaṇitehi payojetvā Satthāraṃ pamukhaṃ katvā aṭṭhasaṭṭhisatasahassa-bhikkhusaṅghassa bhattam adāsi.

aparabhāge amhākaṃ Satthuno uppannakāle Koliyanagare nibbatti. tassa pitā Mahāli Licchavi nāma mātā Suppavāsā nāma sayaṃ Sīvalī nāma ahosi. so sattasaṃvaccharasattamāsasattadivase mātukucchimhi vasi, sattadivase mūḷhagabbho ahosi. evaṃ mahāpuññassa sattassa sattamāsasattadivase dukkhānubhavanaṃ kasmā ahosī ti ce, attano katakammānubhāvena atīte kira ayaṃ rājā hutvā attano sampattarajjena saddhiṃ saṅgāmantānaṃ palāpetvā nagaraṃ parikkhipitvā gaṇhi.

ath'assa mātā nagaradvāram pi parirundhāhī ti āha. so tassā vacanena tathā akāsi. tena kammena mātāputtānam evarūpaṃ dukkham ahosī ti vadanti. sā mūḷhagabbhā sattadivase mahādukkham anubhavantī Satthāraṃ anussaritvā sukhena bhārā muñcitvā sattadivasaṃ Buddhapamukhassa bhikkhusaṅghassa mahādānam adāsi.

At that time, a group of layfollowers invited the Teacher, gave a great almsgiving, and had a great monastery (*pariveṇa*) be constructed for the Teacher. As they were giving a great almsgiving in that same monastery, they realised that solid food was not to be found in the alms-house; seeing neither sour curds nor yogurt, **[24]** nor any honey that had been beaten with a stick, they engaged some people to go and seek out some, giving them a thousand.

They took the thousand and then roamed about in search of yogurt and honey. At that time, Senagutta was coming with yogurt and honey for his master; those people, who were stood within the gate for the sake of yogurt and honey, beheld him and then, as they begged him, starting with a single coin, even up to a thousand, he asked them for what purpose they wanted it. They said: "As alms for the Teacher." Thinking that he himself would give it, he prepared jaggery, honey and molasses, together with cummin and black pepper and so on, and then gave the meal to the sixty-eight-hundred-thousand-strong community of monks[3] with the Teacher at its head.

Later on, he came into being in the city of the Koliyans at the time our Teacher had arisen. His father was named Mahāli Licchavi, his mother was named Suppavāsā, whilst his own name was Sīvali. He lay in his mother's womb for seven years, seven months and seven days, and on the seventh [and final] day the fetus was in utero.[4] Lest it should be asked why suffering (*dukkha*) should have been experienced for seven months and seven days on the part of one of such great merit, it is said that it was due to deeds he had himself done in the past, in that he, as king, had taken a city by encircling it, after causing those who were fighting, along with the current king,[5] to flee.

His mother had then told him to obstruct the city gate too. He did as she said. They say that it was as a result of that deed that there was suffering of such a kind for mother and son. Whilst she, as one with fetus in utero, was experiencing great suffering for seven days, she recollected the Teacher and, after being easily released of her burden, gave a great almsgiving for seven days to the community of monks with the Buddha at its head.

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[3] Ras. *aṭṭhasaṭṭhi bhikkhusatasahassa.*

[4] The whole episode is to be found at Ud 15ff.

[5] *sampattarajjena*; Ras. *sapattaraññā.*

putto sattame divase bhikkhusaṅghena saddhiṃ Satthāraṃ nimantetvā pabbaji. kumārassa Sāriputtatthero ācariyo ahosi, Mahāmoggallānatthero upajjhāyo ahosi. so tasmiṃ yeva divase vipassanaṃ vaḍḍhetvā arahattaṃ pāpuṇi. pubbe attano kammanissandena puññavā ahosi. atha satthā aparabhāge Revatattheraṃ **[25]** passituṃ gacchanto vīsatisahassabhikkhusaṅghaṃ gahetvā tiṃsayojanikena amanussāvāsakantārena gacchanto devatāhi Sīvalittherassa māpitavihāre vasanto devatānaṃ sajjitamahādānaṃ paribhuñjanto agamāsī ti.

Sīvalittherassa vatthu catutthaṃ.

15. Samaṇagāmapabbatavatthumhi atthuppatti

Cetiyapabbatavāsino dvādasabhikkhū tasmiṃ tasmiṃ ṭhāne cetiyaṃ vanditvā anupubbena Samaṇagāmapabbatam agamaṃsu. tasmiṃ kāle suriye atthaṅgamite ratti ahosi. te aññattha gantuṃ asakkontā tasmiṃ pabbatapāde mātularukkhamūle sayiṃsu. etesam antare eko bhikkhu satārahagāthaṃ vatvā devatānaṃ pattiṃ adāsi. tasmiṃ rukkhe adhivatthā devatā dhammaṃ sutvā pasannā punadivase therānaṃ gamanakāle devaputto āgantvā bhante imasmiṃ pabbatapāde rukkhamūle nisīdatha ahaṃ vo piṇḍapātaṃ dassāmī ti āha. bhikkhū adhivāsesuṃ. imassa pana devaputtassa aññaṃ kiñci n' atthi ekaṃ badālatāpaṇṇam eva nibbatti. so devaputto therānaṃ dibbojapuṇṇabadālatāpaṇṇam eva adāsi. bhikkhū bhattakiccāni katvā ukkaṇṭhissanti. amhe gacchāmā ti devaputtassa āhaṃsu.

On the seventh day, the son invited the Teacher, together with the community of monks, and went forth. The elder Sāriputta became the lad's master, whilst the elder Mahāmoggallāna became his preceptor. On that same day, he augmented his insight (*vipassanā*) and reached arahantship. He had become one possessing merit through the trickling down of his former deeds. Then, at a later stage, when the Teacher was going to see the elder Revata, **[25]** taking with him a community of twenty thousand monks, he went through a thirty-Indian-mile (*yojana*[6]) wilderness that was the abode of non-humans, stayed in the monastery the deities had fashioned for the elder Sīvali, before going on his way, partaking of the great almsgiving that had been dispensed by the deities.

The story of the elder Sīvali is fourth.

15. The story of Mount Samaṇagāma

This the matter-arising regarding the story of Mount Samaṇagāma. After saluting the temples at this place and that, twelve monks, who were residents of Mount Cetiya, went in due course to Mount Samaṇagāma. At that time, it was night, the sun having already set. Being unable to go elsewhere, they lay down to sleep at the foot of a thorn-apple -tree[7] at the foot of that mountain. One monk amongst them, uttered the [four] *Satārahagāthā*, and then assigned the benefit to the deities.

The deity that resided in that tree, upon hearing Dhamma, became devout and, on the next day, that godling (*devaputta*[8]) came, when the elders were leaving, and said: "Sirs, please remain seated at the foot of this tree at the foot of the mountain; I will give you your almsfood." The monks consented. However, that godling had nothing save for a single creeper (*badālatā*)-leaf that had come into being, so that godling gave that same creeper-leaf, that was full of divine nutritive essence, to the elders. The monks, with the business of the meal completed, were not satiated, and told the godling that they would be on their way.

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[6] Editor's Note: We have translated yojana as "mile", that is an Indian measure of distance that corresponds to approximately eight English miles, if we follow Alexander Cunningham's *Ancient Geography of India*, vol. I.1.: *The Buddhist Period, Including the Campaigns of Alexander, and the Travels of Hwen-Thsang*, Trübner and Company, 1871, p. 574.

[7] *mātularukkha*; according to SED, sv *mātulavṛkṣa*, the thorn-apple tree.

[8] It is not without interest that the individual concerned is referred to as both a *devatā* and *devaputta*.

devaputto cintesi ayyā ajja amhākaṃ santike lūkhapaṇṇam eva paribhuñjittha, sve mama sahāyo devaputto ekadivasantarena āgantvā dibbabhojanaṃ paribhuñjissati, sve etass' āgamanadivasaṃ, ayyā sve bhattakiccaṃ katvā gacchantū ti vatvā nimantesi.

punadivase ekassa sahāyo devaputto **[26]** etassa santikam āgato tassa pana yāgubhājanam eva tigāvutaṭṭhāne ṭhapīyati. so devaputto therānaṃ yāguṃ datvā sayaṃ pi paribhogam akāsi. tathā antarakhajjakaṃ gahetvā tigavutaṭṭhāne aṭṭhaṃsu. tathā nānāvidhabyañjanasahitaṃ dibbabhojanaṃ gahetvā tigavutaṭṭhāne aṭṭhaṃsu. devaputto antarakhajjakaṃ datvā dibbabhojanam adāsi. mahāthero devaputtassa sampattiṃ oloketvā manussapathe ṭhatvā kiṃ kammaṃ nāma akāsī ti pucchi.

devaputto tassa kathaṃ sutvā ahaṃ bhante atītabhave Cetiyapabbate samaṇohutvāmayhaṃvassaggenabhattaṃgaṇhantouṭṭhitabhattapiṇḍapātato upaḍḍhaṃ saṅghass' atthāya datvā upaḍḍhaṃ aggahesiṃ. ahaṃ tena kammena bhummadevaputto hutvā nibbattiṃ. nibbattakālato paṭṭhāya tigāvutaṭṭhāne dibbannapānabhojanaṃ gahetvā tiṭṭhāmī ti āha. bhikkhū devaputtassa kathaṃ sutvā attano gatagataṭṭhāne devaputtassa kathitaṃ vatvā bahumanusse dānasīlabhāvanāmayapuññakammesu niyojesun ti.

Samaṇagāmavatthu pañcamaṃ.

The godling thought: "Today, my worthy ones have consumed merely a coarse leaf in our presence; on the following day, a godling who is my colleague will come within the space of a single day[9] and will consume[10] heavenly food," and said: "Tomorrow will be the arrival of this [godling who eats heavenly food]. My worthy ones, you shall eat here and then you may leave."

On the next day, the godling who was his companion **[26]** came into his presence and set down his vessel of rice-gruel at a spot six miles[11] [away]. The godling gave the rice-gruel to the elders and himself made use of it too. He likewise brought refreshments[12] and[13] then stood at a spot six miles [away], after which he similarly brought the heavenly food, accompanied by various kinds of condiments, and then stood at a spot six miles [away]. Once the godling had given the refreshments, he gave the heavenly food. The great elder, observing the godling's successful attainment, then asked what deed he had done when stationed in the ways of men. The godling, upon hearing what he had to say, said:

"In a past becoming, Venerable Sir (*bhante*), I was a recluse at Mount Cetiya; when accepting food in accordance with my monastic standing,[14] I gave half of the food that had been presented during the almsround for the benefit of the community (*saṅgha*), whilst I took half for myself. As a result of that deed, I came into being as a terrestrial godling. Onwards from the time that I came into being, I would take a meal of heavenly food and drink and then stand at a place six miles [away]." After hearing what the godling had had to say, the monks spoke of what the godling had related at whichever place they went, thereby encouraging many people where meritorious deeds consisting of giving, morality and bringing into being are concerned.

The story of Samaṇagāma is fifth.

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[9] *ekadivasantarena.*

[10] *paribhuñjissati.*

[11] Editor's Note: The Pali text says *tigāvuta*: "three *gāvuta*s". A *gāvuta* is approximately a quarter of a *yojana*, i.e. approximately two miles; see note 5.

[12] *antarakhajjaka*; cp CPD sv, what is eaten between the morning gruel and noon.

[13] The text seems somewhat repetitive at this point; moreover, it is unclear what the significance of the godling withdrawing to a spot so far away might be, given that a *gāvuta* is usually explained as the distance a team of oxen could pull a cart, before becoming exhausted. Moreover, since this is normally considered to be around two miles, depending on the terrain, this would put the godling some six or seven miles away.

[14] *mayhaṃ vassaggena bhattaṃ gaṇhanto.*

REFERENCES & ABBREVIATIONS

References & abbreviations to Pali texts follow the system adopted by the *Critical Pali Dictionary*. Volume and page references are to Pali Text Society editions.

This translation is based on the edition of Jacqueline ver Eecke-Filliozat & Jean Filliozat (2003). *Sahassavatthupakaraṇaṃ*, published by the Sangha Assembly of Region III as a contribution to the royal cremation ceremonies of Phra Thammarajanuwat (Kamon Kovido Pali VI), Wat Thepsirin, Bangkok. (A computerized version can be consulted on EFEO DATA FILLIOZAT folder 512.)